In August 2021, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan as American forces completed their withdrawal. The collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government took only a few weeks, and the speed of it stunned policymakers across the region. For South Asia, the consequences run far deeper than a change of regime in Kabul. The Taliban’s return has reshaped the security calculations of every neighbouring state and exposed the deep fractures running through the region’s only continent-wide cooperative body, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Understanding why a single political event in Afghanistan could paralyse an eight-member organisation tells us a great deal about how regional cooperation actually works, and why it so often fails.

Table of Contents

How the Taliban returned to power

The roots of the 2021 takeover lie in a deal signed in Doha, Qatar, in February 2020 between the United States and the Taliban. Under that agreement, the US committed to withdrawing all its troops, while the elected Afghan government was not even a party to the talks. When the Biden administration confirmed a full withdrawal timed to the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban launched a rapid offensive. The Afghan National Army offered almost no major resistance, and the Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, re-establishing what they call the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The new rulers formed an interim government and described it as inclusive, though the international community has largely disputed that claim. Crucially, even years later, no SAARC member state has formally recognised the Taliban government. This non-recognition is the thread that runs through almost every regional complication discussed below.

Pakistan’s long shadow over Kabul

The phrase “Pakistan-backed Taliban” is not casual shorthand. Pakistan has a documented, decades-long history of supporting the Afghan Taliban, and while Islamabad publicly pledged non-partisanship after the takeover, analysts argue these denials are significantly overstated given its record of interference. To understand why, you need to grasp Pakistan’s strategic logic.

Pakistani military thinking has long been shaped by a doctrine of strategic depth, the idea that a friendly government in Kabul gives Pakistan a buffer against its primary rival, India. As one analysis from the National University of Singapore notes, Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy has been fundamentally India-centric, aimed at limiting New Delhi’s influence and ensuring a pro-Islamabad regime next door. Support for the Taliban was the central instrument of that policy.

Why the takeover threatens regional stability

The instability flowing from Afghanistan is not abstract. It manifests in concrete security threats that spill across borders, and ironically, Pakistan itself has become one of the biggest victims.

The boomerang of terrorism

The most striking development since 2021 has been the resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. This group operates from Afghan soil and has sharply increased the intensity of its attacks since the Afghan Taliban took power. The takeover that Islamabad welcomed has, in the words of one study, exacerbated economic, security and humanitarian crises with mounting concerns for neighbouring countries, with Pakistan among the most vulnerable through terrorism, drug trafficking and refugee flows.

The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to act against the TTP has badly strained relations between Kabul and Islamabad. By late 2025, this distrust had escalated into open conflict, with cross-border clashes in October 2025 reaching the deadliest levels since the Taliban seized power. The two sides agreed to repeated ceasefires that quickly broke down, and the renewed tensions directly threaten the security of the wider region. This is the central paradox: the very group Pakistan nurtured to secure its western flank has helped destabilise it.

A new security map for South Asia

The realignment has been dramatic. The Durand Line, the 2,600-kilometre colonial-era border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, remains a flashpoint because the Taliban refuse to recognise it as a legitimate international boundary, calling it an imaginary line. Combined with the TTP issue and the deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, the friendship Islamabad expected has curdled into hostility.

The impact on SAARC

To appreciate how the Taliban issue affects SAARC, it helps to recall that the organisation was already in deep trouble. Founded in 1985 and based in Kathmandu, SAARC brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined in 2007 under President Hamid Karzai. But the body operates on a principle that turns out to be its Achilles’ heel.

The unanimity trap

Under Article X of the SAARC Charter, all decisions must be taken on the basis of unanimity, and every member must attend a summit for it to proceed. This means any single state can effectively freeze the entire organisation. That is precisely what has happened. The last summit, the 18th, was held in Kathmandu in November 2014. The 19th was scheduled for Islamabad in 2016 but collapsed after a terrorist attack on an Indian army camp in Uri.

