The Impact of Great Power Dynamics on India’s Look East Policy

India’s eastward turn did not happen in a vacuum. When New Delhi launched its Look East policy in the early 1990s, it was reacting to a world that had just been turned upside down by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the policy’s later evolution was shaped less by what happened in Moscow and more by what was happening in Beijing. The rise of China as an economic and military heavyweight quietly rewrote the strategic script for the entire region, pulling India into a role it had not originally imagined: that of a regional balancer. This post traces how great power competition transformed a modest economic outreach into a central pillar of foreign policy, and how it eventually gave birth to groupings like the Quad.

Why the Look East policy began
The shift from economics to strategy
The China factor: how a rising power reshaped the policy
The Indian Ocean and the fear of encirclement
The South China Sea and the demand for a counterbalance
Why ASEAN could not respond alone
Great powers enter the picture: the US, Japan, and Australia
Japan’s pivotal role
The transition from Look East to Act East
The Quad: institutionalising the balance
What the Quad stands for
India’s careful balancing act
The bigger picture: reactive statecraft

Why the Look East policy began

The Look East policy was the brainchild of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, and it was formally launched in the early 1990s. Its original logic was economic. After decades of inward-looking, socialist-style planning, India was opening up. Southeast Asia, with its fast-growing “tiger economies,” was the obvious place to seek trade, investment, and new markets.

During the Cold War, India’s relationships with many Southeast Asian states had been given relatively low priority. Non-alignment, tense ties with the West, and a focus on South Asian disputes had kept New Delhi somewhat distant from the region. The policy under Rao, and later Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was an attempt to repair that neglect. At this early stage, the goal was integration, not balancing. The strategic dimension came later.

The shift from economics to strategy

What began as a trade-focused initiative gradually acquired a hard security edge. Scholars describe the policy as seeking to complement historical and cultural linkages with tangible economic interdependence and, increasingly, political and security cooperation. The trigger for this deepening was the changing balance of power in Asia. As one regional power grew far faster than the others, India’s neighbours began to look at New Delhi differently, and India began to look at the region differently too.

The China factor: how a rising power reshaped the policy

No single development influenced India’s eastward strategy more than the rise of China. After Deng Xiaoping’s reforms from 1979 onwards, China cultivated extensive trade and economic relations with Asian nations while building deep commercial and military ties with Pakistan and competing for influence in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. For India, this was not just an economic phenomenon; it was a strategic encirclement taking shape on multiple fronts.

The concurrent rise of China and India is sometimes called a geopolitical event of historic proportions, because rarely has the global system seen two large, ancient powers re-emerge at the same time, side by side. Yet the two rose at very different speeds. China’s economy and military pulled decisively ahead, and that gap created anxiety not only in New Delhi but across East and Southeast Asia.

The Indian Ocean and the fear of encirclement

India has long viewed the Indian Ocean region, and the Bay of Bengal in particular, as its sphere of influence. China’s growing naval reach into these waters challenged that assumption directly. A stronger Chinese military footprint in maritime Asia raised the prospect of India being squeezed in its own backyard. This is why developments far to the east, in the South China Sea, came to matter so much for a country whose primary maritime concern is the Indian Ocean.

The South China Sea and the demand for a counterbalance

The South China Sea became the flashpoint that turned regional anxiety into active diplomacy. China’s expansive territorial claims, island-building, and assertive patrols alarmed several Southeast Asian states, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s assertiveness in these waters undercut its own “peaceful rise” narrative, and this raised India’s value as a strategic counterweight in the eyes of both Southeast Asian states and the United States.

In other words, China’s behaviour did India a strange favour. By making smaller neighbours nervous, it created demand for an outside power that could help balance the scales. India, with its size, naval capability, and democratic credentials, fit the bill. Smaller states in East Asia began reaching out to it for trade, diplomacy, and potentially as a key regional balancer.

Why ASEAN could not respond alone

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations operates on consensus and non-interference, which makes collective action against a powerful neighbour difficult. The bloc has remained divided over how to handle China’s conduct in the disputed waters, with disagreements dating back over a decade. Some members rely heavily on Chinese investment; others feel directly threatened. This internal disunity meant that ASEAN as a whole could not push back firmly, which increased the appeal of bringing in external partners like India.

