The Karbi and Dimasa Kachari Struggle for Autonomy in Assam

Tucked away in the hill districts of Assam, two indigenous communities have spent decades pressing a demand that sits awkwardly between local self-rule and full statehood. The Karbis of Karbi Anglong and the Dimasa Kacharis of Dima Hasao (the former North Cachar Hills) have long argued that the autonomy granted to them on paper has never matched what they actually experience on the ground. Their struggle is not for a separate country, nor even for a separate state outside Assam, but for an “autonomous state” carved out within Assam itself. Understanding why these communities feel short-changed, and how their movement evolved through political mobilisation and armed insurgency, opens a window into the wider politics of ethnic identity in India’s Northeast.

Who are the Karbis and Dimasa Kacharis? 🔗

Before getting into the politics, it helps to know who these communities actually are. Both are recognised Scheduled Tribes with deep historical roots in the hills south of the Brahmaputra valley.

The Karbis 🔗

The Karbis are one of the major tribes of Assam, concentrated mainly in the hill district of Karbi Anglong and the newer district of West Karbi Anglong. They speak a Tibeto-Burman language and have a distinct social organisation, religious practices, and cultural traditions that set them apart from the Assamese-speaking plains population. Historically, the British administration referred to them as “Mikirs,” a name the community itself rejects as imposed from outside.

The Dimasa Kacharis 🔗

The Dimasa Kacharis are among the oldest known communities of Northeast India, with a kingdom whose history stretches across several centuries. The very name “Dimasa” carries their identity: in their language, “di” means river, “ma” means big, and “sa” means children, so the term translates roughly as “children of the big river.” Facing pressure from the Ahom kingdom, the Dimasa rulers shifted their capital over time, eventually establishing it at Maibang in present-day Dima Hasao. Today the Dimasa are concentrated in Dima Hasao, with significant populations in Karbi Anglong, Cachar, and parts of Nagaland. Their language belongs to the Tibeto-Burman family and is today considered vulnerable due to its limited everyday use.

The origins of the autonomy demand 🔗

The story of autonomy in these hills begins soon after Independence. When the administrative units of the region were first organised in 1951, the area was known as the United Mikir and North Cachar Hills. In 1952, both the Karbis and Dimasas were granted a degree of self-governance through separate District Councils under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. These councils were meant to protect tribal land, customs, and local administration from being overrun by outside influence.

The Sixth Schedule is often described as a “mini-constitution” within the Constitution. Within autonomous regions, laws passed by the state legislature or even Parliament on subjects assigned to the district council do not automatically apply unless the council itself accepts them. On paper, this is a significant grant of power. In practice, the Karbis and Dimasas came to feel that the councils were too limited to deliver real development or genuine self-rule.

A demand that predates the better-known hill movements 🔗

The demand for greater autonomy in Assam’s hill areas traces back to the 1950s, when sections of the tribal population of undivided Assam sought a separate hill state. After prolonged agitation, Meghalaya gained statehood in 1972, and the leaders of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills were given the choice to join the new state or remain within Assam. They chose to stay, persuaded by a promise from the Centre of more powers, including a special constitutional provision crafted just for them.

Article 244(A): the “state within a state” 🔗

That promise took the form of Article 244(A). This is the constitutional heart of the entire movement, and it is worth understanding clearly.

Inserted by the Twenty-second Amendment Act of 1969, Article 244(A) empowers Parliament to create an autonomous state within Assam for certain tribal areas. Crucially, it allows for that autonomous state to have its own Legislature or Council of Ministers, or both, with powers defined by law. In effect, it offers something far stronger than an autonomous council: a near-state-like body, with control over subjects including, most importantly, law and order, while still remaining part of Assam.

This is the distinction that defines the demand. The Karbis and Dimasas are not seeking a separate state outside Assam, nor a Union Territory. They want the elevation of their existing autonomous councils into a single autonomous state under Article 244(A), giving them genuine legislative and executive control while keeping Assam’s territorial integrity intact.

It is also worth noting what these districts currently have. Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao are administered through autonomous councils under the Sixth Schedule, namely the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council and the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council. The demand under Article 244(A) is essentially to upgrade this arrangement into something with real legislative teeth.

The formation of the ASDC 🔗

For decades the autonomy demand simmered without a single, unified political vehicle. That changed in the 1980s. The Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC) was formed on 17 May 1986, bringing together Karbi and Dimasa communities under a common banner to press for the implementation of Article 244(A).

What makes the ASDC interesting is its organisational character. It was set up as a mass organisation linked to the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, giving the movement a distinctly left-leaning ideological flavour rather than a purely ethnic one. Many of its early leaders were students who had themselves taken part in the wider Assam Movement before turning their energies towards the specific cause of the hill tribes. The Karbi Students Association worked alongside the ASDC from the very beginning, mobilising people through meetings, demonstrations, and sustained political pressure.

The ASDC went on to achieve real electoral success. Its leader Dr. Jayanta Rongpi represented the area in the Lok Sabha, winning as the ASDC candidate in 1991, 1996, and 1998, and the party also won control of the district councils. This was rare for a regional tribal party and gave the autonomy demand a credible voice in both Parliament and local administration.