India blamed Pakistan-based terrorists and announced a boycott. Within days, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan joined the boycott, with Sri Lanka soon expressing similar reservations. With four of eight members opting out, Pakistan was forced to postpone the summit. No SAARC summit has been held since, which is why the body is widely described as moribund or effectively defunct.

The Taliban question deepens the deadlock

Into this already paralysed organisation arrived the question of who should represent Afghanistan. This is where Pakistan’s support for the Taliban collides directly with the reluctance of other members to engage the group. The clash became visible in September 2021, when the annual SAARC foreign ministers’ meeting, usually held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, was cancelled.

The reason was telling. Pakistan insisted the Taliban be allowed to represent Afghanistan, which other member states refused to accept. As the Britannica summary of SAARC puts it, the Taliban’s takeover has further strained the grouping’s dynamics, with Pakistan supporting Taliban participation while other members object. Because every SAARC decision requires consensus, this single disagreement is enough to keep meetings from happening at all.

The Taliban takeover therefore added a fresh layer of indecision on top of the existing India-Pakistan freeze. As one commentator observed, no South Asian country recognises the Kabul regime, which raises unresolved questions about its participation in future summits. SAARC cannot decide who speaks for one of its eight members, and so it cannot convene.

Divergent responses: a region pulling apart

What makes the situation genuinely interesting is that the member states have not simply split into “engage” and “don’t engage” camps along predictable lines. The picture is more fluid, and recent developments have scrambled expectations entirely.

India’s calculated pivot

India’s response is the most surprising. Having evacuated its Kabul diplomats in 2021 and long viewed the Taliban with suspicion, New Delhi has gradually moved toward pragmatic engagement. In January 2025, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Taliban’s acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai, the highest-level engagement since Kabul’s fall. The relationship accelerated after the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, which India blamed on Pakistan and which the Taliban condemned.

The turning point came in October 2025, when Muttaqi visited New Delhi for the first high-level face-to-face meeting between the two governments. During the visit, India announced it would upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, while still stopping short of formal recognition. The logic is strategic: by becoming Afghanistan’s largest humanitarian donor and a major economic partner, India builds influence and counters Pakistan, all without granting the Taliban legitimacy.

Pakistan’s strategy backfires

For Pakistan, this is the worst possible outcome. The country that championed the Taliban now finds Kabul drifting toward its rival. Islamabad has responded by accusing India of “inciting” the Afghan Taliban and using it as a proxy, even designating alleged India-linked militants under new labels. The strategic depth Pakistan sought has produced a hostile neighbour to its west and a TTP problem it cannot contain.

Smaller states and the search for alternatives

The smaller SAARC members, particularly Nepal and Bangladesh, have repeatedly pushed to revive the summit process, but without Indian participation their efforts go nowhere. Frustrated with SAARC’s paralysis, India has pivoted decisively toward alternative groupings that exclude Pakistan, chiefly BIMSTEC (which links South and Southeast Asian states) and the BBIN initiative grouping Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. The shift toward subregional cooperation is, in effect, a workaround for SAARC’s death.

What it all means for the future of cooperation

The Taliban episode is best understood as a stress test that SAARC failed. The organisation was built on the assumption that member states could insulate multilateral cooperation from their bilateral disputes. Pakistan itself invoked this principle when it accused India of casting the shadow of bilateral problems over a regional forum. But the unanimity rule means that insulation was always a fiction. Any deep rivalry, whether over Kashmir or over the Taliban’s seat, can hold the whole structure hostage.

The deeper lesson concerns the relationship between terrorism, political instability and institutional design. SAARC’s consensus model was meant to protect small states from domination. Instead, it has become a veto that guarantees gridlock whenever the two largest members disagree. With cross-border terrorism, contested governments, and now an active Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict, the conditions that would allow consensus simply do not exist. Whether South Asia builds new institutions that can function despite the India-Pakistan rivalry, or whether the region remains one of the least integrated in the world, is a question the Taliban’s return has made impossible to ignore.

