Distribution of Competence in Indian Federalism: A Detailed Overview

The Indian Constitution faced a tough balancing act in 1950. It had to hold together a vast and diverse country while still giving regions room to manage their own affairs. The answer was a carefully designed system of dividing law-making powers between the Union and the States. This division, often called the distribution of competence, decides who can legislate on what. It is one of the most important features of Indian federalism, and understanding it is key to understanding how governance actually works in the country.

What is distribution of competence in federalism? 🔗

In any federal system, power is split between a central authority and regional units. The term “competence” simply refers to the legal authority of a government to make laws on a particular subject. Distribution of competence, then, is the constitutional arrangement that allocates this authority between the two levels of government.

The distribution works along two lines. The first is territoriality, meaning the geographical area over which a legislature can make laws. Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of India, while a State legislature can make laws only for that particular State or a part of it. The second is subject specification, meaning the specific topics or subjects each level can legislate on. This second dimension is where the real complexity lies, and it is organised through a detailed scheme in the Constitution.

This whole framework comes from Articles 245 and 246 and is laid out in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Importantly, the idea was not invented from scratch. The framers borrowed heavily from the Government of India Act of 1935, which had already created three lists of subjects for the colonial administration. The Constituent Assembly renamed and refined these lists to suit an independent nation.

The three lists of the Seventh Schedule 🔗

The heart of the distribution of competence is the threefold division of subjects into three lists. Each list defines a clear zone of legislative responsibility, which helps prevent overlap and confusion.

The Union List 🔗

The Union List, also called List I, contains subjects of national importance that require uniform laws across the entire country. Only Parliament can legislate on these matters. It originally had 97 subjects, a number that has since changed slightly due to constitutional amendments.

The subjects here are those that affect the nation as a whole. They include defence, foreign affairs, railways, banking, currency, and atomic energy. The logic is straightforward. A country cannot have different defence policies or separate currencies for each State. These matters demand a single, consistent approach, so they are placed firmly under central control.

The State List 🔗

The State List, or List II, covers subjects of local or regional interest. State legislatures have the power to make laws on these matters. It originally contained 66 subjects, though this figure has also been reduced over time through amendments.

The subjects on this list deal with day-to-day administration that is best handled at the local level. Examples include public order, police, public health, agriculture, and the regulation of intoxicating liquors. The reasoning is that local administrators understand local needs better than a distant central government. A State knows its own public health challenges and policing requirements far more intimately than the Centre ever could.

The Concurrent List 🔗

The Concurrent List, or List III, is the most interesting of the three. Both Parliament and the State legislatures can make laws on subjects in this list. It originally had 47 subjects, a number that grew when items like education were moved into it by the 42nd Amendment.

This list was a clever device. Most federal constitutions do not have one. The framers included it to avoid the rigidity of a strict two-way division. Subjects placed here are those where both levels of government have a legitimate interest, such as criminal law, marriage and divorce, education, and forests. The Concurrent List allows the Centre to set a national framework while States can fill in local details.

What happens when laws conflict? 🔗

Allowing two governments to legislate on the same subject naturally creates the possibility of conflict. The Constitution anticipated this and built in clear rules to resolve such situations. The general order of priority is Union List over Concurrent List over State List.

The rule of union supremacy under Article 254 🔗

When a State law and a Union law on a Concurrent subject clash, Article 254 provides the answer. The central law prevails, and the State law becomes void to the extent of the inconsistency. This is known as the doctrine of repugnancy.

For this doctrine to apply, the conflict must be real and direct. The two laws must be so inconsistent that it becomes impossible to obey one without disobeying the other. As the courts clarified in Deep Chand v. State of UP, if both laws occupy the same field and clash, the State law is void and the central law wins.

There is, however, an important exception. Under Article 254(2), if a State passes a law on a Concurrent subject that conflicts with central law, but that State law receives the assent of the President, then the State law can prevail within that particular State. The catch is that Parliament can later override it by passing fresh legislation on the same subject.

