India is urbanising at a pace that few systems of governance can comfortably keep up with. Cities generate the bulk of national income, attract millions of migrants every year, and are projected to house close to 800 million people by 2050. Yet the institutions meant to run these cities, the urban local bodies, often struggle with empty treasuries, half-transferred powers, and constant oversight from above. Understanding why this gap exists, and what the Constitution intended to fix, is central to making sense of urban governance today.
Table of Contents
- What urban local governance means
- Why it matters for a rapidly urbanising country
- The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992
- Key features of the amendment
- The gap between intention and reality
- Incomplete devolution of functions
- Financial constraints and dependence
- State government encroachment
- Parallel bodies and bureaucratic inefficiency
- Pathways to stronger urban governance
- Genuine devolution and capacity building
- Financial reform
- Empowering elected representatives
What urban local governance means
Urban local governance refers to the administration of a town or city by its own residents through elected representatives. The jurisdiction of such a body is restricted to a defined urban area marked out by the state government. In practice, this is the third tier of government, sitting below the Union and the states, and it is responsible for the everyday services that make city life functional, from drinking water to garbage collection.
The system is organised into three broad categories based on the size and character of the settlement. Nagar Panchayats govern areas that are in transition from rural to urban. Municipal Councils (also called Nagar Palikas) manage smaller and medium urban areas. Municipal Corporations run the largest and most complex cities, typically those with populations above one million.
Why it matters for a rapidly urbanising country
The link between urban governance and quality of life is direct. When local bodies function well, residents get reliable water, clean streets, and responsive administration. When they do not, the consequences are visible in clogged drains, overflowing landfills, and unplanned construction. Academic work on the subject argues that the lack of empowerment of cities is actively constraining their ability to deliver a better quality of life and to attract the investment that sustains economic growth.
The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992
For most of independent India’s history, urban bodies had no constitutional protection. They were creatures of state law, easily reshaped, suspended, or ignored. This changed with the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, which came into force on 1 June 1993. The Act inserted a new Part IX-A into the Constitution, covering Articles 243-P to 243-ZG, dealing exclusively with municipalities.
The core idea was decentralisation, the transfer of decision-making power closer to the people affected by those decisions. By granting constitutional status to urban local bodies, the amendment tried to convert them from mere extensions of the state bureaucracy into genuine units of self-government with their own mandate.
Key features of the amendment
The Act introduced several structural guarantees designed to make urban bodies durable and democratic:
Three-tier structure: It mandated the creation of Nagar Panchayats, Municipal Councils, and Municipal Corporations depending on the size of the urban area.
Regular elections: State Election Commissions were tasked with conducting municipal elections, reducing the earlier practice of indefinitely postponing them.
Reservations: Seats were reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population, and at least one-third of all seats were reserved for women, ensuring a voice for groups previously left out of urban administration.
The Twelfth Schedule: The amendment added a new schedule listing 18 functions that may be entrusted to municipalities, including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, public health, and slum improvement. These functions defined the intended working domain of urban local bodies.
Financial machinery: The Act provided for State Finance Commissions to review the financial position of municipalities every five years and recommend how revenues should be shared between the state and its local bodies.
Planning committees: It also required the setting up of District Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees to coordinate development planning across overlapping jurisdictions.
The gap between intention and reality
The 74th Amendment laid out an ambitious framework, but it deliberately left the actual transfer of powers to the states. The Constitution provides the skeleton; the states were meant to add the flesh. This is precisely where the system has faltered. Many states have been slow to hand over the functions, funds, and staff that local bodies need to govern effectively.
Incomplete devolution of functions
The Twelfth Schedule is illustrative rather than binding, which means a state is not strictly compelled to transfer every function on the list. The result has been uneven and partial implementation across the country. One assessment noted that by 2013, only 11 out of 31 states and union territories had transferred all 18 functions to their urban local bodies. Where functions are withheld, the local body cannot plan or act independently in those areas, and city administration remains fragmented.
Many urban bodies consequently operate more like implementing agencies that carry out state schemes than as autonomous governments. This is a significant departure from the self-governance the amendment envisioned.
Financial constraints and dependence
Money is perhaps the sharpest constraint. A Reserve Bank of India report on municipal finances found that revenues are dominated by property tax collections and transfers from higher tiers of government, which leaves municipalities with little genuine financial autonomy. When the bulk of your budget comes from someone else, your independence is limited regardless of what the Constitution says.
