India's Contemporary Concerns in Its Relationship with Russia • PolSci Institute

For decades, Russia has been India’s most dependable strategic partner – a reliable arms supplier, a diplomatic shield at the United Nations, and a “time-tested” friend through the Cold War and after. Yet the foundations of this special relationship are now being tested by forces neither country fully controls. As Russia turns increasingly eastward and draws closer to Beijing and Islamabad, New Delhi finds itself watching its oldest ally develop friendships with its two most difficult neighbours. This is the heart of India’s contemporary anxiety about Russia: not a fear of betrayal, but a worry about drift.

Why Russia’s pivot to Asia matters
The “no limits” partnership
The fear of advanced weapons reaching China
A worrying role reversal
Russia and the Belt and Road Initiative
A more complicated reality
Russia’s growing ties with Pakistan
Joint military exercises
The Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline
How serious are these concerns, really?
The defence partnership remains deep
India’s answer: strategic autonomy

Why Russia’s pivot to Asia matters

The story begins with geopolitics far from South Asia. After Western sanctions intensified following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and again after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia accelerated what analysts call its “Pivot to the East.” Cut off from European markets and capital, Moscow has had little choice but to deepen economic and strategic ties with Asia – and above all with China.

The problem for India is structural. Russia’s pivot has reduced its options, leaving it increasingly dependent on Beijing. As one assessment notes, the central challenge for Moscow has been managing its relationship with China without becoming a junior, dependent partner. The faltering war in Ukraine has only deepened this dependence, with several Indian commentators observing that Moscow is now widely seen as the junior partner in its partnership with Beijing, reliant on China for political and economic support.

For New Delhi, a Russia that leans heavily on China is a Russia that may, over time, find it harder to remain neutral in any future India-China confrontation. That single concern colours almost every other worry on this list.

The “no limits” partnership

Just before the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Russia and China signed a joint statement declaring a partnership with “no limits” and “no forbidden areas.” Scholars have described the deepening China-Russia relationship as one of the most consequential strategic alignments in the world today. For India, which fought a war with China in 1962 and continues to face a tense, militarised border in the Himalayas, the closeness of these two powers is an unwelcome development.

The fear of advanced weapons reaching China

Defence cooperation has always been the bedrock of India-Russia relations. Since the mid-1960s, Russia and the former Soviet Union have been India’s principal defence partner and primary supplier of arms, sharing critical technologies and entire production lines for aircraft, tanks, and submarines. India even leased Russian nuclear-powered submarines and bulk-ordered hundreds of T-90 tanks over the years.

But the same willingness to share advanced platforms is now a source of concern when the recipient is China. Russia has supplied Beijing with sophisticated military hardware, including advanced air defence systems and fighter aircraft. Analysts warn that Russia providing more advanced military platforms to China would be a major concern for India, with early signs already visible.

A worrying role reversal

There is a deeper twist to this story. The traditional flow of military technology between Russia and China is reversing. Where Russia was once the senior supplier, its arms industry is now becoming increasingly dependent on dual-use components from China. This interdependence binds Moscow ever more tightly to Beijing’s industrial base, raising questions in New Delhi about where Russian loyalties would lie in a crisis.

The key strategic worry, as one analysis puts it, is what Russia’s position would be on possible future hostilities between China and India. If Moscow ever felt compelled to side with Beijing, it would be a genuine game-changer that could force India to fundamentally rethink the partnership.

Russia and the Belt and Road Initiative

Launched by China in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a vast infrastructure programme aimed at connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa through ports, railways, and energy corridors. India has consistently refused to join it, and for good reason: the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India considers its sovereign territory. India was the only major regional power to stay away from the 2017 Belt and Road summit hosted in Beijing, viewing the project as a challenge to its sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

Russia’s growing alignment with the BRI complicates India’s position. Moscow has publicly urged New Delhi to find a way to work with Beijing on the project, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggesting that India should not let political problems deter it from benefiting from the initiative. When India’s oldest partner publicly nudges it toward a project it views as a sovereignty threat, the diplomatic friction is obvious.

A more complicated reality

It is worth noting that Russia’s relationship with the BRI is not as simple as full endorsement. Moscow has long been cautious about China’s expanding footprint in Central Asia, a region it regards as its own sphere of influence. Russia has not formally agreed to membership in the BRI, instead promoting its own “Greater Eurasian Partnership” as a counterweight. Reports indicate that Moscow itself is increasingly concerned about China’s surging influence in Central Asia, where Beijing has broken Russia’s historic monopoly over energy exports. This shared unease about an over-powerful China is, paradoxically, one reason the India-Russia relationship endures.

Russia’s growing ties with Pakistan

Perhaps no development unsettles New Delhi quite like Moscow’s warming relationship with Islamabad. For most of the Cold War, Russia firmly backed India while Pakistan aligned with the United States and China. That clean division has blurred. As Pakistan’s relationship with Washington deteriorated, Islamabad found a more welcoming reception in the Russia-China orbit.