The doctrine of pith and substance 🔗

Sometimes a law passed by one legislature appears to stray into the territory of the other. To handle this, courts apply the doctrine of pith and substance. The court examines the true nature and main object of the law. If the substance of the law falls within the competence of the legislature that passed it, then minor or incidental encroachment into another list does not make the law invalid.

This doctrine is essential because the boundaries between lists are not always perfectly clean. A State law on agriculture might touch upon a subject in the Union List, but if its core purpose is genuinely agricultural, it stands. This flexibility prevents laws from being struck down over technical overlaps.

Residuary powers and where they sit 🔗

No matter how detailed the three lists are, the framers knew they could not predict every subject the future might bring. New technologies and new social issues constantly emerge. To cover these gaps, the Constitution provides for residuary powers.

Under Article 248, Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws on any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent or State Lists. This placement of residuary powers with the Centre is significant. In some federations, such as the United States, residuary powers rest with the states. In India, they go to the Union, which reflects the strong centralising tendency built into the Constitution.

When the union can legislate on state subjects 🔗

The division of powers is not absolute. In certain extraordinary situations, Parliament can step in and make laws even on subjects in the State List. These provisions add flexibility to the system and allow the Centre to act when national interest demands it.

National interest and emergencies 🔗

Under Article 249, Parliament can legislate on a State subject if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by a two-thirds majority declaring it necessary in the national interest. The Rajya Sabha represents the States, so this acts as a federal safeguard. Such a law is valid for one year at a time.

Under Article 250, when a national emergency is in force, Parliament automatically gains the power to make laws on any State subject. These laws cease to operate six months after the emergency ends. Article 249 has been used very sparingly, which shows the Centre’s general preference for cooperative methods rather than overriding the States.

Consent of states and international treaties 🔗

Article 252 allows Parliament to legislate on a State subject if two or more State legislatures pass resolutions requesting it. Once enacted, such a law can be amended or repealed only by Parliament. Article 253 empowers Parliament to make laws to implement international treaties and agreements, even if the subject falls in the State List. The Environment (Protection) Act of 1986, passed partly to honour commitments from the Stockholm Conference, is a well-known example of this power in action.

Why this distribution matters 🔗

The careful distribution of competence achieves a delicate balance. It gives States genuine autonomy over matters that affect their people directly, while ensuring the Union can manage subjects that concern the nation as a whole. This is why scholars often describe the Indian system as quasi-federal, meaning federal in form but with a strong unitary bias.

This structure ensures efficient governance. Clear responsibilities mean both levels of government know their roles, which reduces friction and confusion. At the same time, the safeguards and exceptions provide enough flexibility to respond to emergencies, national priorities, and cooperative arrangements between States. The Sarkaria Commission, which reviewed Centre-State relations, concluded that a strong Centre remains necessary to preserve the unity and integrity of the country, while still respecting the legitimate powers of the States.

What do you think? Does placing residuary powers with the Union strike the right balance, or does it tilt Indian federalism too far towards the Centre? And in an era of growing regional aspirations, should more subjects be moved from the Union List to the Concurrent List to give States a greater voice?

References

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventh_Schedule_to_the_Constitution_of_India
2. https://padhai.ai/blogs-padhai/7th-schedule-of-indian-constitution
3. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/ttp-constitution-of-india/seventh-schedule
4. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-2600-union-and-state-legislature-distribution-of-legislative-powers.html
5. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/doctrines/constitution-of-india-doct/doctrine-of-repugnancy
6. https://testbook.com/constitutional-articles/article-254-of-indian-constitution
7. https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-repugnancy/
8. https://www.gktoday.in/article-249/
9. https://www.dalvoy.com/en/upsc/mains/previous-years/2025/law-paper-i/parliamentary-power-state-list-legislation
10. https://www.ourlegalworld.com/doctrine-of-repugnancy-in-the-indian-constitution/