The Fundamental Rights we read about in Part III of the Constitution did not appear overnight in 1950. They were the product of nearly five decades of demands, debates, and constitutional experiments by Indian leaders who wanted guarantees against arbitrary state power. Long before independence, nationalists understood that political freedom alone would mean little without legal protection for individual liberty. Tracing this evolution helps explain why our rights are structured the way they are today.
Table of Contents
- Why the demand for rights began
- The Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925
- The Nehru Report, 1928
- What the Nehru Report demanded
- The Karachi Resolution, 1931
- The Sapru Report, 1945
- The justiciable and non-justiciable distinction
- The Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights
- How the precedents came together
- The lasting significance of this evolution
Why the demand for rights began
The idea of constitutionally protected rights took root because Indians under colonial rule wanted the same legal protections that British citizens enjoyed. The constitutional historian Granville Austin observed that this concept was implicit in the very formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, when Indians sought the rights and privileges available to the British both in India and in England.
The earliest documented attempt came through the Constitution of India Bill of 1895, often called the Swaraj Bill. Drafted under influences associated with Bal Gangadhar Tilak, it sought rights such as freedom of speech, the right to franchise, and a degree of privacy. While the bill never had legal force, it set a precedent: Indians could draft their own vision of guaranteed liberties. Between 1917 and 1919, the Congress passed several resolutions demanding that the British grant such rights, keeping the issue alive in the political conversation.
The Commonwealth of India Bill, 1925
The first systematic attempt to demand constitutional protection for individual liberties came with the Commonwealth of India Bill of 1925. Annie Besant played a central role in its preparation, and it was introduced in the British Parliament by George Lansbury, a leading member of the Labour Party, in December 1925.
The bill is significant for its dedicated section on fundamental rights. It demanded protections including elementary education, freedom of expression, gender equality, and non-discrimination, although most of these rights were subject to restrictions. Scholars typically count seven fundamental rights in the bill: individual liberty, security of dwelling and property, freedom of conscience, free expression of opinion, freedom of assembly, non-discrimination on the ground of sex, and free elementary education along with the free use of public spaces.
The bill never advanced beyond its first reading because the Labour Party lost the elections. Yet its influence was substantial. As scholars have noted, several of its provisions were repeated almost verbatim in the Nehru Report of 1928, making it a genuine ancestor of later constitutional thinking.
The Nehru Report, 1928
The next major milestone arrived as a direct challenge to the British. In 1927, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, taunted Indian leaders to prove they could draft a constitution themselves. When the all-British Simon Commission was appointed without a single Indian member, the insult sharpened the resolve of the nationalist movement.
In response, an all-party committee chaired by Motilal Nehru produced its report in August 1928. Unlike the later Government of India Act of 1935, the Nehru Report contained a clear Bill of Rights. The committee was explicit about its priorities, stating that the first concern of the people should be to have their fundamental rights guaranteed in a manner that would not permit their withdrawal under any circumstances.
What the Nehru Report demanded
Clause 4 of the report set out nineteen fundamental rights. These included equal rights for women, the right to form unions, and universal adult suffrage, along with full protection for the cultural and religious interests of minorities. The report drew inspiration from the American Bill of Rights, which left a deep impression on Indian leaders thinking about how to constrain a future government.
The report was not adopted, partly because of communal differences over the question of representation, and it was discarded by the Simon Commission. Even so, it established the principle that civil and political rights should be comprehensive, enforceable, and beyond easy removal by the state.
The Karachi Resolution, 1931
A few years later, the Congress took a decisive step at its Karachi session in March 1931, presided over by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. The session adopted two linked resolutions, one on Fundamental Rights and another on the National Economic Programme, together known as the Karachi Resolution. The text was drafted primarily by Jawaharlal Nehru with revisions by Mahatma Gandhi.
The resolution outlined around twenty rights and principles. Beyond the familiar civil liberties of speech, press, assembly, and religion, it added a strong socio-economic dimension: protections for workers, a living wage, limited working hours, and the right of labour to form unions, alongside free primary education and provisions for farmers and peasants. This was a deliberate move to show ordinary Indians what Swaraj would mean for them in practical terms. The opening logic was direct: political freedom had to include real economic freedom for the masses.
The socio-economic content of the Karachi Resolution proved especially important. It later shaped the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution, foreshadowing the eventual split between enforceable rights and guiding principles.
