Appointment of Judges in Zia-Ul-Barani’s Ideal Governance

When Ziauddin Barani sat down in the 1350s to write the Fatawa-i-Jahandari, he was not merely recording history. He was designing an ideal state. Having served Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq for seventeen years as a close companion, Barani had watched power up close, and he had clear ideas about how a just kingdom should function. Among the many institutions he discussed, the judiciary held a special place. For Barani, the appointment of judges was not a routine administrative task but one of the most important duties a ruler could perform, because it was through judges that ordinary people experienced whether the state was fair or cruel.

Why judges mattered in Barani’s vision of governance 🔗

Barani believed that the primary duty of a ruler was to ensure justice for all subjects, regardless of their social standing or religion. The Fatawa-i-Jahandari presents an idealized vision of kingship in which the Sultan must uphold both moral conduct and legal fairness. Within this framework, judges became the instruments through which justice actually reached the people. A Sultan could declare his commitment to justice, but it was the judge in the courtroom who decided real disputes, punished real wrongdoers, and protected real victims.

This is why Barani treated judicial appointments with such seriousness. A corrupt or incompetent judge would undo everything the ruler claimed to stand for. The whole legitimacy of the Sultanate, in Barani’s thinking, depended on whether the common person believed they would be treated fairly. Justice was therefore not just a moral ideal but a practical foundation for political stability.

Protecting the vulnerable from oppression 🔗

A recurring theme in Barani’s writing is the protection of the weak against the powerful. He argued that a ruler’s legitimacy came from his ability to prevent oppression and maintain order. Judges were appointed precisely to stand between the strong and the weak. Without a functioning judicial system, the powerful could seize land, withhold inheritances, or escape punishment for violence. Barani saw the judge as a check on this kind of abuse, ensuring that even those without wealth or influence had somewhere to turn.

This protective role gave judicial appointments a moral weight. By appointing honest and learned judges, the Sultan was effectively extending his protection to every corner of his kingdom. By appointing weak or dishonest ones, he was abandoning his subjects to exploitation.

The Sultan at the apex of the judicial system 🔗

In Barani’s structure, the Sultan stood at the very top of the judicial hierarchy. The king was considered the supreme authority in all legal matters, which meant that the entire system of courts and judges ultimately drew its authority from him. This concentration of judicial power in the ruler was consistent with Barani’s broader political philosophy, in which the Sultan was seen as a kind of divine agent whose commands carried religious weight.

However, this supreme authority was not meant to be exercised arbitrarily. Barani held that the Sultan, though the highest legal authority, was required to seek advice from the Qazi-ul-Quzat, or Chief Judge, on religious and legal affairs. The ruler was powerful, but he was also expected to respect the expertise of those trained in law. This created a balance: the Sultan had the final word, yet he was guided by learned judges who understood the principles of justice in depth.

The role of the Chief Judge 🔗

The Chief Judge occupied a position of immense respect in the Sultanate’s judicial structure. Historically, this highest judicial officer was known as the Qazi-ul-Quzat, sometimes also called the qazi-i-mamalik. He was selected from among the most learned and virtuous men in the kingdom. The principle here was that the person entrusted with overseeing all other judges had to be beyond reproach in both knowledge and character.

This reflects an important idea in Barani’s framework: judicial authority was meritocratic in one specific sense. Judges were expected to be chosen for their learning in law and their moral standing. During the Sultanate period, judges were appointed on the basis of their high standard of learning in law, and they were regarded as men of great ability who commanded respect in society.

A structured system of courts 🔗

Barani did not imagine justice as something delivered haphazardly. He envisioned a structured judicial system with different courts handling different kinds of disputes. This system operated at multiple levels and dealt with both civil and criminal matters, ensuring that the machinery of justice could reach across the kingdom rather than being concentrated only in the capital.

Civil and criminal courts 🔗

The judicial system distinguished between civil and criminal cases. According to descriptions of the period’s dual judicial system, certain courts dealt with civil matters such as property disputes, inheritance, and contractual disagreements. Other courts handled criminal matters such as theft, violence, and similar offences. Punishments in these courts were meant to align with the principles of the Shari’ah, the Islamic legal code that formed the backbone of the Sultanate’s formal justice.

This separation was practical. Property and inheritance disputes required careful examination of evidence and law, while criminal cases demanded swift action to maintain public order. By organising courts according to the type of case, the system could function more efficiently and deliver more appropriate outcomes.

