Understanding Autonomy in Indian Federalism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

When a state government clashes with the Centre over GST revenues, a Governor sits on a bill for months, or a Chief Minister demands a larger share of central taxes, the underlying question is always the same: how much freedom do states actually have to govern themselves? This is the heart of state autonomy in Indian federalism. It refers to the authority of states to make decisions on matters affecting their territories, populations, and resources within the boundaries set by the Constitution. The concept is neither fixed nor settled. It has been negotiated, contested, and reshaped continuously since 1950, and it remains one of the most debated aspects of how power is organised in the country.

What state autonomy actually means 🔗

State autonomy is best understood as the degree of self-governance that states possess within the larger structure of the Union. It covers their ability to legislate, administer, and raise resources for matters that fall within their domain. The Indian Constitution does not grant states unlimited self-rule. Instead, it creates a structured division of powers that allows states to handle local affairs while the Union maintains national standards and unity.

The foundation of this arrangement lies in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, read with Article 246. It divides governmental subjects into three lists. The Union List contains subjects like defence, foreign affairs, and currency, on which only Parliament can legislate. The State List covers matters such as police, public health, agriculture, and local government, where state legislatures have primary authority. The Concurrent List holds subjects like education and forests, where both the Centre and states can make laws, though central law prevails in case of conflict. This three-list system is the legal skeleton of state autonomy in the country.

Why India is called quasi-federal 🔗

India’s federal system carries a strong unitary bias, which is why scholars describe it as “quasi-federal” rather than fully federal. Unlike the United States, where each state has its own constitution and sovereign powers, India operates under a single Constitution that applies to both levels of government. The framers consciously chose this design, drawing heavily on the Canadian model, which favours a strong centre over a loose union of sovereign units.

This centralising tendency is built into several features. Emergency provisions allow the Centre to override state authority during a national, state, or financial emergency. The All-India Services, such as the IAS and IPS, are controlled centrally even though officers serve in states. Under Article 249, Parliament can even legislate on State List subjects if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution declaring it in the national interest. These features mean that autonomy in the Indian context is always conditional and bounded.

Historical roots of the autonomy debate 🔗

The architecture of state autonomy did not emerge in a vacuum in 1947. When the Constituent Assembly began its work, it adopted a federal structure broadly modelled on the Government of India Act, 1935, which had first introduced provincial autonomy and federal principles under colonial rule. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, as chairman of the Drafting Committee, deliberately argued for a “Union of States” with a strong centre. His reasoning was rooted in the immediate context of Partition and the fear that a weak centre could not hold together a country of such linguistic, cultural, and regional diversity.

The linguistic reorganisation of states 🔗

The first major assertion of regional identity came through the linguistic reorganisation of states in the 1950s and 1960s. The creation of Andhra Pradesh in 1953 following sustained agitation, and the later formation of states on linguistic lines, demonstrated that regional demands could reshape the federal map itself. This process strengthened distinct state identities and, in doing so, laid the groundwork for future autonomy demands. Once people identified strongly with their state and language, they began to expect that their state government would represent and protect their interests against centralising pressures.

The misuse of Article 356 🔗

For much of the early decades, the relationship tilted heavily towards the Centre. The most controversial instrument was Article 356, which permits the imposition of President’s Rule when the constitutional machinery in a state breaks down. By the 1980s, it had been invoked dozens of times, frequently to dismiss state governments run by opposition parties. This pattern was widely seen as a political weapon rather than a genuine constitutional safeguard, and it became the single biggest grievance in the autonomy debate. The frequent dismissal of elected state governments convinced many regional leaders that their autonomy existed only at the mercy of the ruling party at the Centre.

Commissions that shaped centre-state relations 🔗

Growing friction over federal imbalances led the government to set up formal review mechanisms. The most significant of these was the Sarkaria Commission.

The Sarkaria Commission 🔗

Established in 1983 under Justice R.S. Sarkaria, the commission examined the working of centre-state relations and submitted its report in 1988 with 247 recommendations. It advised against drastic structural changes and instead focused on strengthening cooperative mechanisms. Its key recommendations were influential. It urged that Article 356 be used very sparingly and only as a last resort after all alternatives had been exhausted, with a prior warning issued to the state and the proclamation treated as a “speaking document” that clearly states its reasons. It recommended that Governors be eminent, detached persons rather than active political appointees, and it called for the activation of the Inter-State Council under Article 263 to institutionalise dialogue. The Inter-State Council was duly created in 1990 as a direct outcome.

The Bommai judgment and the Punchhi Commission 🔗

The Supreme Court gave these ideas legal teeth in the landmark S.R. Bommai case of 1994, which held that federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution and that Presidential proclamations under Article 356 are subject to judicial review. This judgment converted many of the Sarkaria principles into binding constitutional doctrine and significantly curbed the arbitrary dismissal of state governments.

The Punchhi Commission, set up in 2007 under former Chief Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi and reporting in 2010, revisited these questions in the context of a changed polity and economy. It reaffirmed cooperative federalism as essential to India’s unity and offered more detailed guidance on the role of Governors and on restricting central intervention. Yet the record of implementation has been mixed. While the Inter-State Council was created and the Article 356 guidelines are now largely respected, many recommendations requiring constitutional amendments were never enacted because of political complexities.

