When the British left in 1947, they did not simply hand over one unified country. Alongside British India sat more than 500 princely states, semi-autonomous kingdoms that were given a remarkable and dangerous freedom: each ruler could choose to join India, join Pakistan, or attempt to stay independent. Most of these decisions passed quietly. But a handful did not. The choices made in Junagadh, Hyderabad, and especially Kashmir lit fuses that are still burning today. To understand why India and Pakistan remain locked in conflict nearly eight decades later, you have to start with the princely states.
Table of Contents
- What were the princely states?
- The tools of integration
- Junagadh: when geography overruled the ruler
- The plebiscite solution
- Hyderabad: the kingdom that wanted to stand alone
- The Razakars and the road to Operation Polo
- Kashmir: the wound that never healed
- The tribal invasion and the Instrument of Accession
- The plebiscite that never happened
- Why these three states set the pattern
- The legacy in foreign policy terms
What were the princely states?
The princely states were territories that the British never ruled directly. Instead, they were tied to the British Crown through a system of subsidiary alliances, where the local king or nawab handled internal administration while the British controlled defence and foreign affairs. There were over 500 of them, ranging from tiny estates to vast kingdoms larger than many European countries.
When the British departed, the Indian Independence Act of 1947 released these states from their treaty obligations. Suddenly, hundreds of rulers held legal sovereignty over their own territory. The British position was clear: they would not force any state into either dominion. The rulers themselves would decide.
This created a serious problem. A newly independent India could not function as a patchwork of independent kingdoms scattered across its map. The task of bringing these states into the fold fell largely to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, and V. P. Menon, secretary of the newly formed States Department.
The tools of integration
Patel and Menon used a mix of persuasion and pressure rather than outright force in most cases. They offered rulers two key documents. The first was the Standstill Agreement, which kept existing administrative arrangements in place temporarily so that daily governance would not collapse. The second was the Instrument of Accession, by which a ruler agreed to hand over three subjects to the central government: defence, external affairs, and communications.
This approach worked astonishingly well. The Maharajas of Patiala, Gwalior, Baroda, and Bikaner acceded, and even the Nawab of Bhopal eventually abandoned his plan for a “third force” of independent rulers. By the time India became free, the overwhelming majority of states had signed on. As Britannica notes, geographical location was usually the deciding factor. Only three states became genuine flashpoints, and all three involved a mismatch between the religion of the ruler and the religion of the population. [Image: Map of British India in 1947 showing princely states shaded separately from directly-administered provinces]
Junagadh: when geography overruled the ruler
Junagadh was a small state on the coast of present-day Gujarat. Its population was roughly 80% Hindu, but it was ruled by a Muslim Nawab, Mahabat Khanji III. On 15 August 1947, defying expectations and the advice of Lord Mountbatten, the Nawab acceded to Pakistan, arguing that Junagadh was connected to Pakistan by sea.
The problem was that Junagadh was surrounded on all its land borders by Indian territory. The decision triggered immediate unrest. Two smaller states under Junagadh’s suzerainty, Mangrol and Babariawad, declared their independence from the Nawab and acceded to India instead. As tensions rose, India argued that the wishes of the people, not just the ruler, should determine the outcome.
The plebiscite solution
Patel cut off supplies and communications and moved forces to the border. The Nawab and his family fled to Pakistan, and on 7 November 1947 Junagadh’s court invited the Government of India to take over administration. Interestingly, the Dewan who issued that invitation was Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, father of the future Pakistani leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
India then held a referendum. In the plebiscite of February 1948, an overwhelming 99.95% voted to join India, with only 91 votes out of more than 190,000 going the other way. Junagadh became part of India. The case established an important precedent in India’s eyes: the will of the people could override a ruler’s decision when the two clashed.
Hyderabad: the kingdom that wanted to stand alone
Hyderabad was the opposite of Junagadh in scale. It was the largest princely state, covering around 80,000 square miles across what is now Telangana, parts of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, with a population of roughly 16 million. Like Junagadh, it had a Muslim ruler, the Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan, governing a largely Hindu population. But unlike Junagadh, the Nizam did not want to join Pakistan. He wanted full independence.
The Nizam was reportedly one of the richest men in the world, and he had ambitions to keep Hyderabad as a sovereign state in the heart of the subcontinent. He signed a Standstill Agreement with India in 1947 to buy time, but he also began stockpiling arms, restricting Indian currency, and even loaned a large sum to Pakistan from the state treasury.
The Razakars and the road to Operation Polo
Internally, Hyderabad was unravelling. A paramilitary force called the Razakars, led by Kasim Razvi and aligned with the Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen, sought to preserve Muslim political dominance. The Razakars became notorious for raiding villages and suppressing dissent, while the Hyderabad State Congress led a popular movement demanding accession to India.
India viewed an independent, well-armed Hyderabad sitting in its centre as a strategic threat. Patel famously described the state as a “cancer in the heart of India.” After diplomacy failed, India launched Operation Polo, officially called a “Police Action” to avoid international intervention.
