Middle Powers as Emerging Powers: Understanding the Concept and Challenges

The phrase “middle power” turns up constantly in debates about who really matters in world politics, yet almost no one agrees on what it actually means. Countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, and South Africa are routinely placed in this category, but they differ wildly in wealth, military strength, and regional clout. So what binds them together? And why has this slippery label become so popular in the post-Cold War era? This post unpacks the concept, examines how scholars try to define it, and looks at the distinct challenges these states face as they push for a larger voice in global affairs.

What is a middle power? 🔗

At its simplest, a middle power is a state that sits in the middle of the international hierarchy–below a superpower that wields overwhelming influence, but clearly above the mass of small and weak states. It has enough resources and diplomatic skill to shape outcomes on specific issues, but not enough to dictate terms to the world.

The trouble starts the moment you try to be more precise. As the Carnegie Endowment notes, there is no consensus definition, no agreed criteria or thresholds, and no settled list of which countries qualify. The former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans once observed that it is easier to define middle powers by what they are not: they are not global powers able to impose their preferences on others. This is why the category is best understood as ambiguous and fluid rather than fixed.

The main approaches to defining middle powers 🔗

Because the term resists a single definition, scholars have developed several distinct lenses for identifying middle powers. Reviews of the literature usually set out three paradigmatic approaches-positional, behavioural, and identity-based-which are often presented as rivals but in practice overlap and influence one another. Understanding these three is the key to grasping the whole debate.

The positional approach 🔗

The positional approach, rooted in realist thinking, ranks states using measurable attributes of power. As one survey explains, it produces lists that place middle powers below the system-defining great powers but above the mass of minor powers. The relevant indicators usually include population size, military expenditure, and gross domestic product.

The appeal here is simplicity and the comfort of hard numbers. The weakness is that quantity can mislead: a large population can be a source of strength or, in conditions of food insecurity, a source of vulnerability. Critics argue this method tends to swap what can be easily counted for what we actually want to understand.

The behavioural approach 🔗

The behavioural approach shifts attention from raw capabilities to how states actually conduct themselves. The idea is that middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a particular range of foreign policy interests, using their diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability. Typical behaviours include preferring multilateral solutions, building coalitions, and acting as good international citizens.

This model captures something real about diplomatic style, but it has limits. As one analysis points out, the behavioural model has been questioned for emphasising diplomatic preferences rather than actual influence-a state that talks like a middle power but never achieves its preferred outcomes may not deserve the label. The proposed fix is to require evidence of real effectiveness, not just good intentions.

The identity approach 🔗

The third approach treats middle power status as a matter of self-perception and recognition. Here, the concept is reserved for states whose leaders explicitly claim a special middle power role for their own country. Status, in this view, is relational-a country is a middle power partly because it says it is and partly because others accept the claim.

Some constructivist scholars combine these threads, defining middle power as a self-identified and externally recognised status that emerges through deliberate efforts to assert oneself despite having smaller capabilities than great powers. The risk of demanding that a state satisfy all three approaches at once is that the list shrinks back to its Eurocentric origins, with only Canada and Australia comfortably qualifying.

Traditional versus emerging middle powers 🔗

One of the most useful distinctions in this field separates older, established middle powers from the newer entrants. The political scientist Eduard Jordaan argued that while all middle powers stabilise and legitimise the global order through cooperative initiatives, the two types differ in important ways.

According to his framework, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social-democratic states with weak regional orientation-Canada, Australia, and the Nordic countries fit this mould. Emerging middle powers, by contrast, are semi-peripheral, more unequal internally, and recently democratised states that show strong regional influence and seek regional integration. Brazil, South Africa, and India sit closer to this second group.

This distinction matters because the two types behave differently. Traditional middle powers often construct identities distinct from the powerful states near them and offer modest concessions to demands for global reform. Emerging middle powers favour reform of the existing order, lean heavily on their regional roles, and frequently see themselves as voices for the developing world.

Why middle powers matter more after the Cold War 🔗

Middle powers are not entirely new. During the Cold War, many of these countries were active in the Non-Aligned Movement, but its members were largely marginal players who rarely affected the superpower contest. What has changed is their genuine ability to influence outcomes, which is why analysts argue the old framing no longer does them justice.

The shift towards a more multipolar world has opened space for these states to manoeuvre. The World Economic Forum has highlighted how, amid growing geo-economic uncertainty and fragmentation, middle powers could be instrumental in building a new multilateralism to tackle shared global challenges. With the two largest powers locked in rivalry, mid-sized states gain leverage precisely because neither giant can take their alignment for granted.

The tools middle powers use 🔗

Middle powers rarely get their way through force. Instead they rely on diplomacy and clever institutional strategies. Britannica notes that they typically possess highly institutionalised foreign services and wide networks of diplomatic missions, which let them disseminate ideas and act as moral and intellectual leaders. By projecting credible positions on issues like human security, they can set agendas, build coalitions, and challenge great-power dominance on particular questions.

