India’s relationship with East and Southeast Asia did not begin with a grand strategy. It began as a quiet economic experiment in the early 1990s. By the start of the new millennium, that experiment had matured into something far more ambitious. The country was no longer content to simply observe opportunities in the East. It wanted to participate, partner, and shape outcomes. This shift, from passively looking to actively engaging, marks one of the most significant transformations in post-Cold War foreign policy, and it set the stage for the comprehensive strategy that followed.
Table of Contents
- From a cautious beginning to a confident outlook
- What changed by the early 2000s
- Deepening political engagement
- Building strategic partnerships
- Strengthening economic links
- Why the economics mattered strategically
- Expanding defence and security cooperation
- Security dialogues and disaster response
- A foundation for what came next
From a cautious beginning to a confident outlook
The Look East Policy was born out of necessity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and a severe balance-of-payments crisis, the government under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao launched economic liberalisation in 1991. Reaching out to the booming economies of Southeast Asia was a natural extension of opening up the domestic economy. The initial focus was narrow: trade, investment, and reconnecting with markets that had drifted away during the Cold War.
The first phase produced steady institutional gains. India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1992, a Full Dialogue Partner in 1996, and a Summit-level Partner in 2002. Each step deepened formal ties. But for much of the 1990s, the engagement remained largely economic and somewhat tentative. The policy was about positioning, not yet about action.
What changed by the early 2000s
Two forces pushed the policy into a more assertive phase. The first was economic confidence. India’s growth rate had picked up considerably, and a faster-growing economy needed larger markets, energy security, and reliable trade routes. The country now had the capacity to be a serious partner rather than a hesitant newcomer.
The second force was the changing security environment. Southeast Asia was becoming a more contested space, with growing concerns about freedom of navigation and the balance of power in the wider region. As China’s presence expanded, smaller nations in the area began to welcome additional partners who could help maintain a stable, rules-based order. The convening of the first India-ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in 2002 signalled that the relationship had graduated to the highest level of political dialogue.
Deepening political engagement
The most visible sign of the new approach was the frequency and seriousness of high-level political contact. Summit meetings became regular fixtures, and India joined the key regional institutions that mattered. It had become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996 and a founding member of the East Asia Summit in 2005, joining the latter despite reservations from China about its inclusion.
These were not ceremonial memberships. They placed India inside the institutional machinery where regional security, trade, and political coordination were actually discussed. Participation in forums like the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum gave the country a voice in shaping the regional order rather than reacting to it from the sidelines.
Building strategic partnerships
Alongside multilateral engagement, India built focused bilateral relationships with several key countries. Three partnerships stand out from this period.
Japan emerged as one of the most important. Economic ties had grown through the 1990s, but the strategic dimension had been held back, partly due to the fallout from India’s 1998 nuclear tests. By the mid-2000s, however, policymakers had begun to treat the relationship with Japan as one of the most strategically valuable across the entire Asia-Pacific. Shared concerns about regional stability brought the two democracies closer, and the partnership steadily expanded from trade into security cooperation.
Singapore became India’s economic and financial gateway to the region. It pushed strongly for India’s deeper integration into Southeast Asian structures and was the first country with which India signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, in 2005. Singapore also became a vital defence partner. A defence cooperation agreement was signed in 2003, followed by a bilateral agreement for joint military training and exercises in 2007.
Vietnam developed into a partnership shaped heavily by defence. India’s engagement with Vietnam has often been led by security cooperation, including defence supplies that help reduce dependence on a single supplier. The relationship reflected a shared interest in a balanced regional order and gave India a trusted partner in a strategically sensitive part of Southeast Asia.
Strengthening economic links
Economics remained the backbone of the engagement, but the scale and ambition grew sharply. The relationship gained real momentum with the framework for an India-ASEAN free trade arrangement agreed in 2003. This was a turning point, because it moved cooperation from dialogue toward concrete commercial integration.
The free trade process eventually produced the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, which came into force in 2010 and gave a substantial boost to two-way trade and investment. India also pursued bilateral trade agreements with individual East Asian economies, including South Korea and Japan, broadening the web of commercial ties well beyond Southeast Asia.
Why the economics mattered strategically
Trade was never just about commerce. Roughly 55 percent of India’s sea-borne trade passes through the South China Sea region, which made the stability of these waters a direct national interest. Deeper economic links with the East therefore reinforced India’s stake in keeping vital sea lanes open and secure. The economic and security dimensions of the policy were tightly linked, each strengthening the case for the other.
Expanding defence and security cooperation
The clearest evidence of the move from looking to engaging was in the security domain. The Indian Navy became a central instrument of foreign policy, projecting presence and building trust across the region.
India began conducting the Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise, known as SIMBEX, annually since 1994. What started with a focus on anti-submarine warfare gradually broadened to cover maritime security, anti-air, and anti-surface operations. It has since become the longest continuous naval exercise India conducts with any partner.
Multilateral engagement grew through the MILAN exercises, which brought together navies from across the Indian Ocean region. India also extended its naval reach eastward in concrete ways. Indian vessels conducted surveillance missions in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea in 2003, and the aircraft carrier INS Viraat was sent on Southeast Asian deployments to build ties with regional navies.
Security dialogues and disaster response
Beyond exercises, India worked to institutionalise security cooperation through regular dialogues with partner nations and participation in regional security mechanisms. The devastating Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 also proved a turning point. India’s rapid humanitarian response demonstrated that it could act as a net security provider in the region, capable of delivering relief and coordinating with other navies during a crisis. This capacity for cooperative action, rather than mere presence, captured the essence of the new approach.
A foundation for what came next
By the time the policy was formally rebranded as the Act East Policy in 2014, the groundwork had already been laid. The summit-level partnerships, the trade agreements, the membership in regional institutions, and the steady drumbeat of naval exercises were all products of the engagement phase that began in the early 2000s. The later policy expanded the focus to include connectivity, the development of the Northeast, and a broader Indo-Pacific vision, but it built directly on this earlier transformation.
The journey from looking to engaging reflects a deeper change in how the country saw itself. It moved from a cautious economy seeking markets to a confident power willing to shape the regional order through political partnerships, economic integration, and security cooperation. The eastward turn was no longer a hopeful gaze toward distant opportunities. It had become a sustained, deliberate effort to build influence across one of the most dynamic regions of the world.
What do you think? Was the shift from Look East to a more active engagement driven more by India’s own economic confidence, or by the changing balance of power in Asia? And how much of the success in this period depended on partnerships with countries like Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam rather than on engagement with ASEAN as a bloc?
References
- https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/india-asean-partners-for-progress
- https://theasanforum.org/from-look-east-to-act-east-transitions-in-indias-eastward-engagement/
- https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-asean-at-25-celebrating-the-past-preparing-for-the-future
- https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspetives-24.pdf?ver=2017-03-14-123654-447
- https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-asean-naval-cooperation-an-important-strategy
- https://intlreg.org/2023/05/09/growing-maritime-cooperation-asean-and-india/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIMBEX
- https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-look-east-to-act-east-mapping-india-s-southeast-asian-engagement
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