The operation began on 13 September 1948 and ended with the Nizam’s surrender on 17 September, just five days later. Hyderabad was integrated into the Indian Union. The Nizam was allowed to remain a ceremonial head for a time. Notably, Hyderabad’s accession was resolved without a plebiscite, a contrast that critics of India’s Kashmir policy would later point to. [Image: Indian Army troops entering Hyderabad during Operation Polo, September 1948]
Kashmir: the wound that never healed
If Junagadh and Hyderabad were inversions of the same religious-demographic puzzle, Kashmir was the most explosive combination of all. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim-majority population but was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh. It also shared borders with both new nations, making it strategically vital to each.
Hari Singh hesitated. Joining Pakistan risked alienating his Hindu and Sikh subjects and his own dynasty; joining India risked unrest among the Muslim majority. He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and proposed remaining independent, hoping to avoid choosing at all.
The tribal invasion and the Instrument of Accession
That hope collapsed in October 1947. Pakistan sponsored a tribal invasion aimed at annexing Kashmir, and Pashtun tribesmen swept toward the capital, Srinagar. Facing the loss of his kingdom, Hari Singh appealed to India for military help.
India’s response set the legal stage for everything that followed. The government, led by Nehru, would only send troops if the Maharaja first acceded to India. Under intense pressure, Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. Indian forces were airlifted into Srinagar and pushed the invaders back.
The plebiscite that never happened
Here lies the heart of the dispute. When Mountbatten accepted the accession, he attached a now-famous condition. In his letter to the Maharaja, he wrote that once law and order were restored and the soil cleared of the invader, the question of accession should be settled by a reference to the people. India took the matter to the United Nations on 1 January 1948.
The war ended with a UN-mediated ceasefire on 1 January 1949, establishing the Line of Control that still divides the region. The UN called for a plebiscite, but it required Pakistan to withdraw its forces first, which never happened. The promised vote was never held.
This unresolved condition produced two competing narratives that persist today. India maintains that the accession was legal, final, and later ratified by Kashmir’s Constituent Assembly. Pakistan argues that the accession was conditional and that the Muslim-majority population deserves the right of self-determination through the plebiscite that was promised but never delivered.
Why these three states set the pattern
The princely states issue is not just a historical footnote. It created the structural template for the entire Indo-Pak rivalry. Three patterns emerged that still shape the conflict.
The ruler-versus-people question. Junagadh and Hyderabad showed India arguing that popular will mattered more than a ruler’s signature when the two conflicted. Kashmir reversed this, with India relying on the ruler’s signature while Pakistan invoked popular will. Each country adopted whichever principle suited its claim, and both have accused the other of inconsistency ever since.
Religion versus geography. Partition was loosely organised around religious majorities, but the princely states did not have to follow that logic. The clash between a ruler’s faith, a population’s faith, and the practical pull of geography produced exactly the disputes that became battlegrounds.
The unfinished settlement. Junagadh was resolved by plebiscite and Hyderabad by military action, and both are settled in practice. Kashmir was resolved by neither, leaving a UN file open for over seventy years. It remains one of the oldest unresolved disputes on the UN agenda, and has been the trigger for multiple wars between the two countries.
The legacy in foreign policy terms
For students of India’s foreign policy, the princely states are where the country’s external posture toward Pakistan was born. The accession crises hardened positions on sovereignty, set the terms of debate at the United Nations, and embedded Kashmir as the central, recurring issue in every round of Indo-Pak diplomacy.
India’s consistent stance, that accession by the legal ruler was binding, flows directly from October 1947. Pakistan’s consistent stance, that contested accessions should be decided by the people, also flows from the same months. The diplomatic vocabulary the two countries still use, around self-determination, territorial integrity, and the validity of accession, was forged in the handling of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir.
What looks at first like a tidy administrative chapter, the integration of over 500 states into one nation, in fact left behind the single most enduring conflict in South Asia. The vast majority of accessions were smooth. But the few that were not have shaped the strategic reality of the subcontinent ever since.
What do you think? If India accepted plebiscites as the deciding factor in Junagadh and Hyderabad, should the same logic have applied to Kashmir, or do the differences in how each accession unfolded justify treating them differently? And does a ruler’s signature on an Instrument of Accession hold more legitimacy than the expressed will of a state’s population?
References
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princely_states_of_Pakistan
- https://inc.in/congress-sandesh/tribute/sardar-patel-and-integration-of-states
- https://www.britannica.com/topic/princely-state-colonial-India
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Integration_of_Junagadh
- https://www.drishtiias.com/to-the-points/paper1/integration-of-princely-states-after-independence
- https://kpiasacademy.com/hyderabad-state-integration-operation-polo/
- https://inclusiveias.com/operation-polo-integration-of-hyderabad-into-india-1948/
- https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/operation-polo
- https://gujarat.pscnotes.com/paper-i/history-of-india/integration-princely-states/
- https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/independence-and-partition-1947
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_of_Accession_(Jammu_and_Kashmir)
- https://www.eurasiareview.com/09062024-accession-of-jammu-and-kashmir-dimensions-and-outputs-oped/
- https://pakun.org/kashmir-at-the-un
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