India’s ‘Look West’ Policy: Strategic Shifts and Partnerships

For decades, India’s diplomatic energy flowed eastward and northward, while the Arab and Gulf states to its west remained an afterthought, treated mostly as a source of oil and a destination for migrant workers. That changed in 2005, when New Delhi formally articulated a strategy to treat West Asia as part of its “extended neighbourhood.” This recalibration, known as the ‘Look West’ policy, reflected a simple recognition: a region holding the world’s largest oil reserves, hosting millions of Indian workers, and sitting astride the trade routes between Asia and Europe could no longer be peripheral to India’s national interest. Two decades on, this policy has matured into one of the most consequential arms of Indian foreign policy.

What is the ‘Look West’ policy? 🔗

The ‘Look West’ policy is India’s diplomatic strategy to deepen engagement with the countries of West Asia, the region commonly referred to as the Middle East. It was adopted in 2005 under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who described West Asia as India’s extended neighbourhood and sought a more advanced economic relationship with the region. The aim was to move the relationship beyond a shared past into a partnership built around shared present-day challenges and a shared future.

The policy operates along three main axes that India must balance simultaneously: the Arab Gulf states (led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar), Israel, and Iran. Managing these three poles at once is delicate, because they are often rivals or outright adversaries of one another. India’s ability to engage all three without becoming entangled in their disputes is precisely what makes the policy distinctive.

The name itself echoes the older ‘Look East’ policy of the 1990s, which redirected attention toward Southeast Asia after the Cold War. Where ‘Look East’ was a response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demands of globalisation, ‘Look West’ grew out of India’s expanding economic appetite and its dependence on the resources, markets, and labour opportunities of the Gulf.

Why did India turn its attention westward? 🔗

The shift to West Asia was driven by a mix of economic compulsions and strategic calculations. Three factors stand out as the engines of this policy.

Energy security 🔗

The most immediate driver is oil and gas. West Asia holds a majority of the world’s proven petroleum reserves, and India, as one of the largest and fastest-growing energy importers, simply cannot meet its needs without the region. The Gulf states have long been India’s primary suppliers of crude oil and liquefied natural gas. Qatar, for instance, has historically supplied over 90 percent of India’s imported natural gas, while the UAE remains a major crude and LNG source. Securing stable, affordable energy flows through chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz is a permanent fixture of Indian strategic planning, as noted in analyses of India-West Asia ties.

The Indian diaspora 🔗

The second pillar is the enormous Indian community working across the Gulf. Roughly half of all Indian migrants worldwide live in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar hosting the largest numbers. This migration accelerated after the 1970s oil boom, when labour demand in the construction and oil sectors drew workers in large numbers, particularly from Kerala and, more recently, from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

The diaspora is not merely a social link; it is an economic lifeline. India received about $118.7 billion in remittances in 2023-24, and Indians in the Gulf account for a disproportionately large share of this. Despite making up only around a quarter of the overall overseas population, Gulf-based Indians send home nearly 40 percent of India’s bank remittances, led by workers in the UAE. These inflows help finance a substantial portion of India’s trade deficit and act as a cushion against external economic shocks. The welfare of this community gives India a strong incentive to maintain warm relations with host governments.

Counter-terrorism and shared security concerns 🔗

The third driver is a shared interest in countering religious extremism and terrorism. India and several Gulf states face common threats from radical ideologies and cross-border militancy. Over the years, India has built cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE on intelligence sharing, extradition of wanted individuals, and counter-radicalisation efforts. The region’s security vulnerabilities, including missile and drone threats and disruptions to maritime trade in the Red Sea, directly affect Indian interests, making security collaboration a practical necessity rather than an abstract goal.

The strategy of de-hyphenation 🔗

A defining feature of India’s approach to West Asia is what diplomats call de-hyphenation. This means engaging with rival states on their own merits, without letting a relationship with one country damage ties with another. The clearest example is India’s handling of Israel and Palestine. For decades these were treated as a linked package, but India now maintains a robust strategic partnership with Israel while continuing to voice support for the Palestinian cause and its relationships with Arab states.

The same principle applies across the wider region. India simultaneously courts Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and the UAE, even though these countries are frequently at odds. This balancing act is an expression of India’s broader commitment to strategic autonomy, the long-standing principle of refusing to be locked into any single bloc or alliance. Strategic autonomy gives India the flexibility to pursue its interests with each partner independently, an approach that has given New Delhi considerable room to manoeuvre.

