Legislative Dynamics in Indian Federalism: Center and State Relations

India’s federal system rests on a deceptively simple question: who gets to make which laws? The answer shapes everything from how police forces are run to how the national defence is organised. The Constitution does not leave this to chance or to ongoing negotiation between the Centre and the states. Instead, it lays down a detailed scheme of legislative powers in Part XI and the Seventh Schedule, dividing law-making authority while ensuring the Union retains the upper hand. Understanding this division is the key to understanding why Indian federalism is often described as “quasi-federal” rather than purely federal.

The constitutional basis of legislative relations 🔗

Legislative relations between the Union and the states are governed by Articles 245 to 255 in Part XI of the Constitution. These provisions do two distinct things. First, they fix the territorial limits within which each level of government can make laws. Second, they distribute the subjects on which each can legislate. Together, they create a working model for sharing power in a large and diverse country.

The framers drew this scheme largely from the Government of India Act, 1935, which had introduced a three-fold division of legislative subjects. The Constituent Assembly adapted that model to suit a sovereign republic, expanding the Union’s reach to secure national unity while leaving states enough room to manage local affairs.

Territorial extent of laws 🔗

Article 245 sets the geographical boundaries of law-making. Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of India, while a state legislature can make laws only for the whole or any part of its own territory. Importantly, a law made by Parliament cannot be struck down merely because it has extra-territorial operation. This means Parliament alone can pass laws that apply to Indian citizens and their property anywhere in the world.

States cannot ordinarily legislate beyond their borders. The one recognised exception is the Doctrine of Territorial Nexus, under which a state law with effects outside the state can still be valid if there is a sufficient connection between the state and the subject matter of the law. The courts have used this doctrine to uphold state taxation and regulation where a genuine link exists.

The Seventh Schedule: three lists of subjects 🔗

The heart of the legislative division lies in Article 246 read with the Seventh Schedule. The Schedule splits subjects into three lists, and Article 246 assigns each list to a specific legislature. The three lists are the Union List (List I), the State List (List II), and the Concurrent List (List III).

It is worth noting that the numbers of subjects have changed over time through amendments, so figures quoted in older textbooks may differ. The original counts were 97, 66, and 47 respectively, but several subjects have since been moved or added.

The Union List 🔗

The Union List contains subjects of national importance on which only Parliament can legislate. It currently includes around 100 subjects, covering matters such as defence, foreign affairs, atomic energy, banking, currency, and railways. These are areas where uniform laws across the country are essential. No state can make laws on these subjects, which guarantees that critical functions like national security and international relations remain firmly with the Centre.

The State List 🔗

The State List contains subjects of local or regional interest on which state legislatures have exclusive power “in normal circumstances.” It currently comprises around 59 subjects (originally 66). Typical State List subjects include public order, police, public health, agriculture, irrigation, fisheries, land, local government, and state public services. This list is what gives states genuine autonomy to govern matters that affect daily life within their territory.

The Concurrent List 🔗

The Concurrent List is a distinctive feature not found in most federal constitutions. It contains around 52 subjects (originally 47) on which both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate. Subjects such as criminal law, criminal procedure, marriage, contracts, education, and forests fall here. The list was designed as a device to promote cooperative federalism, allowing flexibility on matters of shared interest while avoiding the rigidity of a strict two-fold division.

The 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 reshaped this list significantly by transferring five subjects from the State List to the Concurrent List: education, forests, weights and measures, protection of wild animals and birds, and the administration of justice. This shift is often cited as evidence of the centralising tendency built into the Constitution.

Resolving conflicts: the doctrine of repugnancy 🔗

Because both Parliament and state legislatures can make laws on Concurrent List subjects, conflicts are inevitable. The Constitution resolves them through Article 254, which embodies the Doctrine of Repugnancy. The basic rule is straightforward: if a central law and a state law on a Concurrent subject are inconsistent, the central law prevails, and the state law becomes void to the extent of the repugnancy.

Repugnancy must exist as a fact, not as a mere possibility. The test, as courts have framed it, is whether the two laws can stand together. If they cannot be reconciled and both occupy the same field, the central law wins. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979), the Supreme Court clarified the conditions under which a state law would be held void for repugnancy.

The exception under Article 254(2) 🔗

There is an important exception. If a state law on a Concurrent subject conflicts with an earlier parliamentary law, the state law can still prevail within that state if it has been reserved for the President’s consideration and has received presidential assent. However, this does not permanently settle the matter. Parliament retains the power to later amend, vary, or repeal that state law by passing fresh legislation on the same subject. This arrangement allows states some breathing room while keeping ultimate supremacy with the Union.

