The Judiciary in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: Guardian of Rights and Democracy

The strength of any democracy can be measured by one simple test: when the powerful break the rules, who holds them accountable? In South Asia, that answer rests largely with the judiciary. Across India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, courts are tasked with the same fundamental job-upholding the rule of law and protecting citizens from the overreach of the state. Yet despite a shared colonial legal heritage, the three countries have built judicial systems that differ sharply in structure, independence, and effectiveness. Understanding these differences tells us a great deal about the democratic health of the region.

Why an independent judiciary matters 🔗

A judiciary is the third pillar of government, alongside the legislature and the executive. Its core function is to interpret laws, settle disputes, and ensure that no law or government action violates the constitution. For this to work, the judiciary must be independent-free from pressure by politicians, bureaucrats, or any party to a case.

Independence is not just a nice ideal. Without it, fundamental rights become unenforceable and the constitution becomes a piece of paper rather than a binding contract. Two tools make judicial independence meaningful in practice. The first is judicial review, the power of courts to strike down laws or executive actions that breach the constitution. The second is security of tenure, meaning judges cannot be easily removed or punished for delivering inconvenient verdicts. Where these safeguards are strong, the judiciary acts as a genuine check on power. Where they are weak, courts tend to bend toward whoever controls the government.

India: a unified and assertive judiciary 🔗

India operates a single integrated judicial system. Unlike federal countries such as the United States, where central and state courts run on separate tracks, India has one unified hierarchy that applies the same body of law across the entire country. This pyramid-like structure places the Supreme Court at the apex, followed by High Courts at the state level, and then District and subordinate courts at the local level. Lower courts function under the direct supervision of the courts above them, which keeps the interpretation of law consistent nationwide.

The structure of Indian courts 🔗

The Supreme Court, established in 1950 under Article 124 of the Constitution, sits at the top with a Chief Justice and up to 33 other judges. Below it are 25 High Courts, each serving one or more states, established under Article 214. At the base are the District Courts under Article 233 and a wide network of subordinate courts handling everyday civil and criminal matters.

The Supreme Court carries three types of jurisdiction. Its original jurisdiction covers disputes between the Union and states or between states themselves. Its appellate jurisdiction handles appeals from High Courts in significant legal matters. Its advisory jurisdiction, under Article 143, allows the President to seek the Court’s opinion on questions of law. High Courts, importantly, can issue writs to enforce fundamental rights directly.

How India protects judicial independence 🔗

Several features insulate Indian judges from political pressure. Removing a Supreme Court judge requires a special majority in both Houses of Parliament on grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity-a process so difficult that it has almost never succeeded. Judges also enjoy fixed salaries and secure tenure.

The most distinctive feature is the collegium system. Evolved through a series of Supreme Court judgments rather than written into the Constitution, it gives senior judges-not the executive-the power to appoint and transfer judges. When Parliament tried to claw back some of this power by creating the National Judicial Appointments Commission, the Supreme Court struck it down in 2015, reaffirming that appointments must stay free of political influence.

A court that shapes society 🔗

The Indian judiciary has used its independence to expand access to justice. The most powerful example is Public Interest Litigation (PIL), pioneered by judges such as P. N. Bhagwati and V. R. Krishna Iyer. PIL relaxed the traditional rule that only a directly affected person could approach the court, allowing concerned citizens to raise issues affecting marginalised groups. Through landmark rulings-from limiting Parliament’s power to alter the Constitution’s “basic structure” to decriminalising homosexuality-the Court has acted as a bulwark against the misuse of power. That said, critics note the judiciary is not flawless: vague criteria around judge transfers and a massive backlog of pending cases remain serious concerns.

Pakistan: a parallel system shaped by Islamic law 🔗

Pakistan’s judiciary shares the same British colonial roots as India’s but has developed a distinctive feature: a parallel religious court system. The superior judiciary comprises the Supreme Court at the apex, five High Courts, and the Federal Shariat Court. There is a High Court for each of the four provinces and one for the Islamabad Capital Territory, with a network of district and subordinate courts handling local civil and criminal cases below them.

The Supreme Court and High Courts 🔗

The Supreme Court of Pakistan is the final court of appeal, exercising original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction. It hears appeals from the High Courts and entertains cases involving violations of fundamental rights under Article 184(3). The provincial High Courts oversee the administration of justice within their territories and serve as appellate courts for all civil and criminal cases in their respective provinces.

