Continuity and Change: Indian Foreign Policy during UPA

When the United Progressive Alliance came to power in May 2004, many wondered whether India’s foreign policy would shift dramatically under a new government led by an economist rather than a career politician. The answer, as it turned out, was a careful blend of the old and the new. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh chose to honour existing commitments while steadily reorienting diplomacy towards economic growth and strategic partnerships. Over the next decade, this approach reshaped India’s place in the world without abandoning the principles that had guided it since independence.

The guiding logic: continuity with change 🔗

The phrase that best captures the UPA’s foreign policy is “continuity with change.” Even before he formally settled into office, Manmohan Singh signalled that a change in government in New Delhi would not mean a break in India’s international promises. On his first major foreign trip in September 2004, he made clear that India would honour the commitments made by the previous regime and carry forward the process of strengthening ties with the United States and Pakistan.

This was significant. The previous National Democratic Alliance government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee had made India a declared nuclear power in 1998 and had begun cautious engagement with Washington. Rather than reversing course, the UPA built on this foundation. The result was a foreign policy that looked familiar in its values but markedly different in its priorities.

The Manmohan Doctrine 🔗

Analysts often use the term “Manmohan Doctrine” to describe the thinking behind UPA foreign policy. The core idea was simple: economic growth should be the main driver and instrument of diplomacy. Having steered the country through the balance of payments crisis as Finance Minister in 1991, Singh understood the deep link between trade and traditional foreign policy. He believed that a fast-growing economy would give India both the resources and the leverage to pursue its interests abroad. The Observer Research Foundation notes that the fundamental construct of this doctrine was that economic growth should be the main driver of foreign policy.

This economic emphasis is what most clearly separated the UPA era from earlier decades, when ideology and strategic autonomy dominated the conversation. Trade, investment, and energy security moved to the centre of the agenda.

The economic turn in diplomacy 🔗

If economic interest was the engine, then engagement with Asia’s fast-growing economies was the road. Two developments stand out: the deepening of the Look East policy and India’s entry into emerging multilateral groupings like BRICS.

Deepening the Look East policy 🔗

The Look East policy was not a UPA invention. It had been launched in 1991 to rebuild economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asia after the Cold War. What the UPA did was expand its scope and depth. The decade between 2004 and 2014 significantly expanded the policy, moving it from a slow, trade-focused effort into a more proactive and comprehensive approach that covered political, security, and cultural dimensions.

Frequent high-level visits between India and Southeast Asian capitals became routine. India strengthened its institutional ties with ASEAN, participated actively in regional forums like the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and pursued trade agreements with countries such as Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia. The policy was later rebranded as “Act East” in 2014, but the groundwork for that more assertive version was laid during the UPA years.

Joining the rising powers in BRICS 🔗

The UPA period also coincided with the emergence of new groupings of major developing economies. India became a founding member of BRICS, the bloc that brought together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa. This reflected the UPA’s belief in a multipolar world order, where power was no longer concentrated in the West.

BRICS gave India a platform to coordinate with other large economies on global financial reform, development financing, and the restructuring of international institutions. It fit neatly into the broader UPA goal of using economic weight to amplify diplomatic influence. The later creation of a BRICS development bank grew out of conversations that took shape during these years.

The defining achievement: the India-US Civil Nuclear Deal 🔗

No discussion of UPA foreign policy is complete without the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. It was the boldest and most consequential diplomatic move of the decade, and it permanently altered the trajectory of India-US relations.

What the deal involved 🔗

The framework began with a July 2005 joint statement between Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush. The terms of the operating agreement, known as the 123 Agreement after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, were concluded in 2007 and finally approved by President Bush in September 2008. Under the arrangement, India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place its civilian reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In return, the United States worked towards full civil nuclear cooperation.

The diplomatic significance was enormous. India had been kept out of global nuclear commerce since its 1974 nuclear test. The deal secured a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which made India the only country with nuclear weapons outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty permitted to trade in the global nuclear market. In effect, it ended decades of nuclear isolation.

A political gamble at home 🔗

The deal was not easy to deliver. It faced fierce opposition from the Left parties that supported the UPA from outside. When Singh insisted on going ahead, the Left withdrew support, leaving the government short of a majority. The UPA survived a no-confidence motion in 2008, a result that surprised many observers who had written off its chances. Singh’s willingness to stake his government on a foreign policy decision showed how central the nuclear deal was to his vision.