Joint military exercises

The most visible sign of this shift is the regular series of joint military drills. Since 2016, Russia and Pakistan have conducted counter-terrorism exercises, often called “Druzhba” (Friendship). In November 2020, a Russian special forces contingent arrived in Pakistan for a two-week joint exercise focused on counter-terrorism cooperation. Russia has also offered to expand cooperation, with Lavrov stating Moscow was ready to supply Pakistan with special military equipment and deepen counter-terrorism collaboration.

From India’s perspective, watching its closest defence partner conduct exercises with its primary adversary is a genuine irritant – even if the drills are modest in scale compared to the much larger Indra exercises that Russia conducts with India.

The Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline

On the economic front, the centrepiece of Russia-Pakistan cooperation is the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, previously known as the North-South Gas Pipeline. This is an ambitious project to build a roughly 1,100-kilometre pipeline linking Karachi to Lahore, estimated to cost up to USD 2.5 billion. For Pakistan, struggling with chronic energy shortages, the pipeline promises relief. For Russia, it offers a foothold to reactivate its presence in South Asia.

How serious are these concerns, really?

It would be easy to read this list and conclude that India-Russia ties are unravelling. The reality is more measured. Several of these worries, while real, have clear limits.

The Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, despite years of announcements, has repeatedly stalled. Recent assessments note that the project has not moved forward, hampered by Pakistan’s financial instability, payment issues, and logistical hurdles. Russia-Pakistan defence cooperation, too, remains far more modest than Russia-India ties. Analysts have long argued that Pakistan cannot meaningfully influence Russia’s strategic partnership with India, with arms sales to Islamabad remaining small and limited.

The defence partnership remains deep

India still depends heavily on Russian hardware. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India was the world’s second-largest arms importer between 2020 and 2024, with Russian-made weaponry accounting for around 36% of its purchases. This dependence – built over decades on submarines, fighter jets, and missile systems – cannot be unwound quickly. As one analysis observes, the dependence nurtured over decades cannot be dismantled in a matter of a few years, given the challenges of switching systems and adapting to new standards.

The relationship’s resilience was on display when President Putin visited New Delhi in December 2025, his first trip to India since the Ukraine conflict escalated. The visit reaffirmed the goal of reaching USD 100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, with defence cooperation as a key pillar.

India’s answer: strategic autonomy

So how does New Delhi manage a partner who is friendly with its rivals? The answer lies in India’s enduring doctrine of strategic autonomy, now often described as “multi-alignment.” Rooted in the Cold War philosophy of non-alignment, this approach means balancing relations with Russia, China, and the United States while diversifying partnerships to navigate a volatile world order.

In practice, this means India is hedging. While keeping Russia close, it has steadily diversified its arms procurement, sourcing hardware from France and Israel and deepening defence ties with the United States, Japan, the UK, and the EU. The strategy is to maintain strategic ties with Russia without becoming overly dependent, ensuring multiple options for its defence needs.

Crucially, India insists on its right to choose its own partners. New Delhi has bristled at Western pressure over its Russia policy, warning pointedly that it is not acceptable diplomatic practice to give advice on India’s relations with a third country. The same principle applies in reverse: India accepts that Russia, too, will pursue its own interests with China and Pakistan. The goal on both sides is to manage these third-country relationships without letting them undermine the core partnership.

Russia, for its part, has been careful to reassure India. Moscow has stated it does not intend to build any alliance against India and sees no reason for New Delhi to be alarmed by its drills with Pakistan. Whether these reassurances hold as Russia’s dependence on China grows is the open question that defines the relationship’s future.

What do you think? Can India sustain its “time-tested” partnership with Russia even as Moscow drifts closer to Beijing – or will the logic of the China-Russia alignment eventually force New Delhi to choose? And in a multipolar world of shifting allegiances, is strategic autonomy a strength that keeps India’s options open, or a balancing act that becomes harder to maintain with each passing year?

How useful was this post?

Click on a star to rate it!

Average rating 0 / 5. Vote count: 0

No votes so far! Be the first to rate this post.

References

PDF 📄

India’s Contemporary Concerns in Its Relationship with Russia

Share on Mastodon

India’s Contemporary Concerns in Its Relationship with Russia

Table of Contents

Why Russia’s pivot to Asia matters 🔗

The “no limits” partnership 🔗

The fear of advanced weapons reaching China 🔗

A worrying role reversal 🔗

Russia and the Belt and Road Initiative 🔗

A more complicated reality 🔗

Russia’s growing ties with Pakistan 🔗

Joint military exercises 🔗

The Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline 🔗

How serious are these concerns, really? 🔗

The defence partnership remains deep 🔗

India’s answer: strategic autonomy 🔗