Dynamic Diplomacy: India’s Foreign Policy under NDA – II

When Narendra Modi took office in 2014, few expected foreign affairs to become his signature strength. Yet over the following years, diplomacy emerged as one of the most visible features of his government. The approach was active, personal, and unapologetically focused on national interest. It marked a clear shift from a cautious, reactive posture to one defined by frequent travel, high-profile partnerships, and a confident projection of culture and identity on the world stage. This is the story of how foreign policy under the NDA-II government attempted to reposition the country as a leading voice in a rapidly changing world order.

A more assertive and proactive diplomacy 🔗

The most obvious change was the sheer energy of engagement. Modi travelled abroad more than 50 times in his first two years alone, visiting over 40 countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, Germany, and Japan. He also hosted most of the world’s top leaders at home and convened a landmark India-Africa Forum Summit. This pace of activity signalled that diplomacy was now a top political priority, not a background function of governance.

Underneath the visible activity was a deeper philosophical shift. While the government retained the core principles of strategic autonomy and peaceful coexistence, it moved decisively from the older idea of non-alignment toward what scholars now call multi-alignment. Instead of staying aloof from major powers, the strategy was to cultivate strong partnerships with many of them at the same time, aligning with different actors on different issues to maximise freedom of action. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar captured this thinking when he described the task as engaging America, managing China, cultivating Europe, reassuring Russia, and bringing Japan into play.

From non-alignment to multi-alignment 🔗

This evolution did not happen overnight. Analysts often trace three broad phases: non-alignment during the Cold War, strategic autonomy after 1991, and finally multi-alignment from 2014 onward. The newer approach reinforces the older goal of preserving room to manoeuvre, but it does so by building a diverse web of strategic partnerships rather than by keeping distance from the great powers. The aim was to engage everyone on the country’s own terms, securing benefits across multiple relationships without being trapped in any single bloc.

Strengthening ties with strategic partners 🔗

The clearest expression of multi-alignment was the deepening of partnerships with key democracies, especially Japan and the United States.

The special partnership with Japan 🔗

Relations with Japan grew into one of the most consequential partnerships of the period. Modi invested considerable political capital in cultivating ties with successive Japanese leaders at a personal level, and the relationship was formally elevated to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership. Cooperation expanded across defence equipment, technology sharing, joint military exercises, and major economic investment commitments. Both countries increasingly saw each other as anchors of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, with a shared interest in balancing China’s growing power in the region.

Closer alignment with the United States 🔗

Ties with the United States also moved closer than at any earlier point. A notable feature of this government was that it was less hesitant about tilting toward Washington in its broader outlook. Shared concern about China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific provided a strong strategic logic for the relationship. Both sides framed the partnership around democratic values and regional security, even as the country carefully guarded its independence and resisted being pulled into any formal military alliance.

The Quad and the Indo-Pacific 🔗

These bilateral relationships fed into a wider regional architecture. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, brings together India, Japan, the United States, and Australia. Although the grouping was first initiated in 2007, it lapsed and then found new life in November 2017 during Modi’s tenure, eventually rising to leader-level summits. The Quad became a central platform for cooperation on a free and open Indo-Pacific, reflecting a strategic shift in thinking that recognised the Indian and Pacific Oceans as one interconnected maritime space.

Leveraging soft power and the diaspora 🔗

Alongside hard-headed strategy, the government made culture a deliberate instrument of foreign policy. This was a conscious effort to project the country as a peaceful, rising civilisation with much to offer the world.

The International Day of Yoga 🔗

The most successful example was the campaign for an International Day of Yoga. Modi proposed the idea at the United Nations in 2014, and the Foreign Office quickly mobilised support, winning 175 co-sponsors at the UN General Assembly. The resolution was adopted by acclamation, and 21 June has since been celebrated worldwide. Yoga proved a powerful medium for promoting a particular way of life and for projecting an image of a peaceful country that refrains from aggression. Scholars often describe yoga as a gift to the world that helps cultivate goodwill among other nations.