The agreement also drew criticism. Some analysts argued that the binding commitments, including a separation plan and perpetual safeguards, placed real constraints on India’s long-term nuclear programme. These debates continue, but few dispute that the deal transformed the India-US relationship from Cold War mistrust into a working strategic partnership.

Non-alignment in a new form 🔗

Through all these changes, the UPA continued to affirm India’s traditional commitment to non-alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement. Singh attended NAM summits and spoke about reforming global institutions like the United Nations so that developing nations would have a greater voice.

Yet the practice was more pragmatic than the rhetoric suggested. Embracing a close partnership with the United States while still calling for strategic autonomy reflected a balancing act. The UPA was not choosing sides so much as keeping its options open, deepening ties with Washington while maintaining old friendships and pursuing economic interests wherever they led. This pragmatic non-alignment, rather than ideological neutrality, became the hallmark of the era.

Managing the neighbourhood and the great powers 🔗

Continuity and change also defined how the UPA handled relations with Pakistan, China, and Russia. Each relationship required a different mix of dialogue and strategic caution.

Pakistan: dialogue under strain 🔗

Relations with Pakistan were perhaps the most difficult test. The UPA initially pursued the composite dialogue process inherited from the previous government. This effort was severely disrupted by the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which a Pakistan-based militant group killed scores of people. India suspended formal talks in the aftermath.

The government’s later attempts to revive engagement proved controversial. At a 2009 meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Singh and his Pakistani counterpart issued a joint statement that critics argued diluted India’s firm position on cross-border terrorism. Singh continued to press Pakistan, raising the issue of a speedy trial for those held over the Mumbai attacks during subsequent meetings. The approach reflected the UPA’s general preference for dialogue and confidence-building measures over confrontation, a stance that drew both support and sharp criticism.

China: engagement alongside vigilance 🔗

With China, the UPA pursued a dual-track approach. On one hand, it deepened economic and diplomatic engagement, establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership in 2005 and signing a border defence cooperation agreement in 2013. Trade between the two countries grew rapidly during this period.

On the other hand, the government quietly strengthened India’s defensive posture along the disputed border. It invested in border infrastructure, raised new mountain divisions, and deployed advanced fighter aircraft to airbases in the northeast. This combination of trade engagement and military preparation captured the cautious realism with which the UPA viewed a rising and assertive China.

Russia: a steady strategic partner 🔗

Russia remained one of India’s most reliable partners throughout the UPA years. The relationship rested on a foundation of defence cooperation, energy ties, and civil nuclear collaboration. Annual summits kept the partnership active, and Russia remained a major supplier of military hardware. Unlike the dramatic shifts in the US relationship, ties with Moscow showed strong continuity, providing a sense of stability in India’s external relations and reinforcing its multi-aligned posture.

Weighing the legacy 🔗

The UPA decade left a complex legacy. On the positive side, it ended India’s nuclear isolation, built a genuine partnership with the United States, deepened engagement with Southeast Asia, and anchored India in emerging groupings like BRICS. The economic logic that ran through these moves gave Indian diplomacy a clearer sense of purpose.

At the same time, critics point to missed opportunities. Some argue that the government failed to draft a clear strategic doctrine and was unable to fully convert high economic growth into lasting international influence. Its handling of Pakistan, in particular, remains a subject of heated debate. What is not in dispute is that the UPA period was one of momentous geopolitical change in Asia, and that India navigated it by combining old principles with new priorities.

What do you think? Did the UPA strike the right balance between honouring the tradition of non-alignment and pursuing a close partnership with the United States? And looking back, was the economic focus of the “Manmohan Doctrine” a strength that modernised Indian diplomacy, or did it leave the country without a clear strategic vision?

References

1. https://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040920/main1.htm
2. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-manmohan-doctrine-and-narendra-modis-foreign-policy
3. https://www.dalvoy.com/en/upsc/mains/previous-years/2014/economics-paper-ii/indias-look-east-policy
4. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/print/20080911-1.html
5. https://www.shankariasparliament.com/current-affairs/india-us-civil-nuclear-deal
6. https://www.thequint.com/news/world/india-foreign-policy-manmohan-singh-narendra-modi-china-us
7. https://www.deccanherald.com/world/manmohan-singh-leaves-tehran-home-2357558
8. https://vajiramandravi.com/quest-upsc-notes/evolution-of-indias-foreign-policy/