In August 2021, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan as American forces completed their withdrawal. The collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government took only a few weeks, and the speed of it stunned policymakers across the region. For South Asia, the consequences run far deeper than a change of regime in Kabul. The Taliban’s return has reshaped the security calculations of every neighbouring state and exposed the deep fractures running through the region’s only continent-wide cooperative body, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Understanding why a single political event in Afghanistan could paralyse an eight-member organisation tells us a great deal about how regional cooperation actually works, and why it so often fails.
Table of Contents
- How the Taliban returned to power
- Pakistan’s long shadow over Kabul
- Why the takeover threatens regional stability
- The boomerang of terrorism
- A new security map for South Asia
- The impact on SAARC
- The unanimity trap
- The Taliban question deepens the deadlock
- Divergent responses: a region pulling apart
- India’s calculated pivot
- Pakistan’s strategy backfires
- Smaller states and the search for alternatives
- What it all means for the future of cooperation
How the Taliban returned to power
The roots of the 2021 takeover lie in a deal signed in Doha, Qatar, in February 2020 between the United States and the Taliban. Under that agreement, the US committed to withdrawing all its troops, while the elected Afghan government was not even a party to the talks. When the Biden administration confirmed a full withdrawal timed to the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban launched a rapid offensive. The Afghan National Army offered almost no major resistance, and the Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, re-establishing what they call the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
The new rulers formed an interim government and described it as inclusive, though the international community has largely disputed that claim. Crucially, even years later, no SAARC member state has formally recognised the Taliban government. This non-recognition is the thread that runs through almost every regional complication discussed below.
Pakistan’s long shadow over Kabul
The phrase “Pakistan-backed Taliban” is not casual shorthand. Pakistan has a documented, decades-long history of supporting the Afghan Taliban, and while Islamabad publicly pledged non-partisanship after the takeover, analysts argue these denials are significantly overstated given its record of interference. To understand why, you need to grasp Pakistan’s strategic logic.
Pakistani military thinking has long been shaped by a doctrine of strategic depth, the idea that a friendly government in Kabul gives Pakistan a buffer against its primary rival, India. As one analysis from the National University of Singapore notes, Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy has been fundamentally India-centric, aimed at limiting New Delhi’s influence and ensuring a pro-Islamabad regime next door. Support for the Taliban was the central instrument of that policy.
Why the takeover threatens regional stability
The instability flowing from Afghanistan is not abstract. It manifests in concrete security threats that spill across borders, and ironically, Pakistan itself has become one of the biggest victims.
The boomerang of terrorism
The most striking development since 2021 has been the resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. This group operates from Afghan soil and has sharply increased the intensity of its attacks since the Afghan Taliban took power. The takeover that Islamabad welcomed has, in the words of one study, exacerbated economic, security and humanitarian crises with mounting concerns for neighbouring countries, with Pakistan among the most vulnerable through terrorism, drug trafficking and refugee flows.
The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to act against the TTP has badly strained relations between Kabul and Islamabad. By late 2025, this distrust had escalated into open conflict, with cross-border clashes in October 2025 reaching the deadliest levels since the Taliban seized power. The two sides agreed to repeated ceasefires that quickly broke down, and the renewed tensions directly threaten the security of the wider region. This is the central paradox: the very group Pakistan nurtured to secure its western flank has helped destabilise it.
A new security map for South Asia
The realignment has been dramatic. The Durand Line, the 2,600-kilometre colonial-era border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, remains a flashpoint because the Taliban refuse to recognise it as a legitimate international boundary, calling it an imaginary line. Combined with the TTP issue and the deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, the friendship Islamabad expected has curdled into hostility.
The impact on SAARC
To appreciate how the Taliban issue affects SAARC, it helps to recall that the organisation was already in deep trouble. Founded in 1985 and based in Kathmandu, SAARC brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined in 2007 under President Hamid Karzai. But the body operates on a principle that turns out to be its Achilles’ heel.
The unanimity trap
Under Article X of the SAARC Charter, all decisions must be taken on the basis of unanimity, and every member must attend a summit for it to proceed. This means any single state can effectively freeze the entire organisation. That is precisely what has happened. The last summit, the 18th, was held in Kathmandu in November 2014. The 19th was scheduled for Islamabad in 2016 but collapsed after a terrorist attack on an Indian army camp in Uri.
India blamed Pakistan-based terrorists and announced a boycott. Within days, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan joined the boycott, with Sri Lanka soon expressing similar reservations. With four of eight members opting out, Pakistan was forced to postpone the summit. No SAARC summit has been held since, which is why the body is widely described as moribund or effectively defunct.
