Evaluating the Effectiveness of Confidence Building Measures

Two nuclear-armed neighbours sharing one of the world’s most contested borders have, for decades, avoided full-scale war despite repeated standoffs. Part of the explanation lies in a quiet category of diplomacy known as confidence building measures, or CBMs. These are practical arrangements-hotlines, advance notice of military exercises, troop limits near disputed lines-designed not to settle the underlying quarrel, but to keep it from turning deadly. The harder question, and the one that matters most for policymakers, is whether these measures actually work. The honest answer is that their effectiveness depends heavily on context, design, and above all the political will of the parties involved.

What confidence building measures are meant to do 🔗

Confidence building measures are actions taken to reduce the fear of attack between parties locked in a tense or adversarial relationship. They emerged during the Cold War as a way to ease military tensions between the East and West blocs, and the logic has since spread to borders, cyberspace, and civil conflicts around the world.

The crucial point to grasp is what CBMs are not designed to do. They do not resolve territorial disputes. They do not redraw boundaries or settle questions of sovereignty. Instead, their value lies in managing the day-to-day friction of a contested relationship and preventing small incidents from escalating into large ones. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which runs one of the world’s most developed CBM systems, captures this distinction well: such measures will not stop an intentional conflict, but they can stop an unintentional one by slowing the spiral of escalation.

The common toolkit 🔗

Most CBM frameworks rely on a recognisable set of instruments. These include military-to-military communication channels, advance notification of troop movements and exercises, dedicated hotlines between senior commanders, regular meetings between border personnel, and agreed rules of conduct during patrols. Transparency is the thread running through all of them. When each side knows what the other is doing and why, the risk of misreading a routine action as a hostile one drops sharply.

The India-China experience: a relative success story 🔗

The border relationship with China offers the clearest evidence that CBMs can work when both sides commit to them. Following the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, the two countries built an unusually detailed framework over the following two decades.

The centrepiece was the 1996 Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures. It committed each side not to use military force against the other and set limits on the major weapons systems-tanks, combat vehicles, artillery, and missiles-that could be deployed near the Line of Actual Control. Combat aircraft and helicopters were barred from flying within ten kilometres of the line. This was followed in 2005 by a protocol that created standard operating procedures for when patrols from both armies came into contact, designating specific points along the line for Border Personnel Meetings.

Why this framework held for so long 🔗

For nearly four decades after the 1962 war, this architecture delivered a remarkable outcome: not a single shot fired in anger along the disputed frontier, despite the absence of an agreed boundary. The CBMs created predictable, institutionalised ways for soldiers to manage face-offs on the ground. When tensions rose, there were established channels to defuse them before they turned violent. This is precisely the kind of conflict management that CBMs are designed to provide.

The limits exposed by Galwan 🔗

The system’s weaknesses became visible in 2020. The deadly clash in the Galwan Valley-the first fatal confrontation on the border in decades-revealed that the existing measures could be strained past breaking point. Indian officials concluded that the Chinese side had not fully adhered to the existing agreements, and that a fresh set of CBMs was needed to clarify the Line of Actual Control, a task that had remained unfinished since 1996.

Yet even here, the recovery process illustrates the resilience of the underlying approach. After the October 2024 disengagement deal covering the Depsang and Demchok areas in eastern Ladakh, the two governments moved to rebuild trust through new measures. By 2025 they had agreed to resume direct flights, reopen border trade through three Himalayan passes, and expand the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage. CBMs, in other words, became the very mechanism through which the relationship was stabilised after a crisis.

The India-Pakistan experience: a more troubled record 🔗

The picture with Pakistan is considerably more complicated, and it shows how political will and broader hostility can undermine even well-intentioned measures. The two countries have signed numerous agreements over the decades, yet the success rate has been markedly lower.

The most ambitious attempt came at the 1999 Lahore Summit, held just months after both nations conducted nuclear tests. In the Lahore Declaration and an accompanying memorandum, the prime ministers pledged to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and to consult on doctrines and concepts aimed at preventing conflict. Observers at the time hoped these arrangements might prove more durable than earlier efforts.

When agreements collapse under political pressure 🔗

That hope was short-lived. Within months, the Kargil conflict erupted, and as one analysis put it, the Lahore understanding was effectively buried under the snow of Kargil. This is the central lesson of the India-Pakistan case: agreements signed in moments of optimism can be swept away when the wider relationship deteriorates or when domestic politics make compromise politically costly.