The Sapru Report, 1945
By the mid-1940s, the focus shifted from demanding rights to deciding how they should be structured. The Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee, published in 1945, were prepared by a non-party committee chaired by the eminent lawyer Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. It was appointed by the Non-Party Conference and represented a range of interests outside the major parties.
Like earlier documents, the Sapru Report contained a section on fundamental rights covering freedom of speech, freedom of the press, religious freedom, and equality. Its real contribution, however, lay elsewhere.
The justiciable and non-justiciable distinction
The Sapru Committee was the first to formally raise the question of dividing rights into justiciable and non-justiciable categories. Justiciable rights are those individuals can claim immediately and courts can enforce, such as freedom of speech and protection against arbitrary arrest. Non-justiciable rights represent policy directives that guide the state but cannot be enforced through litigation.
The committee observed that rights should be divided so that breaches of some may be subject to judicial pronouncement while breaches of others may be remedied without going to the courts. Interestingly, the committee discussed this distinction in its explanatory sections but did not put forward a firm recommendation; instead, it alerted future drafters to pay close attention to the question. This single idea had enormous consequences. It directly influenced the eventual split between Fundamental Rights in Part III and the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of our Constitution.
The Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights
The final stage of this journey unfolded inside the Constituent Assembly. On 24 January 1947, the Assembly appointed an Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities, and Tribal and Excluded Areas, chaired by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. This committee handled the rights of citizens, minorities, and people in tribal and excluded areas.
Within this structure sat the crucial Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee, headed by J.B. Kripalani. This sub-committee did the detailed work of debating, drafting, and refining the specific rights that would eventually appear in the Constitution. It is here that the long history of demands was finally translated into precise legal language. The reports produced by these committees were then handed to the Drafting Committee under Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, whose task was to give the proposals a workable legal framework.
How the precedents came together
The Constitution makers borrowed deliberately from each historical document. From the Commonwealth of India Bill, they carried forward the principle of equality before the law. From the Nehru Report, they adopted a comprehensive approach to civil and political rights. From the Sapru Report, they took the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable rights, which became the dividing line between Part III and Part IV.
The framers also added uniquely Indian concerns. The right to equality was designed to confront the historical inequalities of the caste system, and the right to freedom of religion was crafted to protect a deeply diverse society while guarding against communal conflict. The Constitution further allowed for reasonable restrictions, recognising that no right could be absolute in a complex society.
The lasting significance of this evolution
The path from the 1895 Swaraj Bill to the 1950 Constitution reveals an important truth: rights were not a gift handed down from above but a hard-won achievement built through sustained political effort. Each document added something durable. The early bills established that rights could be demanded and drafted. The Nehru Report made them comprehensive. The Karachi Resolution gave them a socio-economic conscience. The Sapru Report introduced the structural distinction that defines our constitutional design. And the Kripalani sub-committee turned all of this into enforceable text.
This layered history also explains why Fundamental Rights occupy such a protected place. The framers had seen decades of arbitrary colonial power, and they were determined that a free state, even one led by Indians, should remain bound by constitutional limits. Understanding these origins gives the rights in Part III a depth that the bare articles alone cannot convey.
What do you think? Was the decision to separate justiciable Fundamental Rights from non-justiciable Directive Principles a wise compromise, or did it weaken the socio-economic promises made in documents like the Karachi Resolution? And if the framers were drafting these rights today, which historical demand do you think deserves the strongest protection?
References
- https://www.gktoday.in/fundamental-rights-first-demand-advisory-committee-and-sapru-committee/
- https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical-constitution/the-commonwealth-of-india-bill-national-convention-india-1925/
- https://aishwaryasandeep.wordpress.com/2022/02/28/the-nehru-committee-report-1928/
- https://www.insightsonindia.com/modern-indian-history/national-movement-1919-1939/nehru-report-1928/
- https://compass.rauias.com/modern-history/karachi-session1931/
- https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/fundamental-rights-and-directive-state-principles-administrative-law-essay.php
- https://www.insightsonindia.com/polity/indian-constitution/significant-provisions/dpsps/
- https://prepp.in/news/e-492-committees-of-constituent-assembly-making-of-the-indian-constitution-indian-polity-upsc-notes
- https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical-constitution/sapru-committee-report-sir-tej-bahadur-sapru-1945/
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