A defining feature of recent middle-power strategy is minilateralism-small, issue-focused groupings that sit between bilateral deals and large multilateral institutions. As one analysis explains, by working together on a specific agenda, small groups of countries avoid the gridlock of decision-making in larger organisations. The Quad and the I2U2 group are prominent examples, allowing members to pool capital, technology, and markets without the friction of consensus among dozens of states.

India as a middle power 🔗

India offers a revealing case because it can be read through every one of the approaches above. Positionally, its economic scale, military capacity, and diplomatic reach place it firmly above smaller states. Behaviourally, it has long favoured multilateralism and coalition-building. In terms of identity, it increasingly presents itself as a leading voice of the developing world.

For decades, India was described as a state with enormous potential that nonetheless remained a middle power, unable to fully convert its economic, demographic, and political scope into commensurate influence. That is changing. Analysts now describe India as the most committed major state to the idea of a multipolar Asia, gaining the confidence to forge relationships that maximise its position without alienating partners or rivals.

Strategic autonomy and multi-alignment 🔗

India’s signature approach is what its diplomats call multi-alignment-engaging multiple power centres simultaneously rather than joining a single camp. Its strategic position lets it act as an intermediary between competing blocs, cultivating ties with Western nations and Russia while expanding influence in bodies like BRICS+, the G20, and the United Nations. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has framed groupings like the Quad around the growth of a multipolar order and the principle that others cannot hold a veto over India’s own choices.

This flexibility has produced concrete results. In a more transactional and unpredictable global environment, New Delhi has expanded diplomacy with other middle powers-producing agreements on defence, energy, technology, and trade with countries including Brazil, France, Israel, and Japan. Reviving coalitions such as India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) is part of this outreach to fellow middle powers.

The challenges middle powers face 🔗

For all their growing prominence, middle powers operate under real constraints, and their roles are far from secure.

The shadow of great-power rivalry 🔗

The most basic challenge is that the gap between the top two powers and everyone else remains vast. Whether the world is bipolar or multipolar, the dominance of the U.S.-China dynamic is a reality that India and other middle powers cannot ignore. Their room for manoeuvre can shrink suddenly if the giants either clash openly or strike a bargain over the heads of smaller states.

Limited and conditional influence 🔗

Even capable middle powers find their impact uneven. A study of Japan and South Korea captures this neatly, describing their diplomacy as “indispensable yet insufficient”-they promote norms and facilitate dialogue, yet their influence stays limited and is often overshadowed by great-power rivalry. Middle-power diplomacy is therefore conditional and relational rather than a permanent attribute.

The risk of being seen as a follower 🔗

Choosing partners carries reputational danger. Indian commentators have warned that during the Cold War, by focusing narrowly on regional security interests, India came to be seen as a “camp follower” of the Soviet Union, damaging its relations with the West. The same caution applies today: aligning too closely with one bloc can undercut the very independence that gives a middle power its value.

Internal contradictions 🔗

Emerging middle powers in particular wrestle with internal inequality and the tension between reform and stability. They want a bigger seat at the table, yet they also benefit from the order they are trying to change, leaving them to balance ambition against the constraints of the existing system.

The evolving role of middle powers 🔗

Looking ahead, the relevance of middle powers seems likely to grow rather than fade. As the U.S.-led liberal order weakens, some scholars argue these states are asserting agency through strategic adaptability, emerging as key actors in securing a more stable global transition. Their strengths-coalition-building, norm promotion, and bridging divides-are precisely the skills a fragmented world needs to address climate change, pandemics, and economic instability.

The concept will remain contested. But that ambiguity is also part of its usefulness: it is flexible enough to describe a Canada and an India, a Japan and a Brazil, even as those countries pursue very different paths. What unites them is the strategic position of being too significant to ignore yet too constrained to command-and the diplomatic creativity that position demands.

What do you think? If middle power status depends on behaviour and recognition rather than fixed numbers, can a country lose the label simply by changing how it acts? And as India grows more powerful, is it still useful to call it a “middle power,” or is it outgrowing the category altogether?

References

1. https://www.britannica.com/topic/middle-power
2. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/the-middle-power-moment
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11. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/01/middle-powers-multilateralism-international-relations/
12. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10/minilateral-diplomacy-middle-power-india-israel-uae/
13. https://www.isdp.eu/publication/india-in-a-world-of-asymmetrical-multipolarity/
14. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/01/29/india-foreign-policy-report/
15. https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2024/12/10/1926114618/5%20Zakharov_ENG.pdf
16. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/india-and-a-changing-global-order-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-2-0-era
17. https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/india-leaning-one-side-cautiously
18. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249050742_The_Concept_of_a_Middle_Power_in_International_Relations_Distinguishing_Between_Emerging_and_Traditional_Middle_Powers
19. https://www.orfonline.org/research/choosing-the-middle-path-for-middle-power