The doctrine of pith and substance 🔗

Sometimes a law passed by one legislature appears to stray into the domain of another. The courts use the Doctrine of Pith and Substance to handle such situations. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the true nature and character of the law rather than its incidental effects. If the law, in its essence, falls within the legislature’s competence, it will be upheld even if it incidentally touches a subject in another list.

This doctrine prevents laws from being invalidated over minor or unintended overlaps. The legislative entries in the three lists are interpreted broadly so that each legislature can effectively use its powers. In several Supreme Court rulings, this approach has helped distinguish genuine conflicts from harmless encroachments, especially where a state law on a State subject incidentally affects a Union or Concurrent matter.

Residuary powers stay with the Centre 🔗

What happens when a subject does not appear in any of the three lists? This is a real concern in a world of rapid change, where matters like space technology, cyber law, and computer-related issues did not exist when the Constitution was drafted. Article 248 answers this by vesting residuary powers exclusively in Parliament. Parliament alone can make laws on any matter not enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List, and this power includes the right to levy residuary taxes.

Placing residuary powers with the Centre is one of the clearest signs of the Union’s dominance. In the United States and Australia, residuary powers rest with the states. India deliberately chose the opposite path to ensure that emerging and unforeseen subjects would fall under central control.

When Parliament can legislate on State List subjects 🔗

Although the State List is meant to be the exclusive preserve of state legislatures, the Constitution carves out five exceptional circumstances in which Parliament can make laws even on State subjects. These exceptions reveal just how far the balance tilts toward the Centre.

In the national interest (Article 249) 🔗

If the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, declaring it necessary or expedient in the national interest, Parliament may legislate on a specified State List subject. Such a law remains in force for a limited period and can be renewed. This places significant trust in the Rajya Sabha as the representative of the states.

During a national emergency (Article 250) 🔗

While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, Parliament gains the power to make laws on any State List subject for the whole or any part of India. This effectively converts the federal structure into a near-unitary one for the duration of the emergency.

When states make a request (Article 252) 🔗

If two or more state legislatures pass resolutions requesting Parliament to legislate on a State subject, Parliament can do so for those states. Other states may later adopt the law. This is a voluntary, cooperative route that respects state consent.

To implement international agreements (Article 253) 🔗

Parliament can make laws to give effect to international treaties, agreements, or conventions, even if the subject falls within the State List. This power has been used to bring domestic law in line with global commitments on the environment, trade, and human rights.

During President’s Rule (Article 356) 🔗

When the constitutional machinery in a state fails and President’s Rule is imposed, Parliament assumes the power to legislate on State subjects for that state. The state legislature’s powers are exercised by or under the authority of Parliament during this period.

Why the system favours the Centre 🔗

Looking at the whole scheme, a clear pattern emerges. The Union List is the longest and covers the most vital subjects. The Centre holds residuary powers. Union law prevails in conflicts over Concurrent subjects. And Parliament can invade the State List under five different circumstances. The states, by contrast, cannot legislate beyond their territory and cannot override central law on shared subjects without presidential assent.

This is why constitutional scholars describe India as having a federal structure with a strong unitary bias, or a quasi-federal system. The framers made a conscious choice. Having witnessed partition and fearing fragmentation, they wanted a Centre strong enough to hold a diverse nation together, while still giving regions a meaningful sphere of self-government. The legislative division in Part XI and the Seventh Schedule is the constitutional expression of that careful balancing act.

What do you think? Does India’s tilt toward central legislative dominance strengthen national unity, or does it risk weakening the autonomy that genuine federalism is supposed to protect? And as new subjects like artificial intelligence and data governance emerge, should residuary powers continue to rest solely with the Centre?

References

1. https://www.apnilaw.com/upsc/indian-constitution/legislative-relations-between-centre-and-states-articles-245-255/
2. https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/7th-schedule-of-indian-constitution/
3. https://www.tutorialspoint.com/indian_polity/indian_polity_center_state_relation.htm
4. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/ttp-constitution-of-india/seventh-schedule
5. https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/7th-schedule-indian-constitution/
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventh_Schedule_to_the_Constitution_of_India
7. https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/seventh-schedule-of-indian-constitution
8. https://tathastuics.com/article/indian-polity-seventh-schedule
9. https://testbook.com/constitutional-articles/article-254-of-indian-constitution
10. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/doctrines/constitution-of-india-doct/doctrine-of-repugnancy
11. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-9819-doctrine-of-pith-and-substance-centre-state-relations.html
12. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/09/16/evolution-of-the-doctrine-of-repugnancya-perspective-of-the-supreme-court/
13. https://www.legaljourney.in/post/articles-245-to-255-legislative-relations
14. https://inclusiveias.com/centre-state-relations-upsc/