The economic story of India and China is full of contradictions. The two countries fought a war in 1962, continue to dispute their border, and rarely agree on regional politics. Yet over the last two decades, China has become one of India’s most important commercial partners. This relationship is built on a simple reality: China makes the things India needs, and it makes them cheaply. Understanding how trade between these two giants grew so fast, why it remains so lopsided, and what it means for India’s economic future is essential to grasping one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in Asia.
Table of Contents
- From near-zero trade to a hundred-billion-dollar partnership
- The persistent problem of the trade deficit
- Why the imbalance exists: what each country sells
- India’s exports: raw materials and primary commodities
- China’s exports: high-value manufactured goods
- Dependence runs deeper than the numbers suggest
- The pharmaceutical sector and APIs
- Electronics, solar power, and critical inputs
- Investment, collaboration, and complementary strengths
- The Press Note 3 turning point
- Geopolitics and the economics that refuse to follow it
- The road ahead
From near-zero trade to a hundred-billion-dollar partnership
For most of the twentieth century, economic exchange between India and China was negligible. After the 1962 war, relations froze almost entirely. Trade revived only after both economies began opening up, and the real acceleration came in the 2000s once China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.
The numbers tell a dramatic story. China became India’s largest trading partner in 2008, the year bilateral trade touched roughly $30 billion. Before that, the United States had held the top spot. The shift was confirmed by India’s own Economic Survey, which noted that China’s trade share had overtaken that of the US during 2007-08. From there, the trajectory only steepened. By the 2023-24 financial year, two-way trade had crossed $118 billion, and in 2024-25 the figure climbed to around $127.7 billion, making China India’s largest goods trading partner once again.
This growth was rapid even by global standards. Trade that was virtually nothing in the 1960s had become a relationship worth more than a hundred billion dollars within a single generation. The expansion was helped along by political dialogue mechanisms, including a Strategic Economic Dialogue and a Joint Economic Group, and by an explicit target both governments set in 2010 to push bilateral trade to $100 billion.
The persistent problem of the trade deficit
Behind the impressive headline numbers lies a serious imbalance. A trade deficit occurs when a country imports more than it exports. India runs a large and growing deficit with China, and this is the single most discussed feature of the economic relationship.
The first warning signs appeared early. India’s trade deficit with China quadrupled within three years to $16.2 billion in 2007-08. Far from narrowing, it has expanded almost every year since. By 2023-24 the deficit had reached around $85 billion, and in FY2024-25 it surged to a record of roughly $99.2 billion. To put that in perspective, this gap more than doubled from the $44 billion recorded in FY2020-21.
The deficit is not a small share of the relationship; it dominates it. For the 2024-25 financial year, India’s imports from China climbed to about $113.5 billion while exports fell to roughly $14.3 billion. In other words, India imports nearly eight times as much from China as it sells back. This makes the relationship one of structural dependence rather than balanced exchange.
Why the imbalance exists: what each country sells
The deficit is not just about volume. It reflects a fundamental difference in what the two countries trade. The composition of the trade basket explains why the gap is so hard to close.
India’s exports: raw materials and primary commodities
India’s exports to China are dominated by raw materials and minerals such as iron ore, cotton, and unwrought aluminium. According to the Embassy of India in Beijing, the country’s main exports over recent years have been iron ore, light naphtha, p-xylene, shrimps and castor oil. Organic chemicals and seafood, particularly shrimp, also feature prominently.
What these items have in common is that they are low in value and sit at the bottom of the manufacturing chain. India effectively supplies the inputs that fuel China’s factories. This is the export profile of a supplier of raw inputs, not a partner trading finished, high-value goods.
China’s exports: high-value manufactured goods
China’s exports to India look very different. They consist of machinery, electronics, personal computers, integrated circuits, telecom equipment parts, lithium-ion batteries and fertilizers. The recent surge in the deficit has been driven by imports of electronics, batteries and solar components.
The contrast is stark. India sells ores and chemicals; China sells smartphones, machines, and electronic components. Because manufactured goods command far higher prices than raw materials, the value flowing from India to China is small while the value flowing back is enormous. This is the core reason the deficit keeps widening even when trade volumes grow.
Dependence runs deeper than the numbers suggest
The trade deficit is worrying not only for its size but for the kind of dependence it represents. China is India’s top supplier across all eight major industrial product categories, which means many Indian industries cannot function without Chinese inputs.
The pharmaceutical sector and APIs
A striking example is the pharmaceutical industry. India is one of the world’s largest producers of generic medicines, yet it depends heavily on China for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), the chemical building blocks of drugs. In 2023-24, China accounted for 43.45% of India’s pharmaceutical imports, worth about $3.6 billion. For some categories of bulk drugs, the reliance is far higher.