From ‘Look West’ to active partnerships 🔗

After 2014, the policy gained fresh intensity. The Indian government retained the existing framework but added more substantial dimensions, with high-level diplomatic visits, energy deals, and a new emphasis on engaging the overseas Indian community in the Gulf. The relationship moved from cautious engagement to active, institutionalised partnership.

Trade and economic integration 🔗

Economic ties have expanded dramatically. The UAE has become one of India’s largest trading partners, and the two countries signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that came into force in May 2022. The agreement has measurably boosted non-oil trade between the two nations and is held up as a model for how India can diversify its commercial relationships in the region. Bilateral trade has climbed into the range of $100 billion, and the two governments have set ambitious targets to grow it further in the coming years. India is also pursuing a broader trade arrangement with the GCC as a bloc.

Defence and technology cooperation 🔗

Perhaps the most striking shift is in defence. A region India once approached purely through the lens of oil and labour is now a partner in military exercises, training, and defence-industrial collaboration. India and the UAE hold regular joint exercises and have established a Joint Defence Cooperation Committee that explores joint training, industrial collaboration, and research and development. India also conducts naval cooperation with Gulf states to help safeguard the shipping lanes through which its energy supplies flow.

This deepening defence engagement comes with a careful caveat. Indian officials have stressed that closer defence cooperation with a regional state does not mean India will be drawn into the region’s conflicts, reflecting the enduring logic of non-entanglement. The challenge for policymakers is to institutionalise this cooperation without compromising strategic autonomy.

Connectivity corridors 🔗

West Asia has also become central to India’s ambitions for trade connectivity. Two major corridors illustrate this. The first is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced in 2023, which envisions linking India’s west coast to the UAE by sea, then by rail across the Arabian Peninsula to Israel’s Haifa port, and onward to Europe. IMEC is widely seen as offering an alternative to corridors dominated by a single power, particularly China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and is expected to reinforce supply chain security across the region.

The second is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs through Iran’s Chabahar Port to reach Central Asia and Russia. India has invested significantly in Chabahar, viewing it as a gateway to Eurasia that bypasses Pakistan. However, both corridors face real obstacles, including US sanctions on Iran and the instability that periodically grips the region, which can stall progress for years at a time.

The challenges ahead 🔗

The ‘Look West’ policy faces persistent headwinds. The first is the inherent instability of the region itself, where shifting alliances and recurring conflicts can disrupt even well-planned projects. Tensions involving Iran, in particular, complicate India’s connectivity plans and force New Delhi to constantly recalibrate.

The second is the China factor. Beijing has expanded its footprint across West Asia aggressively, deepening economic ties with the Gulf states and even brokering a diplomatic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. China’s growing influence narrows India’s strategic space and compels it to compete harder for relevance in a region where it once enjoyed natural advantages of geography and history.

A third challenge lies in balancing rival partners. The very de-hyphenation that gives India flexibility also demands constant diplomatic skill. Deepening ties with Israel or the UAE must not alienate Iran or Saudi Arabia, and an emerging Saudi-Pakistan defence understanding adds further complexity to an already crowded chessboard.

Why the ‘Look West’ policy matters 🔗

The ‘Look West’ policy represents a fundamental shift in how India views its place in the world. It transformed a region once seen as a distant supplier of oil and a destination for workers into a zone of active strategic partnership spanning energy, trade, defence, technology, and connectivity. The policy demonstrates India’s growing confidence in pursuing multiple, sometimes contradictory, relationships at once, anchored firmly in the principle of strategic autonomy.

As global power continues to shift toward Asia and as the Gulf states themselves pivot eastward in search of new economic partners, the relationship between India and West Asia is likely to deepen further. The success of this policy will depend on India’s ability to keep its delicate balancing act intact while navigating an increasingly contested regional landscape.

What do you think? Can India sustain its policy of engaging rival powers like Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia simultaneously, or will rising regional tensions eventually force it to pick sides? And as China expands its presence in West Asia, what should India prioritise to protect its strategic interests in the region?

References

1. https://hrdc.gujaratuniversity.ac.in/Publication/article?id=201
2. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/strengthening-india-west-asia-ties
3. https://www.business-standard.com/amp/economy/news/remittances-to-india-from-advanced-economies-surpass-gulf-inflows-rbi-125031901164_1.html
4. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2597684/world
5. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/04/indias-de-hyphenated-engagement-of-israel-palestine-and-iran-explained/
6. https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-uae-trade
7. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-connectivity-in-an-era-of-geopolitical-uncertainty/
8. https://forumias.com/blog/india-west-asia-relations-significance-challenges-explained-pointwise/