What do you think? If a regional organisation can be paralysed by the disagreement of just two members, is the consensus model worth preserving, or should South Asia build cooperation around smaller, more flexible groupings? And does India’s pragmatic engagement with a government it refuses to recognise represent clever statecraft or a troubling compromise of principle?

How useful was this post?

Click on a star to rate it!

Average rating 1 / 5. Vote count: 1

No votes so far! Be the first to rate this post.

We are sorry that this post was not useful for you!

Let us improve this post!

Tell us how we can improve this post?

References
  1. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2022/05/06/talibans-takeover-of-afghanistan-and-pakistans-security-challenges/
  2. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistans-hard-policy-choices-afghanistan
  3. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistans-role-in-the-future-of-afghanistan
  4. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2025.2466193
  5. https://orionpolicy.org/opportunity-for-lasting-peace-renewed-violence-tests-afghanistan-pakistan-relations/
  6. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/?p=18422
  7. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/bhutan-bangladesh-afghanistan-boycott-saarc-2088536
  8. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/suspending-afghanistan-from-saarc-and-international-law
  9. https://www.britannica.com/topic/South-Asian-Association-for-Regional-Cooperation
  10. https://theannapurnaexpress.com/story/60610/
  11. https://cenjows.in/indias-diplomatic-ties-with-taliban/
  12. https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/whats-behind-indias-political-rapprochement-with-the-taliban/
  13. https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/saarc-is-dead-long-live-sub-regional-co-operation/

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Introduction to South Asia

1 South Asia as Region

  1. Geography of South Asia
  2. History of South Asia
  3. Form of Government
  4. Political Parties
  5. Political Processes
  6. Intra-Regional Politics
  7. South Asia during the Cold War years
  8. South Asia and the Global War on Terror
  9. South Asia and China
  10. Human Development in South Asia
  11. Economic Growth in South Asia
  12. Regional Cooperation

2 Struggle for Independence and Nationalism in South Asia

  1. Nationalism in South Asia
  2. Freedom Struggle in South Asia
  3. India
  4. Pakistan
  5. Bangladesh
  6. Sri Lanka
  7. Nepal
  8. Bhutan
  9. Maldives

3 Diversity and Pluralism in South Asia

  1. Understanding Diversity and Pluralism
  2. Patterns of Diversity and Pluralism
  3. Diversity of Space
  4. Plurality of Culture and Religion
  5. Linguistic Diversity
  6. Ethnic Landscape
  7. Social and Economic Variations
  8. Political Pluralism
  9. Working of Diversity and Pluralism

4 Political Structures and Processes in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

  1. Constitutional Status
  2. Status of Rights
  3. Role of Judiciary
  4. Role of Election Commission
  5. Role of Army
  6. Role of Media
  7. Pressure Groups
  8. Status of Minorities
  9. Civil Society

5 Political Structures and Processes in Sri Lanka and the Maldives

  1. Political Structures in Sri Lanka
  2. Political Processes in Sri Lanka
  3. Political Structures in Maldives
  4. Political Processes in Maldives

6 Political Structures and Processes in Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal

  1. Similarities and Difference between Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal
  2. Afghanistan: Geography
  3. The Great Game in Afghanistan
  4. Recent History of Afghanistan
  5. The ‘Global War on Terror’
  6. Recent Developments (Afghanistan)
  7. Bhutan: Geography
  8. Recent History (Bhutan)
  9. Political Reform and Modernization (Bhutan)
  10. Gross National Happiness Index
  11. Elections in Bhutan
  12. Nepal: Geography
  13. Recent History (Nepal)
  14. Contemporary History (Nepal)
  15. Recent Developments (Nepal)

7 Human Development and Regional Imbalances in South Asia

  1. Defining Human Development
  2. Origin of Human Development
  3. Dimensions of Human Development
  4. Human Development in the Context of South Asia
  5. Regional Imbalance in South Asia
  6. Policies for Improving Human Development