Judges to the superior courts are recommended by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, chaired by the Chief Justice and including senior judges and law officers. Nominations then pass to a Parliamentary Committee for confirmation before the President makes the formal appointment. This blends judicial and political input in a way that differs noticeably from India’s purely judge-led collegium.

The Federal Shariat Court 🔗

The element that most sets Pakistan apart is the Federal Shariat Court. Created in 1980, it has the power to examine whether any law conflicts with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah. If a law is found “repugnant” to Islamic injunctions, the court notifies the government with its reasons. It also has jurisdiction to review criminal court decisions involving Hudood punishments. The court is composed of eight Muslim judges, including scholars well-versed in Islamic law (Ulema). Its decisions can be reviewed by a Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court.

This dual structure means Pakistani law operates under two overlapping standards-the constitution and Islamic injunctions-a feature that gives religion a formal, institutionalised role in the legal system that neither India nor Bangladesh shares.

Bangladesh: independence in theory, interference in practice 🔗

Bangladesh presents the most striking gap between constitutional promise and ground reality. Article 22 of its Constitution explicitly directs the state to separate the judiciary from the executive. The court system itself is well-organised-a Supreme Court with an Appellate Division and a High Court Division at the top, followed by subordinate civil and criminal courts. Yet the practical independence of this structure has long been compromised.

The roots of executive interference 🔗

The problem lies in how judges are appointed and disciplined. Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President under Article 95, but Article 48(3) requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister-effectively placing control over appointments in the hands of the executive. Amendments to Articles 115 and 116 further transferred authority over the posting, promotion, and discipline of lower court judges to the executive, despite the original Constitution granting this power to the Supreme Court.

The consequences are serious. When the executive controls promotions and transfers, lower court judges may feel pressure to rule in the government’s favour to avoid punitive postings, eroding both impartiality and public trust. Analysts have documented cases of politically advantageous appointments, where judges affiliated with the ruling alliance were elevated to the bench.

Reform attempts and recent developments 🔗

The judiciary itself fought back. The landmark Masdar Hossain case (Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Masdar Hossain) became the authoritative statement on judicial independence. Following it, the formal separation of the judiciary from the executive was declared in November 2007, and recruitment to the subordinate judiciary was moved to a merit-based Bangladesh Judicial Service Commission. These reforms reduced overt interference, but did not fully insulate the courts, particularly in administration and finance.

More recent steps suggest continued movement. The inauguration of a separate Supreme Court Secretariat in December 2025, alongside calls from the Chief Justice for deeper reform, signals an ongoing effort to complete the constitutional promise of an independent judiciary. Notably, reformers have looked to India’s collegium model as a possible template for reducing political influence over appointments.

Comparing the three judiciaries 🔗

The three systems share a common starting point but diverge in revealing ways. India has built the most robustly independent judiciary, with judge-led appointments and an activist tradition through PIL-though it faces its own criticisms about transfers and backlogs. Pakistan combines a conventional court hierarchy with a unique religious dimension through the Federal Shariat Court, and uses a mixed judicial-parliamentary appointment process. Bangladesh has the strongest constitutional language on separation but the weakest practical insulation, owing to deep executive control over appointments and discipline.

These differences are not merely technical. A judiciary that can genuinely check the executive strengthens democracy; one that cannot becomes a rubber stamp. The trajectory of each country’s courts-India defending its independence, Pakistan balancing secular and religious law, and Bangladesh slowly reforming toward autonomy-offers a live picture of how the rule of law is contested across South Asia.

What do you think? Should judicial appointments rest entirely with senior judges, as in India’s collegium, or does some political input keep the judiciary accountable to the people? And when a constitution promises an independent judiciary but the executive controls appointments in practice, what is the most effective way to close that gap?

References

1. https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/chapter%207.pdf
2. https://vakeel360.com/guides/hierarchy-of-courts-india
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collegium_system
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_interest_litigation_in_India
5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_of_Pakistan
6. https://scp.gov.pk/files/Misc/thejudicialsystemofPakistan.pdf
7. https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/hierarchy-of-courts-in-pakistan/
8. https://www.bdlawpost.com/2024/12/why-bangladesh-needs-constitutional.html
9. https://www.tbsnews.net/thoughts/new-chapter-judicial-independence-bangladesh-1319221
10. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/bangladesh/january-2025