India’s own approach, however, has been cautious. Analysts note that New Delhi is often wary of provoking China and tends to avoid language in joint statements that might irritate Beijing. India wants the strategic benefits of being seen as a counterweight without the costs of open confrontation. This balancing act, ambitious in rhetoric but careful in practice, defines much of its regional policy.

Great powers enter the picture: the US, Japan, and Australia

India’s growing regional profile was not just demanded by small states; it was actively encouraged by the major democracies. The United States, Japan, and Australia each had reasons to want a stronger India in the eastern theatre. Washington saw India as a partner in its rebalance toward Asia. Tokyo, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, championed a “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision and saw India as central to it.

Japan’s pivotal role

Japan deserves special attention here. Abe placed India at the heart of strategic concepts like the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” anchoring his vision on the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Tokyo also became a major development partner, with Japan and India agreeing to leverage synergy between Act East and Japan’s infrastructure partnership to build connectivity within India and across the region. Japanese investment in India’s Northeast, the literal gateway to Southeast Asia, gave the policy concrete economic substance.

The transition from Look East to Act East

This deepening engagement culminated in a rebranding. In November 2014, the Modi government upgraded Look East into the Act East Policy, signalling an intent to move from passive observation to active strategic participation, emphasising what officials called the four Cs: culture, connectivity, commerce, and capacity building. The new label even appeared in a 2014 US-India joint statement, linking India’s Act East with America’s rebalance to Asia and committing to a trilateral dialogue with Japan. The word “Act” was a deliberate message: India intended to do more, not just watch.

The Quad: institutionalising the balance

The clearest product of these great power dynamics is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, bringing together India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Its roots lie in an unlikely event, the coordinated relief effort after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the four navies discovered they worked well together.

The grouping was first established in 2007, when officials met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila. It went dormant in 2008, partly because members worried about antagonising China, and was revived only in late 2017. The relaunch took place on the margins of the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines and was explicitly seen as a counterbalance to China’s growing presence in the region.

What the Quad stands for

Officially, the Quad’s central aim is to support a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The members frame their cooperation around a rules-based order, freedom of navigation, and democratic values. Their practical work spans maritime security, critical and emerging technologies, cyber security, and disaster response, including initiatives like maritime domain awareness partnerships designed to help regional states monitor their own waters.

India’s careful balancing act

Even within the Quad, India guards its independence. New Delhi insists the grouping is not a military alliance but a consultative partnership, and it participates in overlapping frameworks while avoiding binding defence commitments that could constrain its strategic autonomy. This reflects a broader shift in Indian thinking, away from rigid non-alignment and toward what scholars call strategic and issue-based alignment. India aligns where its interests are served, without locking itself into anyone’s camp.

This caution has limits, though. The violent clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020 fundamentally altered the India-China relationship, hardening Indian attitudes and pushing New Delhi to balance against Beijing more openly through both military posture and partnerships. The era of giving China the benefit of the doubt has largely ended.

The bigger picture: reactive statecraft

It is worth being honest about the nature of India’s regional strategy. Compared to China’s proactive, well-funded push through trade institutions and massive investment, India’s regional statecraft has often been reactive and cautious, designed to counter Chinese dominance rather than to assert an independent vision. India increasingly relies on external partners to offset its own economic limitations and to check China’s influence in the region.

This is the core paradox of the entire eastward policy. It was born as an economic project, was reshaped into a strategic one by the rise of China, and now functions largely as a balancing exercise. The very assertiveness that India seeks to counter is what gave its policy strategic weight in the first place. Without a rising and increasingly assertive China, there would have been far less demand from East Asian states for an Indian counterweight, and perhaps no Quad at all.

What do you think? Should India embrace its role as a regional balancer more openly, even at the risk of provoking China, or is its current cautious approach the wiser path for a country still focused on its own development? And can a strategy that is fundamentally reactive ever give India the kind of leadership role in the Indo-Pacific that its partners seem to want?

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Table of Contents

Why the Look East policy began 🔗

The shift from economics to strategy 🔗

The China factor: how a rising power reshaped the policy 🔗

The Indian Ocean and the fear of encirclement 🔗

The South China Sea and the demand for a counterbalance 🔗

Why ASEAN could not respond alone 🔗

Great powers enter the picture: the US, Japan, and Australia 🔗

Japan’s pivotal role 🔗

The transition from Look East to Act East 🔗

The Quad: institutionalising the balance 🔗

What the Quad stands for 🔗

India’s careful balancing act 🔗

The bigger picture: reactive statecraft 🔗