The Taliban question deepens the deadlock
Into this already paralysed organisation arrived the question of who should represent Afghanistan. This is where Pakistan’s support for the Taliban collides directly with the reluctance of other members to engage the group. The clash became visible in September 2021, when the annual SAARC foreign ministers’ meeting, usually held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, was cancelled.
The reason was telling. Pakistan insisted the Taliban be allowed to represent Afghanistan, which other member states refused to accept. As the Britannica summary of SAARC puts it, the Taliban’s takeover has further strained the grouping’s dynamics, with Pakistan supporting Taliban participation while other members object. Because every SAARC decision requires consensus, this single disagreement is enough to keep meetings from happening at all.
The Taliban takeover therefore added a fresh layer of indecision on top of the existing India-Pakistan freeze. As one commentator observed, no South Asian country recognises the Kabul regime, which raises unresolved questions about its participation in future summits. SAARC cannot decide who speaks for one of its eight members, and so it cannot convene.
Divergent responses: a region pulling apart
What makes the situation genuinely interesting is that the member states have not simply split into “engage” and “don’t engage” camps along predictable lines. The picture is more fluid, and recent developments have scrambled expectations entirely.
India’s calculated pivot
India’s response is the most surprising. Having evacuated its Kabul diplomats in 2021 and long viewed the Taliban with suspicion, New Delhi has gradually moved toward pragmatic engagement. In January 2025, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Taliban’s acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai, the highest-level engagement since Kabul’s fall. The relationship accelerated after the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, which India blamed on Pakistan and which the Taliban condemned.
The turning point came in October 2025, when Muttaqi visited New Delhi for the first high-level face-to-face meeting between the two governments. During the visit, India announced it would upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy, while still stopping short of formal recognition. The logic is strategic: by becoming Afghanistan’s largest humanitarian donor and a major economic partner, India builds influence and counters Pakistan, all without granting the Taliban legitimacy.
Pakistan’s strategy backfires
For Pakistan, this is the worst possible outcome. The country that championed the Taliban now finds Kabul drifting toward its rival. Islamabad has responded by accusing India of “inciting” the Afghan Taliban and using it as a proxy, even designating alleged India-linked militants under new labels. The strategic depth Pakistan sought has produced a hostile neighbour to its west and a TTP problem it cannot contain.
Smaller states and the search for alternatives
The smaller SAARC members, particularly Nepal and Bangladesh, have repeatedly pushed to revive the summit process, but without Indian participation their efforts go nowhere. Frustrated with SAARC’s paralysis, India has pivoted decisively toward alternative groupings that exclude Pakistan, chiefly BIMSTEC (which links South and Southeast Asian states) and the BBIN initiative grouping Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. The shift toward subregional cooperation is, in effect, a workaround for SAARC’s death.
What it all means for the future of cooperation
The Taliban episode is best understood as a stress test that SAARC failed. The organisation was built on the assumption that member states could insulate multilateral cooperation from their bilateral disputes. Pakistan itself invoked this principle when it accused India of casting the shadow of bilateral problems over a regional forum. But the unanimity rule means that insulation was always a fiction. Any deep rivalry, whether over Kashmir or over the Taliban’s seat, can hold the whole structure hostage.
The deeper lesson concerns the relationship between terrorism, political instability and institutional design. SAARC’s consensus model was meant to protect small states from domination. Instead, it has become a veto that guarantees gridlock whenever the two largest members disagree. With cross-border terrorism, contested governments, and now an active Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict, the conditions that would allow consensus simply do not exist. Whether South Asia builds new institutions that can function despite the India-Pakistan rivalry, or whether the region remains one of the least integrated in the world, is a question the Taliban’s return has made impossible to ignore.
What do you think? If a regional organisation can be paralysed by the disagreement of just two members, is the consensus model worth preserving, or should South Asia build cooperation around smaller, more flexible groupings? And does India’s pragmatic engagement with a government it refuses to recognise represent clever statecraft or a troubling compromise of principle?
References
- https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2022/05/06/talibans-takeover-of-afghanistan-and-pakistans-security-challenges/
- https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistans-hard-policy-choices-afghanistan
- https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistans-role-in-the-future-of-afghanistan
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2025.2466193
- https://orionpolicy.org/opportunity-for-lasting-peace-renewed-violence-tests-afghanistan-pakistan-relations/
- https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/?p=18422
- https://www.deccanherald.com/india/bhutan-bangladesh-afghanistan-boycott-saarc-2088536
- https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/suspending-afghanistan-from-saarc-and-international-law
- https://www.britannica.com/topic/South-Asian-Association-for-Regional-Cooperation
- https://theannapurnaexpress.com/story/60610/
- https://cenjows.in/indias-diplomatic-ties-with-taliban/
- https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/whats-behind-indias-political-rapprochement-with-the-taliban/
- https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/saarc-is-dead-long-live-sub-regional-co-operation/
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