The diaspora as a force multiplier 🔗

The government was also far more ambitious about using the vast overseas community as an asset. Previous governments had recognised this possibility, but this administration embraced the idea fully, treating the diaspora as a bridge for trade, investment, and political influence. Large public events during foreign visits turned overseas communities into visible advocates abroad, helping to amplify the country’s reach and reputation in their host nations.

This cultural strategy was tied to a broader civilisational vision. Drawing on ideas like Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family) and the aspiration to be a Vishwaguru, the government transformed soft power from a passive cultural asset into an active diplomatic tool. Beyond yoga, this included promoting Ayurveda, Buddhism, cinema, and even an International Year of Millets.

Managing relations with China 🔗

The most complex challenge of the period was managing the relationship with China. This was a story of dramatic highs and lows, requiring constant high-level attention.

Engagement through informal summits 🔗

Early on, the strategy emphasised personal engagement and dialogue. Modi hosted Xi Jinping in his home state, and the two leaders held informal summits designed to build direct communication and mutual understanding. The most prominent was the 2018 meeting in Wuhan, which followed a tense 73-day military standoff at Doklam. The Wuhan summit was widely seen as a timely effort to reset a relationship that had grown increasingly negative, and it was followed by a second informal summit in Chennai in 2019. The idea was for the two leaders to understand each other’s strategic vision and prevent friction from spiralling out of control.

The strain after Galwan 🔗

This careful management was severely tested in June 2020, when a deadly clash in the Galwan Valley became the worst border confrontation between the two countries in over four decades. The incident brought relations to a historic low. After Galwan, the two leaders avoided full bilateral summits for years, interacting only briefly at multilateral forums. The consistent position became that normalcy could not return without peace along the border. Underlying tensions had also been building for years over the boundary dispute, the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, which Beijing perceived as part of an effort to contain it.

The neighbourhood and a wider strategic vision 🔗

Closer to home, the government pursued a Neighbourhood First policy aimed at strengthening ties across South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The goal was regional stability and prosperity, built on the recognition that a secure neighbourhood is essential for development and security. Over time, the focus of regional policy shifted away from a long preoccupation with Pakistan toward the more productive Bay of Bengal geography, which links South and Southeast Asia more naturally. This connected closely with the Act East policy, a more energetic reworking of the older Look East approach, designed to deepen economic and strategic ties with Southeast and East Asia.

A voice for the Global South 🔗

The broader ambition was to enhance global standing and secure strategic interests in a multipolar world. This crystallised during the G20 presidency in 2023, when Modi positioned the country as the voice of the Global South. The presidency successfully secured permanent membership for the African Union in the G20, reinforcing a commitment to inclusive global governance and South-South cooperation. The guiding philosophy, as Jaishankar has framed it, was to be “non-West” without being “anti-West”, pursuing partnerships shaped by interest rather than inherited bias.

Achievements and ongoing challenges 🔗

The record of this period reflects genuine accomplishments alongside real constraints. On the positive side, the country clearly raised its global profile, built a dense network of partnerships, and used culture effectively to project a confident identity. Surveys during the early years showed that a majority of citizens believed foreign relations had improved under the government.

At the same time, the approach carried tensions. Balancing closer ties with the United States against a traditional partnership with Russia became harder amid global upheaval. Managing a more powerful and assertive China while keeping channels open remained a delicate act. Critics also noted that the strong emphasis on civilisational identity raised questions about how the country is perceived abroad. The multi-alignment strategy, for all its flexibility, demands constant diplomatic skill to sustain. Even so, it allowed the country to navigate significant geopolitical turbulence while protecting its freedom of action.

What do you think? Does multi-alignment offer a sustainable path for a rising power, or does engaging every major power at once eventually force harder choices? And how much can cultural soft power, such as yoga and diaspora outreach, genuinely advance hard strategic interests in a competitive world order?

References

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