Act East Policy: Enhancing India’s Role in East Asia

India’s eastern neighbourhood holds some of the world’s fastest-growing economies, yet for decades New Delhi treated this region as a distant priority. That changed when policymakers decided that simply “looking” east was no longer enough. The Act East Policy marked a deliberate move from passive observation to active engagement, repositioning India as a serious player in the economic and strategic life of East and Southeast Asia. Understanding this shift is essential to grasping how India sees its role in Asia today.

From Look East to Act East
What changed between the two policies
The economic pillar: trade, investment, and market access
Connectivity: building the physical link
The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway
Other connectivity initiatives
Soft power and the diaspora
The security dimension and the Indo-Pacific
Challenges and the road ahead

From Look East to Act East

The story begins in the early 1990s. After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, India faced a balance-of-payments crisis and began liberalising its state-controlled economy. The Look East Policy was launched in 1991 to take advantage of the fast-growing economies of East and Southeast Asia, and it was championed by then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. The initial motive was almost entirely economic. India wanted access to ASEAN markets and hoped to draw lessons from the success stories of countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea.

Over time, the policy gained a strategic dimension. India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1996, and a summit-level partner in 2002, putting it on par with China, Japan, and South Korea in the regional architecture. But by the 2010s, the external environment had changed dramatically. China’s rise, gaps in Asia’s security order, and India’s own growing capabilities created pressure for a more assertive approach.

In November 2014, at the 9th East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally announced the upgrade. The shift was as much about attitude as branding. As analysts have noted, the Act East Policy is not spelled out in a single official white paper, but its contours are clear from official speeches and actions. It signalled that India would move from intent to implementation, from dialogue to delivery.

What changed between the two policies

The differences are worth spelling out because they are often blurred. Geographic scope: The Look East Policy focused mainly on Southeast Asia, while the Act East Policy explicitly extended attention to East Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Substance: Where Look East was largely about trade and investment, Act East added a clear security dimension. The Northeast: The newer framework places India’s North-Eastern Region at the centre, treating it as the physical gateway to Southeast Asia rather than an afterthought.

At the 2014 East Asia Summit, the government articulated this through what came to be known as the 3Cs and later the 4Cs framework: Culture, Commerce, Connectivity, and Capacity Building. These four pillars still organise the policy today.

The economic pillar: trade, investment, and market access

Economic integration remains the backbone of the policy. ASEAN as a bloc is now one of India’s largest trading partners, and the relationship has deepened considerably over the past decade. According to figures cited by the government, ASEAN accounts for about 11% of India’s global trade, with bilateral trade valued at around $121 billion in FY 2023-24. Since 2015, bilateral trade has almost doubled, accompanied by rising Indian exports and growing foreign direct investment from ASEAN countries.

A milestone came in 2018, when India and ASEAN elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership during the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit. This formalised deeper cooperation across defence, trade, and culture. India has also built strong bilateral economic ties with Japan and South Korea, two economies central to its growth trajectory.

It is worth being honest about the limits here. India chose to withdraw from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019, citing concerns about trade deficits and the impact on domestic industry. When benchmarked against rivals, India remains a comparatively smaller economic actor in the region. Around 2020, India-ASEAN trade stood near $64 billion, dwarfed by ASEAN’s trade with China at roughly $503 billion. The gap shows how much room India still has to grow.

Connectivity: building the physical link

If trade is the goal, connectivity is the means. The single biggest challenge has always been geography. India’s North-Eastern states are connected to the rest of the country by a narrow corridor known as the “Chicken’s Neck,” and they sit far from major ports. Transforming this landlocked region into a connectivity hub is therefore central to the entire policy.

The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway

The flagship connectivity project is the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, sometimes called the Asian Trilateral Highway. Spanning roughly 1,360 kilometres, it connects Manipur in the Northeast with Mae Sot in Thailand via Mandalay and Bagan in Myanmar. The idea is to create a seamless road artery that lets goods, tourists, and people move overland between India and mainland Southeast Asia.

The project’s significance goes beyond roads. Myanmar is the only ASEAN nation that shares a land border with India, making it the natural bridge to the rest of the bloc. Once complete, the highway is expected to boost overland trade, expand economic opportunities for the Northeast, and improve people-to-people contact between the three countries. Special Economic Zones along the route have also been considered to stimulate business.