Why the Assam Accord deepened the grievance 🔗

To understand why the movement intensified in the late 1980s, you have to look at what was happening in Assam more broadly. The Assam Movement (1979-1985), led by the All Assam Students’ Union, was a mass agitation against illegal migration that culminated in the Assam Accord of 1985, signed between the Government of India, the state government, and the leaders of the movement.

The Accord was meant to bring peace. For the hill tribes, it did the opposite. In the early phase of the agitation, communities across tribe, caste, and religion had supported the movement, but many tribal organisations later disassociated themselves, viewing the agitation as chauvinistic. The Accord, and the politics that followed it, came to be seen as centred on the interests of the Assamese-speaking majority of the Brahmaputra valley.

The AGP years 🔗

The Assam Accord gave birth to a new regional party, the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), formed by the student leaders of the agitation. The AGP swept to power in the 1985 assembly elections under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta. But its rise sharpened the anxieties of the hill communities. Groups such as the Bodos, Karbis, and Dimasas felt the Accord focused primarily on the Assamese-speaking majority and neglected the aspirations of the state’s diverse tribal populations.

This sense of being overlooked under an avowedly “Assamese” government was the spark. The ASDC, formed in 1986, channelled exactly this frustration. If the dominant political narrative in Assam was about protecting Assamese identity, the Karbis and Dimasas asked a pointed question: who would protect theirs?

From political agitation to armed insurgency 🔗

For a movement that began with elections and peaceful demonstrations, the trajectory took a darker turn. As the promised autonomy under Article 244(A) failed to materialise, frustration grew. In the 1980s and after, the demand for more power among a number of Karbi groups began to take the form of violence, and over the years it hardened into armed separatist insurgency demanding full statehood.

Various militant outfits emerged in both Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao, and the region also saw repeated bouts of ethnic violence between communities competing for land, political power, and resources. The 1995 Memorandum of Settlement, signed between the ASDC, student bodies, and the governments, tried to address the grievance by expanding the departmental powers of the autonomous councils from 10 to 30. It enhanced the councils but stopped well short of the autonomous state the movement actually wanted.

Recent peace accords 🔗

In more recent years, the government has pursued negotiated settlements with armed groups. In 2021 a peace settlement was reached with five militant groups in Karbi Anglong, promising greater autonomy and a special development package, followed by a similar agreement with the Dimasa National Liberation Army in 2023. The Karbi Anglong Peace Agreement of 2021 brought more than a thousand cadres overground and was accompanied by a substantial development package. Yet even these accords did not resolve the core demand. The implementation of Article 244(A) remains the central, unfinished political question in the region.

The case for autonomy, and the case against 🔗

The strongest argument for an autonomous state is rooted in development and self-determination. Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao have historically lagged behind on infrastructure, education, and healthcare. Supporters argue that only genuine legislative and administrative control will let these communities shape development to fit their own needs, and protect their distinct languages, customs, and land from being absorbed into a larger Assamese identity.

There are also serious counter-arguments. Critics worry that creating a new autonomous state could encourage further fragmentation in a region already crisscrossed by overlapping ethnic claims. Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao are not homogeneous; they are home to Karbi, Dimasa, Hmar, Kuki, Rengma Naga, Zeme Naga, Bodo, Garo, and other communities, and an autonomous state dominated by one or two groups could marginalise the rest. Questions also linger about whether such a unit would be administratively and financially viable on its own.

Why this movement matters 🔗

The Karbi and Dimasa Kachari struggle is a textbook case of how the politics of ethnic identity operates within India’s federal framework. It shows that constitutional promises, like Article 244(A), can sit unfulfilled for over half a century and still anchor a living political movement. It also illustrates a recurring pattern in the Northeast: a demand that begins with peaceful mobilisation, hardens into insurgency when the state fails to respond, and eventually returns to the negotiating table through peace accords, all without the underlying grievance ever being fully resolved.

For students of Indian politics, the lesson is that autonomy is not a single switch but a spectrum, running from district councils to Sixth Schedule arrangements to the still-unrealised autonomous state. Where a community sits on that spectrum, and where it wants to be, is the very substance of these long-running struggles.

What do you think? Does upgrading autonomous councils into a full autonomous state under Article 244(A) genuinely solve the problem of tribal marginalisation, or does it simply shift the same contest over identity and resources to a new and smaller political arena? And in a region as ethnically diverse as Assam’s hills, how should the rights of smaller communities be protected within any autonomous arrangement built around one or two dominant tribes?

References

1. https://www.sahapedia.org/the-dimasa-kacharis-of-cachar-district-overview
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karbi_Anglong_district
3. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-news-analysis/article-244-a-of-the-constitution
4. https://www.legacyias.com/article-244-a-its-relevance-for-assam-hill-tribes/
5. https://www.paperpublications.org/upload/book/Aspiration%20for%20an%20Ethnic%20Identity-537.pdf
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_State_Demand_Committee
7. https://www.iasgyan.in/daily-current-affairs/assam-movement
8. https://indusresearch.in/assam-accord/
9. https://www.sentinelassam.com/more-news/editorial/post-assam-accord-political-scenario-of-assam
10. https://vajiramandravi.com/upsc-daily-current-affairs/mains-articles/article-244-a-of-indian-constitution/
11. https://www.gktoday.in/article-244a-and-autonomy-issue-in-assam/