Central and provincial levels 🔗

The judicial network was not limited to Delhi. Courts operated at both central and provincial levels, which meant that justice could be administered closer to where people actually lived. At the provincial level, qazis were appointed to handle local disputes, while the central authority in the capital supervised the overall system and handled the most significant matters.

Administratively, the appointment of qazis was managed through a dedicated department. The religious and judicial wing of the administration, often associated with the office of the Sadr-us-Sudur, was responsible for ecclesiastical affairs and for appointing qazis across the realm. This officer also approved religious and educational grants such as waqf endowments. The judicial department was further assisted by muhtasibs, or public censors, whose job was to ensure there was no public infringement of moral and legal norms.

Justice aligned with state interests 🔗

One of the most interesting aspects of Barani’s thought is how he balanced religious law with the practical needs of the state. Although he strongly advocated for governance based on the Shari’ah, the actual working of the Sultanate often required flexibility. Barani himself distinguished between jahandari, the secular dimension of rulership, and dindari, the religious dimension, and he accepted that some secular features were inevitable.

A famous example he recorded illustrates this tension. When the theologian Qazi Mughisuddin pointed out the strict legal position on the division of war booty during Alauddin Khalji’s reign, the Sultan responded that he acted according to the needs of the state, which were paramount. This episode, which Barani preserved, shows that even a deeply religious thinker recognised that state laws, the zawabit, could override strict religious law when the stability of the kingdom was at stake.

This had direct implications for the judiciary. Judges were expected to uphold justice, but justice was understood in a way that also served the stability and interests of the state. The judicial system existed not only to settle disputes but to maintain social order and reinforce the authority of the ruler. In Barani’s mind, a stable, well-ordered society and a functioning system of justice were two sides of the same coin.

The link between justice and stability 🔗

For Barani, oppression and disorder were diseases that could afflict the body politic. A well-functioning judicial system was one of the main remedies. By appointing capable judges who could resolve conflicts fairly and punish wrongdoing, the ruler kept society from descending into chaos. Justice, in this sense, was preventive medicine for the state. It stopped grievances from festering into rebellion and kept the powerful from abusing the weak to the point of social breakdown.

The elitist undercurrent in Barani’s thought 🔗

It would be incomplete to discuss Barani’s ideal governance without acknowledging the controversial side of his thinking. Barani held a deeply elitist view of social hierarchy. He believed that governance, education, and high office should largely be reserved for the high-born, and he sharply criticised rulers who appointed people from humble backgrounds to important positions.

This bias shaped his vision of who should hold judicial and administrative authority. While he insisted that judges be learned and virtuous, he also assumed that such virtue was more likely to be found among the aristocracy. Modern readers rightly find this prejudice troubling, and it reminds us that Barani’s ideal state, for all its emphasis on justice, was built on assumptions of inequality that excluded large sections of society from positions of authority. His thought represents both a serious attempt to theorise just governance and a product of the rigid social hierarchies of his time.

Why Barani’s judicial ideas still matter 🔗

Barani’s discussion of judicial appointments remains relevant for anyone studying political thought. He grasped a principle that endures today: the quality of justice depends heavily on the quality of those appointed to deliver it. His insistence that judges be learned, honest, and respected anticipates modern concerns about judicial integrity and competence. His structured system of courts at central and provincial levels echoes the layered judicial hierarchies that exist in contemporary states.

At the same time, his work shows the dangers of concentrating ultimate judicial authority in a single ruler and of tying judicial appointments to social class. These are precisely the problems that modern constitutional systems try to avoid through independent judiciaries and merit-based appointments. Reading Barani, then, is valuable both for what he got right and for what his system reveals about the limits of medieval governance.

What do you think? Was Barani’s insistence on appointing only learned and high-born judges a genuine safeguard for justice, or did it simply protect the interests of the elite? And how does his idea of the ruler as the supreme judicial authority compare with the principle of an independent judiciary that we value today?

References

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziauddin_Barani
2. https://www.dalvoy.com/en/upsc/mains/previous-years/2025/history-paper-i/barani-fatwa-i-jahandari-lament
3. https://testbook.com/question-answer/the-highest-judicial-officer-in-the-sultanate-was–63babcd9abb877bb36cadb11
4. https://bdlrp.com/the-judicial-system-in-medieval-india-an-overview-of-the-sultanate-period/
5. https://www.egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/68913/3/Unit-7.pdf
6. https://selfstudyhistory.com/2014/12/24/8-medieval-india-government-and-administration-under-the-delhi-sultanat-13th-14th-centuries/