China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications for India

China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 as the most ambitious infrastructure plan ever attempted by a single nation. It promises roads, railways, ports, and pipelines stretching across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Yet India is one of the very few major powers that has firmly refused to join. Understanding why requires looking past the glossy promise of “connectivity” to the questions of sovereignty, security, and strategic autonomy that sit at the heart of New Delhi’s foreign policy.

What the Belt and Road Initiative actually is 🔗

The BRI, originally called “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013. Despite the singular-sounding name, it has two main components: the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

The Economic Belt aims to build land routes for trade and travel across Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, roughly tracing the ancient Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road plans a network of ports and sea lanes running through Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and on to Africa and Europe. Together they rest on five stated priorities: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people ties.

The scale is staggering. By some estimates, around 147 countries-accounting for roughly two-thirds of the world’s population-have signed on or signalled interest, and China has spent close to a trillion dollars on these efforts. For developing economies facing huge infrastructure financing gaps, Chinese capital is hard to ignore.

Why the BRI matters strategically 🔗

The BRI is not purely an economic project. Analysts widely see it as a tool that extends China’s geopolitical reach. Xi’s original vision included expanding the international use of China’s currency, the renminbi, and securing reliable transport routes for critical resources like oil and gas.

A key motivation is reducing dependence on the Strait of Malacca, the narrow chokepoint through which much of China’s energy imports pass. By building overland corridors and developing ports across the Indian Ocean, China can diversify its supply lines. This is precisely where Indian anxieties begin, because many of these corridors and ports sit close to India’s borders or astride sea lanes that India considers part of its strategic backyard.

India’s core objection: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 🔗

The single biggest reason for India’s opposition is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the BRI. CPEC is a network of roads, railways, and pipelines connecting China’s Xinjiang region to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. For China, it offers direct access to the Arabian Sea while bypassing the Malacca chokepoint.

The problem for India is the route. CPEC passes through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), including the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which India claims as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. By building infrastructure there, India argues, China is treating contested territory as if it belongs to Pakistan, thereby undermining Indian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The sovereignty argument 🔗

India has made this position clear in official statements. In the Indian Parliament in 2017, the government stated that connectivity initiatives must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that China proceeding with CPEC reflected a lack of appreciation of India’s concerns. India has also pointed to the 1972 Simla Agreement, under which India and Pakistan committed to resolving the Kashmir question bilaterally. When China funds and builds projects in PoK, New Delhi sees it as a third party inserting itself into a dispute that should remain bilateral.

China, for its part, insists that CPEC is purely an economic project. Its foreign ministry has repeatedly stated that the corridor is not directed at third parties and does not affect Beijing’s position on the Kashmir issue. India has not been persuaded by this reassurance.

The security dimension 🔗

Beyond sovereignty, CPEC raises hard security concerns. The presence of Chinese personnel and investment in PoK deepens the China-Pakistan strategic partnership on territory India considers its own. India has also taken note of joint activities by Chinese and Pakistani forces in the disputed region. The corridor effectively gives China a stable foothold on India’s western flank, reinforcing the alliance between its two principal regional rivals.

Fears of strategic encirclement 🔗

India’s worries extend beyond CPEC to the maritime side of the BRI. Chinese-funded ports ring the Indian Ocean: Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, among others. Indian strategists fear these commercial ports could one day serve as naval facilities, a concept often described as China’s “String of Pearls” strategy of encircling India.

Even if these ports remain purely commercial, their presence increases Chinese influence in countries that India has long regarded as part of its own sphere of influence. The concern is less about any single port and more about a gradual shift in the balance of power across South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

The debt-trap debate 🔗

India has also raised concerns about the financial model behind the BRI. The argument is that China offers large loans at non-concessional rates for projects built largely by Chinese companies, leaving smaller nations with debts they cannot sustain. When repayment fails, the borrowing country may be forced to hand over strategic assets, compromising its economic and political independence. Critics call this “debt-trap diplomacy.”

The most cited example is Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Unable to service loans tied to the port, Sri Lanka leased it to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017. The Indian strategic commentator Brahma Chellaney popularised the “debt-trap” term, arguing that China deliberately lures poorer nations into unsustainable loans tied to high-value assets.

A contested narrative 🔗

It is worth noting that the debt-trap thesis is genuinely disputed. Several researchers argue that the Hambantota lease was a financing arrangement rather than a seizure following default, and that the loans were not the sole cause of Sri Lanka’s broader debt distress. Some analysts even point to the port’s later growth as a transshipment hub as evidence against the simplest version of the story. For students, the key takeaway is that the debt-trap argument is a powerful part of India’s case, but it is not an uncontested fact.

India’s alternative: connectivity without dependence 🔗

Refusing to join the BRI does not mean India has rejected connectivity altogether. New Delhi has actively pursued its own infrastructure and trade routes designed to offer an alternative model based on transparency and equal partnership.

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), developed with Russia and Iran, aims to link Indian ports to Russia and Europe through Iran, bypassing routes dominated by China and Pakistan. India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port is central to this effort. Chabahar sits just about 170 kilometres from Pakistan’s Chinese-operated Gwadar Port and gives India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without transiting Pakistani territory.

India has also backed other initiatives such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and regional connectivity projects in its eastern neighbourhood, while strengthening ties with Southeast Asian nations under its Act East Policy. The common thread is a preference for projects that, in India’s framing, respect the sovereignty and financial sustainability of partner countries.

Strategic autonomy at the centre 🔗

India’s stance on the BRI is ultimately an expression of strategic autonomy-the long-standing principle that India will protect its own interests rather than align with any major power’s economic or geopolitical agenda. Despite repeated Chinese invitations and the genuine economic benefits the BRI could offer, India has chosen to stay out, prioritising sovereignty and regional security over short-term gains.

This is a deliberate trade-off. India forgoes potential investment and connectivity in order to avoid legitimising Chinese activity in disputed territory and to resist a model it views as creating long-term dependence. The decision reflects how foreign policy often requires balancing economic opportunity against deeper questions of security and self-determination.

What do you think? Is India’s refusal to join the BRI a principled defence of sovereignty, or a missed economic opportunity that has pushed it to invest in costlier alternatives? And can India’s own connectivity projects realistically match the scale of Chinese infrastructure across South Asia?

References

1. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/11/china-belt-road-initiative-trade-bri-silk-road/
2. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
3. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/08/indias-answer-to-the-belt-and-road-a-road-map-for-south-asia?lang=en
4. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-latest-concerns-with-the-cpec
5. https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-lucknow/20170516/281556585754354
6. https://www.meer.com/en/87923-indias-strategic-response-to-the-belt-and-road-initiative
7. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy/4-sri-lanka-and-bri
8. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3261398/chinese-debt-trap-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-set-debunk-narrative-its-success
9. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Findia-wants-chabahar-port-in-north-south-transport-corridor-to-counter-china-s-moves-to-link-it-with-belt-and-road-initiative-958210.html