The Supreme Court of India: Composition, Appointments, and Immunities

The Supreme Court of India sits at the very top of the country’s judicial pyramid. Every important question about the Constitution, fundamental rights, and the balance of power between institutions eventually reaches its courtrooms in New Delhi. But who exactly are the people who decide these cases? How do they get there, how long do they stay, and what protections shield them from pressure? Understanding the composition, appointment process, and the immunities that keep these judges independent is the first step to understanding how justice works at the highest level.

The composition of the Supreme Court 🔗

When the Court was established in 1950, the Constitution envisioned a fairly small body: a Chief Justice and not more than seven other judges. Article 124(1) deliberately left room for growth, allowing Parliament to prescribe a larger number whenever the workload demanded it. That is exactly what has happened over the decades.

The strength of the Court has been raised repeatedly through amendments to the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956. It went from 8 to 14, then 18, then 26, then 31, and was most recently increased in 2019 to its present sanctioned strength of 34 judges, comprising the Chief Justice of India and 33 other judges. In late 2025, the Union Cabinet approved a proposal to raise the number of judges (excluding the CJI) from 33 to 37, which would take the total to 38 once Parliament passes it. The driving reason behind every such increase has been the same: a mounting backlog of cases and the need for speedier justice.

Who can become a Supreme Court judge? 🔗

Not everyone can be considered for the bench. Article 124(3) lays down clear eligibility criteria. A candidate must be a citizen of India and must satisfy at least one of three qualifications. They must have served as a judge of a High Court (or two or more such courts in succession) for at least five years, or have been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years, or be, in the President’s opinion, a distinguished jurist.

The “distinguished jurist” route is interesting because it theoretically opens the door to eminent legal scholars and academics who never served as judges or practising advocates. In practice, though, this provision has never been used. Every appointment so far has come from the ranks of sitting judges or experienced advocates.

How judges are appointed: the Collegium system 🔗

The text of the Constitution says that judges are appointed by the President “after consultation” with the Chief Justice and other judges. On paper, this sounds like a simple executive function. In reality, the appointment process is one of the most debated features of the Indian judiciary, because of a system that exists nowhere else in the world: the Collegium.

The Collegium is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. It evolved entirely through three landmark Supreme Court judgments, collectively known as the Three Judges Cases. The central question in all three was deceptively simple: does the word “consultation” in Article 124 mean the executive must merely seek the judiciary’s opinion, or must it actually follow that opinion?

The Three Judges Cases 🔗

In the First Judges Case (1981), the Court held that “consultation” did not mean “concurrence.” This gave the executive the upper hand in appointments. That position lasted about twelve years.

In the Second Judges Case (1993), the Court reversed itself. It ruled that “consultation” effectively meant “concurrence,” making the Chief Justice’s recommendation binding on the government and shifting primacy firmly to the judiciary.

In the Third Judges Case (1998), the Court clarified how this judicial opinion should be formed. It held that the CJI must consult a body of senior judges before recommending names. This is what we now call the Collegium: the Chief Justice of India along with the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. For High Court appointments, a smaller collegium of the High Court’s Chief Justice and two senior-most judges is involved.

In simple terms, the Collegium recommends names, the government can raise objections or seek clarifications, but if the Collegium reiterates the same name, the government is bound to appoint that person. This is why the Supreme Court of India is sometimes described as the only court in the world that effectively appoints itself.

The NJAC episode 🔗

Many critics, including several governments, have argued that the Collegium is opaque and lacks accountability. In 2014, Parliament passed the 99th Constitutional Amendment and created the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), a body that would have included members of the judiciary, the executive, and eminent persons. The aim was to make appointments more participatory.

The reform was short-lived. In 2015, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court struck down the NJAC as unconstitutional, holding that it threatened the independence of the judiciary, which forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure. The Collegium system was restored and continues to operate today. The debate over how best to appoint judges, however, is far from settled.

Tenure: how long does a judge serve? 🔗

Supreme Court judges do not serve fixed terms. Instead, they hold office until they attain the age of 65 years, as laid down in Article 124(2). This means the length of any judge’s tenure depends entirely on how old they are when appointed. Because most judges reach the Supreme Court late in their careers, tenures tend to be short. Studies have found that the average tenure of a Supreme Court judge is just over five years.

This short-tenure pattern has real consequences. It means the composition of the Court changes frequently, and the office of Chief Justice in particular often rotates after only a year or two. By convention, the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court is appointed as the next Chief Justice, though this convention has been broken on rare occasions in the past.

Removal: the near-impossible task of impeachment 🔗

Once appointed, a Supreme Court judge enjoys remarkable security of tenure. A judge cannot be dismissed at the government’s will. The only way to remove one is through the rigorous process set out in Article 124(4), commonly called impeachment, although the Constitution itself never uses that word.