The scale of fiscal stress is striking. An RBI survey of municipal corporations covering 2020-21 showed that more than 70 per cent of them saw revenues fall while expenditure rose by over 71 per cent. Own-revenue sources typically make up less than 30 per cent of total municipal income for most bodies, and the situation is worse for smaller councils and Nagar Panchayats. India’s property tax collection, a natural revenue base for cities, remains among the lowest in the world.
Central and state transfers help, but they come with strings attached. Grants tied to specific schemes cannot be used to strengthen a body’s core finances. The 15th Finance Commission recommended a substantial corpus for local bodies for the 2021-26 period and pushed for performance-based grants, but the predictability and timeliness of these transfers remain a problem.
State government encroachment
Even where powers exist on paper, state governments retain considerable control. They sanction budgets, grant administrative approvals, and in some cases hold the power to supersede an elected council entirely. State-appointed officials, particularly the Municipal Commissioner, often wield more real decision-making authority than the elected Mayor. In cities where the Mayor is directly elected, the position can still be largely nominal because the commissioner controls administration.
Reluctance to empower cities is not accidental. Cities are economic powerhouses, and control over urban land, planning, and revenue is politically valuable. State governments and parties have a strong incentive to retain that control rather than surrender it to a local body.
Parallel bodies and bureaucratic inefficiency
A further complication is the proliferation of parallel agencies, such as development authorities and special purpose vehicles, that take over major urban functions like water supply or town planning. These bodies report to the state rather than the elected council, which weakens the role of the municipality and confuses lines of accountability.
Layered on top of this are familiar administrative problems: weak institutional capacity for planning, shortage of trained technical staff, poor coordination between departments, and bureaucratic red tape. The RBI noted that most municipalities prepare budgets but do not use audited financial statements for proper balance sheet and cash flow management, which produces significant inefficiencies in how money is managed.
Pathways to stronger urban governance
The problems are well documented, and so are the directions for reform. None of them are simple, but together they would move urban bodies closer to the constitutional vision.
Genuine devolution and capacity building
The first step is completing the transfer of the Twelfth Schedule functions in spirit, not just on paper, accompanied by the funds and functionaries needed to perform them. States such as Karnataka and Mizoram have invested in capacity-building programmes for local bodies, which improves their competence to actually deliver services once powers are handed over.
Financial reform
Strengthening own-revenue sources is essential to reduce dependence. This means modernising property tax systems, improving collection efficiency, and exploring alternatives such as municipal bonds for financing infrastructure. Predictable, rule-based transfers from states, in line with State Finance Commission recommendations, would give cities a stable financial footing for long-term planning.
Empowering elected representatives
Clarifying the relationship between elected Mayors and appointed commissioners, ensuring councils are not arbitrarily superseded, and constituting ward committees transparently would all help restore democratic substance to urban governance. Initiatives like the National Urban Digital Mission, launched in 2021 to create shared digital infrastructure for municipal services, point toward how technology can support better-run and more transparent cities.
The 74th Amendment remains one of the most significant reforms in the structure of Indian governance. Its promise was a network of empowered, democratic cities. Realising that promise depends less on the constitutional text and more on the willingness of states to let go of control.
What do you think? Should the Twelfth Schedule functions be made mandatory rather than illustrative, removing the discretion states currently enjoy? And given that cities are central to India’s economic future, what would genuinely motivate state governments to part with the financial and administrative control they hold over urban bodies?
References
- https://blog.lukmaanias.com/2024/10/24/strengthening-urban-local-self-governance/
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07352166.2016.1271614
- https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/municipalities-74-amendment-act-1992/
- https://secforuts.mha.gov.in/74th-amendment-and-municipalities-in-india/
- https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/report-on-municipal-finances-rbi
- https://theiashub.com/free-resources/mains-marks-booster/devolution-of-powers-and-finances-up-to-local-levels-and-challenges-therein
- https://www.dalvoy.com/en/upsc/mains/previous-years/2022/public-administration-paper-ii/urban-local-bodies-finances
- https://vajiramandravi.com/questions/the-states-in-india-seem-reluctant-to-empower-urban-local-bodies-both-functionally-as-well-as-financially/
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