The vulnerability of this arrangement became clear during the COVID-19 pandemic, when factory shutdowns in China threatened global drug supplies and India temporarily restricted the export of 26 APIs and formulations. The episode showed how a disruption in one country could ripple through India’s healthcare system. The reason for this dependence is largely price: Chinese APIs are simply cheaper, making them attractive to Indian manufacturers even when self-reliance is a stated goal.
Electronics, solar power, and critical inputs
The same pattern holds across electronics, solar modules, and industrial chemicals. As one analysis put it, India’s import bill from China is anchored in electronics, machinery, chemicals and materials that are difficult to substitute quickly. India cannot simply switch suppliers overnight, because in many cases there is no comparable alternative at the same scale or price.
Investment, collaboration, and complementary strengths
Trade is only one part of the economic relationship. Investment is another, and here the story has been more complicated. While trade boomed, mutual investment flows lagged well behind the growth in trading volumes. Both countries became major destinations for global investment, but they invested relatively little in each other.
The logic of collaboration is nonetheless compelling. The two economies have complementary strengths: India is strong in software, services, and pharmaceuticals, while China leads in hardware manufacturing, electronics, and capital goods. Chinese investment in Indian manufacturing could, in theory, help India build the production capacity it lacks and even strengthen its export competitiveness.
The Press Note 3 turning point
This calculation changed sharply after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash on the border. In April 2020, the government issued Press Note 3, which required prior government approval for investments from countries sharing a land border with India. While framed broadly, the measure was aimed squarely at China. The policy slowed Chinese capital flows but, critically, did not reduce India’s reliance on Chinese imports of electronics, solar modules and industrial intermediates.
By 2026, the government had begun to reconsider. India relaxed some Press Note 3 restrictions, allowing limited Chinese investment in selected manufacturing sectors such as capital goods, electronic components, and solar manufacturing inputs, while keeping strategic areas like semiconductors off-limits. Investments up to a 10% beneficial ownership threshold were permitted through the automatic route, with majority control required to stay in Indian hands. The shift reflected a pragmatic recognition that cutting off investment had not reduced supply-chain dependence.
Geopolitics and the economics that refuse to follow it
One of the most fascinating aspects of this relationship is how little political tension has affected trade. India and China have clashed at the border repeatedly, including incidents at Depsang in 2013, Doklam in 2017, and the Galwan Valley in 2020. After Galwan, India banned dozens of Chinese mobile apps and tightened investment rules.
Yet through all of this, the trade deficit kept widening. The economic relationship has proved remarkably resilient to political shocks, largely because India’s industries simply cannot function without Chinese inputs in the short term. This disconnect, where politics pulls one way and economics another, defines the relationship and makes it so difficult for policymakers to manage.
The road ahead
India’s response has centred on building domestic capacity. The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, including a dedicated scheme for APIs and bulk drugs with a multi-thousand-crore outlay, aim to reduce import dependence by encouraging local manufacturing. The “Make in India” initiative pursues the same goal across sectors. Analysts also note that, paradoxically, easing restrictions on Chinese FDI could help India integrate into global value chains and eventually narrow the trade deficit by building export capacity at home.
The challenge is structural and will not be solved quickly. As long as China can produce manufactured goods more cheaply and at greater scale, and as long as India’s export basket is weighted towards raw materials, the deficit is likely to persist. Closing it requires India to climb the manufacturing value chain, a process that takes years of investment, policy stability, and industrial development.
What do you think? Should India prioritise reducing its dependence on Chinese imports even if it means accepting higher costs in the short term, or is deeper economic engagement with China the more realistic path to building India’s own manufacturing strength? And can a trade relationship this lopsided ever become genuinely balanced, or is some level of dependence simply the price of access to the world’s manufacturing hub?
References
- https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/india-china-economic-ties-determinants-and-possibilities
- https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=2517
- https://www.statista.com/chart/35003/indias-annual-trade-deficit%252A-with-china/
- https://iasscore.in/current-affairs/raw-materials-minerals-prop-up-indias-exports-to-china
- https://www.outlookbusiness.com/economy-and-policy/indias-trade-deficit-with-china-hits-record-992bn-manufacturing-gaps-to-blame
- https://www.policycircle.org/industry/apis-import-depencence-on-china/
- https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/business/india-curbs-export-of-drugs-as-coronavirus-threat-rises-50613
- https://www.business-standard.com/amp/economy/news/india-s-trade-deficit-with-china-may-reach-106-billion-in-2025-gtri-125121900348_1.html
- https://tijer.org/tijer/papers/TIJER2311084.pdf
- https://ashwanimahajan.wordpress.com/2026/03/15/five-years-after-galwan-india-considers-easing-curbs-on-chinese-fdi-amid-strategic-and-economic-concerns/
- https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/india-eases-fdi-rules-for-china-and-neighbouring-countries/
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