A judge can be removed only on two grounds: proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Neither term is defined in the Constitution. Through judicial interpretation, misbehaviour has come to include corruption, wilful misconduct, lack of integrity, and conduct that brings disrepute to the office. Incapacity refers to a physical or mental condition that prevents a judge from performing their duties.

The removal procedure step by step 🔗

The detailed process is governed by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. It involves several demanding stages:

Initiating the motion. A removal motion can begin in either House of Parliament. It must be signed by at least 100 members in the Lok Sabha or at least 50 members in the Rajya Sabha. The Speaker or the Chairman then has the discretion to admit or reject the motion.

The inquiry committee. If the motion is admitted, a three-member committee is constituted to investigate the charges. It comprises a Supreme Court judge, the Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist. This committee functions much like a trial court, framing charges, examining evidence, and giving the judge a chance to defend themselves.

The parliamentary vote. Only if the committee finds the judge guilty does the motion go to a vote. To succeed, it must be passed in both Houses in the same session by a special majority, meaning a majority of the total membership of each House and a majority of at least two-thirds of the members present and voting.

The President’s order. Once both Houses pass the motion, an address is presented to the President, who then issues the order removing the judge.

No judge of the Supreme Court has ever actually been removed through this process. The closest case was that of Justice V. Ramaswami in the early 1990s, where the inquiry committee found him guilty but the motion failed in the Lok Sabha because the required majority was not reached. The sheer difficulty of impeachment is deliberate. It ensures that judges cannot be threatened with removal simply for delivering inconvenient judgments.

The pillars of judicial independence 🔗

The whole point of these elaborate appointment and removal rules is to protect judicial independence. A judge who fears for their job, salary, or reputation cannot deliver impartial justice. The Constitution therefore builds several walls of protection around the judiciary.

Financial security 🔗

Under Article 125, the salaries and allowances of judges are fixed by Parliament, and crucially, they cannot be varied to a judge’s disadvantage after appointment (except during a financial emergency). The salaries are also charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, which means they are not subject to the annual vote of Parliament. This removes the possibility of the legislature using financial pressure to influence judges. As of recent revisions, the Chief Justice draws a monthly salary of ₹2,80,000 and other judges draw ₹2,50,000, apart from allowances and benefits.

Immunity from criticism and the contempt power 🔗

Two further protections shield the dignity of the office. First, under Article 121, the conduct of a Supreme Court judge in the discharge of their duties cannot be discussed in Parliament or any State Legislature, except when an impeachment motion is being considered. This prevents legislators from openly attacking sitting judges.

Second, Article 129 makes the Supreme Court a court of record and gives it the power to punish for contempt of itself. This power extends not just to the Supreme Court but to all courts subordinate to it. The idea is to protect the authority and honour of the judiciary so that its orders are respected and its functioning is not undermined by baseless attacks. At the same time, fair and reasonable criticism of judgments is generally permitted, so this power is not meant to silence all comment.

Other safeguards 🔗

Independence is reinforced in smaller ways too. A retired Supreme Court judge is barred under Article 124(7) from practising in any court in India, which removes the temptation to favour potential future clients. The Chief Justice can appoint the Court’s officers and staff without executive interference, and the conduct of judges is protected from ordinary scrutiny. Together, these provisions create an institution designed to stand apart from political pressure.

Why all of this matters 🔗

The composition, appointment, and immunities of the Supreme Court are not dry technicalities. They directly shape the Court’s most important role: interpreting the Constitution and safeguarding fundamental rights. When the Court strikes down an unconstitutional law, protects a citizen’s freedoms, or checks the misuse of power, it can only do so because its judges are insulated from fear and favour. The rules around who sits on the bench, how they get there, and how securely they hold their office are precisely what give their judgments authority and credibility.

At the same time, these arrangements remain a work in progress. The tension between judicial independence and judicial accountability, most visible in the long-running debate over the Collegium, shows that the system is constantly being questioned and refined. A judiciary that is too insulated risks being unaccountable, while one that is too exposed risks losing its impartiality. Finding the right balance is an ongoing challenge for any constitutional democracy.

What do you think? Does the Collegium system strike the right balance between keeping the judiciary independent and making it accountable, or is a reformed appointment process necessary? And given that no Supreme Court judge has ever been successfully removed, is the impeachment process a genuine safeguard or simply too difficult to ever work in practice?

References

1. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-124-establishment-and-constitution-of-supreme-court/
2. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1812352&reg=3&lang=2
3. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/cabinet-approves-increase-in-the-judge-strength-of-the-supreme-court-of-india-by-four-to-37-from-33/
4. https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/whos-who/judges-supreme-court
5. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/collegium-system-of-judicial-appointments-in-india
6. https://vajiramandravi.com/upsc-exam/collegium-system-and-appointments/
7. https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/article-124-of-indian-constitution/
8. https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/explainer-how-a-sitting-judge-can-be-removed-from-office-398
9. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1539/2/A1968-51.pdf
10. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-125-salaries-etc-of-judges/
11. https://vajiramandravi.com/upsc-exam/supreme-court-of-india/