8 Migration and Development in South Asia

  1. Relationship between Migration and Development
  2. Economic Dimension
  3. Political Dimension
  4. Social Dimension
  5. Climate Change and Migration
  6. Challenges of Migration

9 Environment and Development

  1. Basic Terminology
  2. The Relationship between Development and the Environmental Condition
  3. Changing Trends of Development and their Impact on Environment in South Asia
  4. Population Explosion And Development in South Asia
  5. Resource Utilization And Environmental Quality in South Asia
  6. Sustainable Development And Policy Reforms
  7. Regional Forums For Ecological Issues In South Asia

10 Armed Conflicts in South Asia

  1. Changing Nature and Characteristics of Armed Conflicts in the Region
  2. Contemporary Armed Conflicts in South Asia
  3. Armed Conflicts between India and Pakistan
  4. Internal Armed Conflicts in India involving Non-State Actors
  5. Armed Conflicts Involving Non-State Actors in Pakistan
  6. Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Afghanistan
  7. Armed Conflicts in Sri Lanka and Nepal

11 Territorial Disputes

  1. Territorial Disputes and Their Meaning
  2. Theoretical Explanation of Territorial Disputes
  3. Bilateral Territorial Disputes
  4. Territorial Disputes between India and Pakistan
  5. India/China Disputes
  6. India/Nepal Disputes
  7. Bangladesh – India Disputes
  8. India / Sri Lanka Disputes
  9. Bangladesh / Myanmar Disputes
  10. Bhutan /China Dispute
  11. Pakistan and Afghanistan Disputes

12 Water Disputes and Water Sharing

  1. Understanding the Waterscape
  2. Run of Rivers
  3. South Asia: A Riverine Neighbourhood
  4. South Asia’s Major Rivers
  5. Water and Security or Hydropolitics
  6. Water Treaties
  7. Indus Waters Treaty
  8. Ganga Treaty

13 Civil Society in South Asia

  1. Different Types of Civil Society Organisations
  2. Defining Civil Societies
  3. Origin of the Concept of Civil Society
  4. Civil Society and the State
  5. Civil Society in Contemporary Political Thought
  6. Role and Significance of Civil Society
  7. Globalisation and Civil Society
  8. Civil Societies and South Asia
  9. The Tragedy of Human Rights: A Case Study of Civil Resistance in Afghanistan
  10. The Civil Society Alliance for Scaling up Nutrition: A Case Study of Pakistan
  11. Farm Bills and Agriculture Reforms: A Case Study Farmers’ Protest in India
  12. The Port City Economic Commission Bill: Rise of Labour Movement in Sri Lanka
  13. The People’s Movement in the Struggle for Democracy: A Case Study of Nepal
  14. Labour Mobility and Security: A Study of Bangladesh Civil Society for Migrants
  15. Livelihood Security and Economic Empowerment: A Study of SABAH Bhutan
  16. Rights of Employees Campaign in the Maldives
  17. Civil Societies and Social Movements
  18. Contributions by Civil Society in India
  19. Role of Media in Civil Society
  20. Civil Society and Democracy
  21. Critical Evaluation of Civil Society
  22. Role of Civil Society in Influencing Policy Making
  23. Resources and Principal Tactics of Civil Societies

14 SAARC

  1. Charter and its Principles
  2. Areas of Cooperation
  3. Summits and Important Outcomes
  4. Regional Centres
  5. Role of Observers
  6. SAPTA to SAFTA
  7. In Comparison to EU and ASEAN
  8. Role of China
  9. Control of Afghanistan by the Pakistan backed Taliban
  10. Hurdles in Progress
  11. How to Make SAARC More Effective
  12. Relevance

15 Dynamics of South Asian Security

  1. Concept of Security
  2. Contextualizing South Asia
  3. Security Dynamics of South Asia
  4. Traditional Security Dynamics
  5. Non-traditional Security Dynamics
  6. Response to Security Dynamics by South Asian Countries