Autonomy below the state level 🔗

A crucial part of the autonomy story concerns governance below the state government, and here a tension often emerges. Constitutional reform has repeatedly devolved power to the local level, sometimes in ways that bypass state-level concerns.

Panchayati Raj Institutions 🔗

The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1992 established Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies as a constitutionally recognised third tier of governance. These amendments created a three-tier rural structure at the village, block, and district levels and were designed to address development disparities within states by empowering local communities to participate in planning and governance. They extended the principle of self-government downward, but they also raised a complication: devolution to local bodies is mediated by state governments, which control how much power and finance actually flows down. Local autonomy and state autonomy do not always pull in the same direction.

The PESA Act of 1996 🔗

The standard Panchayati Raj model did not fit the self-governance traditions of tribal areas. Article 243(M) had restricted the application of the 73rd Amendment to Scheduled Areas. Following the recommendations of the Bhuria Committee, Parliament enacted the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, or PESA, which came into force on 24 December 1996. PESA extended Part IX of the Constitution to Scheduled Areas with significant modifications and gave Gram Sabhas some of the strongest statutory powers in the Indian federation.

What makes PESA distinctive is its emphasis on Gram Sabha supremacy rather than the Gram Panchayat, its protection of customary law, and its requirement of community consent rather than mere consultation for many land and resource decisions. It recognises tribal communities’ traditional rights over natural resources, minor forest produce, and minor minerals.

Despite its progressive design, PESA remains under-implemented nearly three decades on. Several states took years to notify their PESA Rules, and some have diluted the Act’s spirit in the process. States like Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh framed their rules only in 2022, while parts of the implementation in Jharkhand remain pending. Panchayats often lack adequate powers to levy taxes, which limits their genuine autonomy, and land continues to be acquired in some cases without the consent of Gram Sabhas. PESA illustrates a recurring pattern in Indian federalism: a strong legal promise of autonomy that depends heavily on the political will of state governments to deliver it.

Contemporary dynamics of state autonomy 🔗

The autonomy debate has shifted in recent decades from constitutional dismissal towards economic and fiscal questions. The character of national politics has also transformed the balance of power.

Coalition politics and regional aspirations 🔗

The rise of regional parties from the late 1980s onwards fundamentally altered centre-state dynamics. When national governments depended on regional allies for survival, the power balance shifted measurably towards the states. Parties rooted in states like Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Punjab, and Maharashtra have used this leverage to secure greater financial grants and policy autonomy. Coalition governments at the Centre have often had to accommodate the demands of key allies, making regional aspirations a permanent feature of national policymaking rather than an occasional irritant.

Fiscal federalism and the GST debate 🔗

The most active battleground today is fiscal autonomy. The introduction of the Goods and Services Tax in 2017 was hailed as a milestone in cooperative federalism, creating a unified national tax regime. But it came at a cost to states. After GST, state governments lost much of their independent power to levy indirect taxes, increasing their dependence on central transfers. Critics point to the weighted voting structure in the GST Council, where the central government holds one-third of the votes, as inconsistent with the federal spirit. States have repeatedly complained about delays in compensation and the erosion of their revenue autonomy.

The replacement of the Planning Commission with NITI Aayog in 2015 added another layer to this debate. NITI Aayog was meant to be a platform for dialogue and consensus-building, but its recommendations lack binding authority. At recent Governing Council meetings, opposition-ruled southern states such as Tamil Nadu and Telangana have forcefully pressed the Centre for a fairer share of resources and greater freedom in policymaking, reflecting how the autonomy debate has become sharper among economically stronger states that feel they contribute more than they receive.

The Governor and asymmetric federalism 🔗

The role of the Governor remains a live source of friction. In states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, Governors have faced criticism for withholding assent to bills passed by elected legislatures, leading to constitutional deadlocks and litigation. At the same time, India has developed what scholars call asymmetric federalism, where different states enjoy varying degrees of autonomy based on their specific circumstances. Article 371 and its variants provide special provisions for states like Nagaland, Mizoram, and others, acknowledging that a uniform model cannot accommodate the country’s diversity. Initiatives like “One Nation, One Election” have also sparked debate about whether standardisation might overlook regional specificities and dilute state autonomy.

Why state autonomy still matters 🔗

State autonomy is not merely an academic concern about constitutional design. It determines whether a state can control its own resources, respond to its unique regional challenges, and pursue a development path suited to its people. The uneven development across states, where some are far wealthier and more industrialised than others, makes the question of who controls resources especially charged. Wealthier states often demand more autonomy to retain their earnings, while less developed states rely on central transfers for survival, creating a structural tension that any federal arrangement must manage.

The enduring lesson from seven decades of constitutional practice is that autonomy in the Indian system is dynamic rather than static. It expands when regional parties gain bargaining power and contracts when the Centre consolidates control. The constitutional framework provides the boundaries, but the actual balance is set by politics, economics, and the strength of institutions like the Inter-State Council and the courts. Recent debates increasingly argue that genuine state autonomy, properly balanced against national unity, is part of the basic structure of constitutional democracy and not simply a concession the Union may grant or withdraw at will.

What do you think? Should economically stronger states be allowed greater fiscal autonomy to retain a larger share of the revenue they generate, or would this deepen inequality between richer and poorer states? And in your view, has the shift towards centralised institutions like the GST Council strengthened cooperative federalism or quietly weakened the autonomy that states once enjoyed?

References

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