The hotline between the two directors general of military operations, established after the 1971 war, shows the same pattern of fragility. The Stimson Center notes that the link has been used only intermittently, and that during periods of serious tension important information has not always been passed across it in time-exactly the moments when such a channel matters most.

Some measures have endured 🔗

It would be wrong to dismiss the India-Pakistan record entirely. A handful of measures have survived even the worst phases of the relationship. The agreement prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities, signed in 1988 and ratified in 1992, has proven the most successful of all, with both states respecting it consistently through wars and crises. The two sides exchange lists of their nuclear installations every January under this arrangement. This durability suggests that narrowly defined, mutually beneficial measures can outlast the political weather, even when broader frameworks fail.

What separates effective CBMs from ineffective ones 🔗

Comparing these two relationships reveals why some confidence building measures succeed while others falter.

Institutional depth matters 🔗

The India-China framework developed sophisticated institutional infrastructure-layered agreements, detailed protocols, and designated meeting points. The India-Pakistan mechanisms have often lacked this depth. A recurring criticism is that the nuclear CBM regime between the two countries provides no procedural detail on how to implement exchanged information, no way to enforce liability for violations, and no review mechanism, despite the Lahore Declaration’s own promise of periodic review. Without institutions to give them teeth, agreements remain little more than statements of intent.

Political will is decisive 🔗

Scholarly assessments converge on a single conclusion: CBMs are valuable for crisis management, but their utility stays limited unless core disputes are also addressed through robust diplomacy. Measures work only when both governments choose to honour them. When domestic politics reward toughness over compromise, or when a relationship is poisoned by deep mistrust, even carefully drafted agreements lose their force. The trust deficit between India and Pakistan, reinforced by history and hardened by media narratives on both sides, leaves little room for the patient reciprocity that CBMs require.

Incremental design helps 🔗

The OSCE model points to another lesson. Effective systems tend to start with modest, achievable steps and build more ambitious measures on top of them as confidence grows. This incremental approach, building each new layer on increased levels of trust, mirrors how the India-China framework expanded steadily through the 1990s and 2000s before it was tested.

Are CBMs effective, then? 🔗

The verdict is conditional rather than absolute. Confidence building measures are effective at what they are designed to do: managing tensions, reducing misperceptions, and lowering the risk of accidental escalation. They are not, and were never meant to be, instruments for resolving disputes. Judged against that realistic standard, the India-China experience shows genuine success across most of its history, while the India-Pakistan record is patchy, with a few resilient measures surviving amid many failures.

What ultimately determines success is not the elegance of the agreement on paper but the sustained commitment of the parties to uphold it. CBMs are tools, and like any tool their effect depends on the hands that wield them. Continuous diplomatic effort, supporting institutions, and-most importantly-political will are what allow these measures to deliver lasting stability rather than a fragile pause between crises.

What do you think? If confidence building measures cannot resolve the underlying disputes, are they worth the diplomatic effort they demand-or do they risk creating a false sense of security? And given the contrasting records with China and Pakistan, what single change would most improve the chances that a CBM survives a serious crisis?

References

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence-building_measures
2. https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Session-2-Presentation-by-the-OSCE.pdf
3. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-china-row-signals-breakdown-of-confidence-building-measures-67469
4. https://carnegieindia.org/research/2023/12/stabilizing-the-border-a-possible-way-ahead-in-the-post-galwan-situation?lang=en
5. https://theprint.in/diplomacy/why-india-needs-new-confidence-building-measures-to-clarify-lac-issue-with-china/502995/
6. https://ilkha.com/english/world/india-china-launch-confidence-building-measures-amid-border-de-escalation-efforts-474253
7. https://www.cfr.org/blog/india-pakistan-and-nuclear-confidence-building
8. https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1361514703_89851329.pdf
9. https://www.stimson.org/2012/confidence-building-and-nuclear-risk-reduction-measures-south-asia/
10. https://www.stimson.org/2023/institutionalizing-nuclear-confidence-building-measures-between-india-and-pakistan/
11. https://www.granthaalayahpublication.org/Arts-Journal/ShodhKosh/article/view/4219