Major Approaches to Understanding Middle Powers: Position, Geography, Norms, and Behavior

When students of international relations look at the global stage, attention naturally gravitates towards the United States and China. Yet the international system is shaped just as decisively by a less glamorous category of states: the middle powers. These are countries like India, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil that lack superpower muscle but wield far more influence than smaller states. The trouble is that scholars have never fully agreed on what a “middle power” actually is. Over decades of debate, four major approaches have emerged to make sense of these states, each looking at a different defining feature: their position in the global hierarchy, their geography, their values, and their behaviour. Understanding these four lenses is the key to grasping why countries in the “middle” matter so much in shaping world order.

Why defining middle powers is so difficult 🔗

The concept of a middle power is one of the oldest yet most contested in international relations. As far back as the late nineteenth century, German writers used the term Mittelmacht to describe a state occupying an intermediate position in the European Concert of Powers. The idea was later revived in the 1940s when Canadian and Australian diplomats argued that their nations deserved recognition for being important enough to matter to the great powers, even if they could never sit at the top table.

The problem is that “middle” can mean many things. It can refer to the amount of power a state holds, where it sits geographically, the kind of foreign policy it pursues, or the diplomatic roles it plays. Because of this fluidity, one scholar famously noted that confusion reigns supreme in attempts to determine precisely who is a middle power, and why. To bring order to this confusion, academics have organised their thinking into a few distinct approaches. The most influential of these are the positional, geographic, normative, and behavioural approaches.

The positional approach 🔗

The most straightforward way to understand middle powers is by looking at where they rank in the international hierarchy. The positional approach defines middle powers as states that fall between great powers and small states in terms of their material capabilities and influence. They are, quite simply, neither great nor minor.

This approach relies heavily on quantifiable indicators of national power. Scholars measure factors such as population size, gross domestic product (GDP), military expenditure, and territorial extent, then rank states accordingly. On this logic, the countries that cluster in the middle of the global league table are the middle powers. The approach is associated with the pioneering work of Carsten Holbraad, whose 1984 book on the structural determinants of middle-power behaviour became a core reference for the field.

Strengths and weaknesses of measuring power 🔗

The appeal of the positional approach is its clarity. By focusing on the material power capabilities that a state possesses relative to both great powers and smaller states, it offers an apparently objective starting point for classification. India, with its large population, growing economy, and substantial military, fits neatly into this middle tier.

But the approach has clear limits. Critics point out that there is little or no correlation between a state’s size or position and the actual conduct of its diplomacy. In other words, having middle power capacities tells us only what a state could do in principle, not what it will choose to do. A country could possess all the resources of a middle power and still behave like an isolationist or an aggressor. Position alone, then, is necessary but not sufficient for understanding these states.

The geographic approach 🔗

A second way of thinking about middle powers focuses not on how much power they hold, but on where they sit on the map. The geographic approach traces back to that original German notion of the Mittelmacht: a state physically located between competing great powers. Such states occupy a geographically intermediate space, and this location fundamentally shapes their strategic choices.

When Carsten Holbraad revisited the concept in 1971, he drew on these early nineteenth-century German writings about a middle geographical state occupying an intermediate position to inform his definition. For states caught between larger neighbours, geography is destiny in a very real sense.

The balancing act of location 🔗

States defined by their geographic position frequently find themselves performing a delicate balancing act between competing powers. Their location forces them to manage relationships carefully, often using their position to preserve independence rather than being absorbed into the orbit of any single great power.

This is highly relevant for understanding India today. Sitting in a region shaped by the rivalry between the United States and China, India must navigate carefully between the two. Commentators note that the changing American role and increasing Chinese assertiveness have created more space for middle powers like India to assert what is often called strategic autonomy. Geography, in this sense, is not just a backdrop but an active driver of foreign policy.

The normative approach 🔗

The third major lens shifts attention away from material facts entirely and towards values. The normative approach defines middle powers by their commitment to a particular set of liberal, internationalist ideals. On this view, middle powers are the world’s “good international citizens.” They are states that, because they benefit so much from a stable and rule-bound world order, take it upon themselves to defend international norms, law, and cooperation.

This idea gained real momentum as the Cold War ended. Scholars began to argue explicitly that middle powers were defined by their adherence to a set of characteristic Western, liberal behaviours. The apparent victory of liberal internationalism seemed to open up new space for middle powers to act as champions of a cooperative global order.