Progress, however, has been slow and difficult. The highway has faced significant delays due to political instability in Myanmar, financial constraints, security concerns, and bureaucratic hurdles across the three countries. By 2023, the Indian government declared around 70% of the roadway complete, but the remaining stretch stalled amid intense conflict in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has indicated the project may be completed by 2027, though the timeline depends heavily on the situation in Myanmar.

Other connectivity initiatives

The highway does not stand alone. Other major projects under the policy include the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, the Agartala-Akhaura Rail Link with Bangladesh, and intermodal transport linkages through inland waterways. The Kaladan project aims to link India’s eastern seaports with Myanmar’s Sittwe port, offering an alternative cargo route that bypasses the Chicken’s Neck.

Japan has emerged as a key partner in this connectivity push. The India-Japan Act East Forum was established in 2017 to support projects in the North-Eastern Region, including roads, bridges, and the modernisation of hydroelectric power, aligning India’s Act East Policy with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. This collaboration brings both investment and technical expertise into a region that has long struggled with infrastructure deficits.

Soft power and the diaspora

Beyond roads and trade figures, the policy leans on cultural affinity. India shares deep civilisational ties with Southeast Asia through the historical spread of Buddhism and Hinduism, and these shared roots give cultural diplomacy a natural foundation. The policy actively promotes cultural exchanges, educational partnerships, and tourism to build long-term goodwill.

The Indian diaspora is a significant asset in this effort. Large communities of people of Indian origin live across Malaysia, Singapore, and other ASEAN states, forming living bridges between India and the region. Yet observers argue this potential is not fully tapped. The Indian diaspora, cultural exchanges, and educational collaborations remain underutilised tools in India’s diplomatic toolkit. Capacity-building programmes, such as the ITEC scheme and Quick Impact Projects in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, extend goodwill at the grassroots level through training and development assistance.

The security dimension and the Indo-Pacific

The most defining feature separating Act East from its predecessor is the explicit security focus. India now treats the Indo-Pacific as a strategic priority, framed around the SAGAR vision, which stands for Security And Growth for All in the Region.

This translates into concrete defence cooperation. India has deepened maritime and defence ties with Vietnam, including support in the South China Sea, and works with Indonesia on developing the Sabang port near the strategically vital Strait of Malacca. Joint naval exercises, coordinated patrols, and port calls have become routine instruments of engagement. India views the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus as an integral part of its Act East Policy and broader Indo-Pacific vision, connecting defence cooperation with economic development and technology sharing.

Throughout, India has stressed ASEAN centrality, meaning ASEAN should remain at the heart of regional institutions. India has committed to upholding ASEAN unity and centrality through the Act East Policy and supports the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. This careful positioning lets India play a meaningful security role without appearing to dominate, while offering smaller states an alternative to dependence on any single major power.

Challenges and the road ahead

For all its ambition, the policy faces real obstacles. Stalled connectivity projects are the most visible. Political upheavals in both Myanmar and Bangladesh have become major roadblocks, hobbling India’s hopes of integrating its economy with Southeast Asian nations. The overthrow of the government in Bangladesh and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar have left flagship projects in limbo.

Other challenges persist as well. India’s trade deficit with ASEAN raises concerns among domestic industries, and the country still trails China, Japan, and South Korea in both economic weight and perceived influence in the region. Realising the policy’s promise will require speeding up infrastructure, deepening partnerships beyond ASEAN to include Japan and Australia, genuinely developing the Northeast, and making fuller use of soft power and the diaspora.

Despite these hurdles, the direction is clear. After completing a decade in 2024, the Act East Policy has firmly embedded India in the region’s economic and security conversations. It has elevated the India-ASEAN relationship, expanded India’s strategic footprint, and reframed the Northeast as a gateway rather than a periphery. The journey from “looking” to “acting” remains incomplete, but it has fundamentally changed how India engages with the eastern half of Asia.

What do you think? Should India prioritise completing physical connectivity projects like the Trilateral Highway, even amid instability in neighbouring countries, or focus its energy on economic and soft-power tools that are less vulnerable to regional turmoil? And how can India better leverage its diaspora and civilisational links to close the influence gap with larger powers in Southeast Asia?

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Table of Contents

From Look East to Act East 🔗

What changed between the two policies 🔗

The economic pillar: trade, investment, and market access 🔗

Connectivity: building the physical link 🔗

The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway 🔗

Other connectivity initiatives 🔗

Soft power and the diaspora 🔗

The security dimension and the Indo-Pacific 🔗

Challenges and the road ahead 🔗