Few works of twentieth-century political philosophy have reshaped how we think about fairness as decisively as John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). At the heart of the book lies a sharp disagreement with the dominant moral theory of Rawls’s era: utilitarianism. Rawls believed that a theory which judges institutions purely by the total happiness they produce could end up justifying serious harm to some people as long as the numbers added up. His response was not merely to point out a flaw, but to build an entirely new framework for thinking about justice. This post unpacks why Rawls rejected utilitarianism and what he offered in its place.
Table of Contents
- What utilitarianism claims about justice
- The core objection: individuals are not interchangeable
- The separateness of persons
- The Kantian foundation of Rawls’s critique
- Why rights need firmer protection
- Rawls’s alternative: justice as fairness
- The original position and the veil of ignorance
- The two principles of justice
- Why this matters for thinking about a just society
What utilitarianism claims about justice
Utilitarianism, in its classical form, holds a simple and powerful idea. A society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction across all the individuals who belong to it. Utilitarians hold that the best social outcome is the one with the greatest sum of happiness over unhappiness, and that policies and institutions should aim at producing this outcome.
This approach has obvious appeal. It treats everyone’s welfare as counting, and it offers a clear decision rule: choose whatever produces the most overall good. When Rawls wrote, this was the leading framework in moral and political theory, drawing especially on the careful classical formulation given by the philosopher Henry Sidgwick. Rawls stated his own aim plainly, describing his project as working out a theory of justice that offers an alternative to utilitarian thought in general.
The core objection: individuals are not interchangeable
Rawls’s central worry was that utilitarianism allows the welfare of some people to be sacrificed for the greater happiness of others. Because the theory looks only at the total or average sum of satisfaction, it has no built-in barrier against imposing heavy burdens on a minority if doing so produces enough benefit for the majority.
Rawls put this concern in striking terms. He argued that there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others, or why the loss of liberty for a few might not be made acceptable by a greater good shared by many. For Rawls, this is exactly where utilitarianism goes wrong as a theory of justice. A framework that permits such trade-offs fails to protect each person against being used for collective ends.
The separateness of persons
The deepest version of this objection is what philosophers now call the separateness of persons. Rawls argued that utilitarianism takes a principle that makes sense for a single individual and wrongly applies it to society as a whole. One person may reasonably accept a sacrifice now for a greater benefit later, because the loss and the gain happen within the same life. But society is made up of distinct individuals, each living only one life.
According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rawls’s objections to utilitarian-style theories can be boiled down to the charge that they neglect the separateness of persons. When a theory balances one person’s losses against another person’s gains as if they cancelled out, it effectively treats many separate people as though they were parts of a single super-person. Rawls famously charged that utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons, treating society as if losses to one individual could be neatly offset by gains to another.
The Kantian foundation of Rawls’s critique
Rawls’s objection was not only practical but deeply moral, and its roots lie in the ethics of Immanuel Kant. Rawls had long admired Kant’s moral philosophy and made it central to his teaching. In raising the separateness of persons against utilitarianism, Rawls was carrying forward Kant’s theme of respect for persons.
The relevant Kantian idea is the principle that we must treat humanity, whether in ourselves or others, always as an end and never merely as a means. Each person has inherent worth and is entitled to be treated with dignity, not used as a tool for producing outcomes that benefit others. Rawls argued that utilitarianism cannot honour this principle consistently. Because it permits sacrificing some individuals for the sake of a larger aggregate, it risks treating those individuals merely as means to the happiness of the majority.
This gives Rawls’s critique its moral force. The complaint is not just that utilitarianism produces uncomfortable results in extreme cases. It is that the theory rests on a mistaken picture of what persons are and what they are owed. People are not simply containers of welfare to be summed up; they are free and equal beings whose claims cannot be overridden whenever the totals favour doing so.
Why rights need firmer protection
This is why one of Rawls’s most quoted lines insists that each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. The point of justice, on this view, is precisely to set limits on the pursuit of the aggregate good. Certain basic rights and liberties should be secure, not because protecting them happens to maximise utility, but because individuals are entitled to them as a matter of fairness.
An academic analysis published in Erkenntnis summarises Rawls’s concern well, noting that utilitarianism may fail to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of persons in its attempt to maximize total social welfare. For Rawls, a just society must place these rights beyond the reach of ordinary cost-benefit calculation.
Rawls’s alternative: justice as fairness
Criticism alone was never Rawls’s goal. He wanted to show that a better theory was available, one he called justice as fairness. Its central device is a thought experiment known as the original position.
The original position and the veil of ignorance
Rawls asks us to imagine people gathered to choose the basic principles that will govern their society. Crucially, they choose from behind what he called a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, the parties are deprived of all knowledge of their personal characteristics and conceptions of the good, and of social and historical circumstances. They do not know their class, race, gender, talents, religion, or even their idea of a good life.
The reasoning is straightforward. If you do not know who you will turn out to be, you cannot rig the rules in your own favour. As one ethics resource explains, people in the original position would be able to come up with a fair set of rules because they would be truly impartial. The veil of ignorance forces fairness by removing the information that lets people pursue private advantage. This is Rawls’s way of building the equal worth of every person directly into the procedure that generates principles of justice.
The two principles of justice
Rawls argued that rational people choosing behind the veil would agree on two principles, arranged in order of priority. The first is the principle of equal basic liberties: each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the right to vote, compatible with the same liberties for everyone else.
The second principle governs social and economic inequalities. It has two parts: positions and offices must be open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and inequalities are permitted only when they work to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society. This second part is the famous difference principle. As Ethics Unwrapped describes it, if there are social or economic differences, they should help those who are the worst off.
The ordering matters. Basic liberties come first and cannot be traded away for economic gains. This is precisely the protection Rawls felt utilitarianism lacked. No appeal to greater overall welfare can justify stripping individuals of their fundamental freedoms.
Why this matters for thinking about a just society
The clash between Rawls and the utilitarians is more than an academic dispute. It reflects two genuinely different visions of what fairness requires. The utilitarian asks how we can produce the most good overall. Rawls asks how we can build a society that no one would object to if they did not know where they would land in it, with special attention to those at the bottom.
Rawls’s framing speaks directly to debates about welfare, education, healthcare, and the distribution of opportunity. The difference principle suggests that growth and inequality are acceptable only when they actually improve the prospects of the least advantaged, rather than simply raising the average. It shifts the question from “does this raise the total?” to “does this help those who have the least?”
It is worth noting that Rawls’s argument has not gone unchallenged. Some philosophers contend that utilitarians can also take the separateness of persons seriously, since giving equal weight to everyone’s interests is itself a form of respect. A formal critique in Erkenntnis even argues that Rawls’s argument against utilitarianism is self-defeating on close examination. Others, drawing on thinkers like Robert Nozick, argue that Rawls does not go far enough in addressing historical injustices. These ongoing debates are part of why A Theory of Justice remains so central. Rawls did not end the conversation about justice; he set its terms for generations of scholars who came after him.
What do you think? Is a society that maximises total happiness genuinely just if it does so by imposing heavy burdens on a small minority? And if you were choosing the rules of society from behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance, not knowing whether you would be among the most or least advantaged, which principles would you be willing to commit to?
References
- https://www.atlassociety.org/post/blind-injustice-john-rawls-and-a-theory-of-justice
- https://iep.utm.edu/rawls/
- https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-018-0079-4
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/
- https://ethics.org.au/thought-experiment-the-original-position/
- https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/veil-of-ignorance
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