Good international citizenship 🔗

What does “good international citizenship” look like in practice? It typically means committing one’s relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of peace and order. It means supporting multilateral institutions, contributing to UN peacekeeping, championing humanitarian causes, and promoting development. The motivation, in the classic formulation, is partly idealistic: middle powers undertake these activities out of a sense that this is simply what a responsible middle power ought to do.

India’s traditional foreign policy posture fits parts of this mould. Its long-standing emphasis on multilateralism, South-South cooperation, and respect for international law reflects this normative orientation. Even today, observers note that India has remained largely committed to multilateralism and has expanded its role in selected areas of global governance.

The behavioural approach 🔗

The fourth and most popular approach defines middle powers by what they do rather than what they are. The behavioural approach, most famously developed by Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal in their influential 1993 study, identifies middle powers through a distinctive style of diplomacy.

According to this view, middle powers can be recognised by three characteristic tendencies: a preference for multilateral solutions to international problems, a willingness to embrace compromise positions in disputes, and an embrace of good international citizenship as a guide to policy. The behavioural definition quickly became the most popular approach to identifying middle powers and remains so today.

Coalition-building and niche diplomacy 🔗

What unites the behavioural definition is the idea that middle powers carve out influence through skill rather than raw strength. They act as mediators and “go-betweens,” build coalitions, and engage in conflict management. During the Cold War, middle power diplomacy relied heavily on mediation and bridge-building. In the post-Cold War era, the toolkit widened. Scholars observe that middle powers expanded their repertoire on an issue-specific basis using niche diplomacy, concentrating their limited resources on particular areas where they could make a real difference.

The tautology problem 🔗

The behavioural approach is powerful, but it has a notable flaw. Critics argue that it contains an unavoidable element of circular reasoning: the same behavioural patterns are used both to define a state as a middle power and to explain why it behaves the way it does. If we say a country is a middle power because it pursues multilateralism, and then explain its multilateralism by pointing to its status as a middle power, we are arguing in a circle. Despite this, the behavioural lens remains the dominant way most analysts identify these states.

The four approaches in conversation 🔗

It is tempting to treat these four approaches as rivals, but in practice they work best together. A widely cited framework combines them, suggesting that middle powers can be identified through their capabilities (the positional dimension), the extent to which they can get things done (their influence), and the degree to which they pursue a foreign policy that befits a middle power (the normative and behavioural dimension). No single approach captures the full picture. Position tells us about potential, geography tells us about constraints and opportunities, norms tell us about identity and values, and behaviour tells us about actual conduct.

India illustrates this neatly. Positionally, its size and economy place it firmly in the middle tier. Geographically, it must balance between great powers in a contested region. Normatively, it has long championed cooperation and international law. Behaviourally, it engages in coalition-building and consensus-seeking on the world stage.

A shifting landscape 🔗

One reason this topic remains alive is that the behaviour of middle powers is visibly changing. The neat picture of the 1990s, in which middle powers were assumed to be reliable champions of multilateralism, no longer fully holds. Today, many middle powers are pursuing a more pragmatic, interest-driven approach.

A clear sign of this shift is the rise of “minilateralism.” Rather than working through large bodies like the United Nations, middle powers increasingly favour small, flexible, issue-based partnerships. Analysts describe how groupings situated between bilateralism and multilateralism are becoming more significant, precisely because they avoid the gridlock of larger institutions. India’s participation in arrangements like the Quad and the I2U2 grouping reflects this trend. Some scholars even argue that the heyday of purely normative middle power diplomacy is fading, as states focus on pragmatic, regional, and realism-based initiatives that secure their national interests.

Yet middle powers have arguably never been more important. As the world drifts towards a more multipolar order, these states are increasingly seen as essential stabilisers. The World Economic Forum has suggested that alignments between middle powers could help drive a renewed form of multilateralism, linking Western and non-Western states such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. Far from being mere followers of the great powers, middle powers may well become the architects of the next international order.

Why this matters for the study of world politics 🔗

Grasping these four approaches does more than help you answer an exam question. It equips you to analyse the behaviour of real states in a fast-changing world. When you read about India navigating between Washington and Beijing, or about new coalitions forming across the Global South, you can ask sharper questions. Is this state acting from its position, its geography, its values, or a calculated strategy? Most often, the honest answer is a combination of all four. The four lenses give you a vocabulary to describe that complexity rather than reducing it to a single cause.

What do you think? If middle powers are increasingly abandoning idealistic multilateralism in favour of pragmatic, interest-based partnerships, does the classic “good international citizen” definition still make sense in the 2020s? And which of the four approaches do you think best captures India’s actual role in the world today?

References

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