Indian Federalism: Constitutional Framework and Dynamics

India describes itself in a curious way. The very first article of its Constitution calls the country a “Union of States,” yet the system that operates beneath that phrase is unmistakably federal. Power is split between a central government and the states, a written Constitution governs both, and the Supreme Court stands ready to settle their quarrels. This blend of unity and division is what makes the federal structure here so distinctive. Understanding how it works means looking closely at the constitutional design that came into force in 1950 and the political dynamics that keep reshaping it.

Why India is called a “Union of States” 🔗

The Constitution deliberately avoids the word “federation.” Article 1 instead describes India as a “Union of States,” and this choice was not accidental. The Constituent Assembly wanted to signal that the states did not voluntarily come together and could not later break away. The Union is indestructible, and no state holds the right to secede.

This is the central difference from a classic federation like the United States, where the constituent units originally agreed to join and retain a theoretical claim to sovereignty. Here the states cannot leave the union under any circumstances, which firmly anchors national unity above regional autonomy.

The quasi-federal label 🔗

Because the system mixes federal and unitary features, scholars rarely call it purely federal. The constitutional scholar K.C. Wheare famously described it as “quasi-federal,” meaning an intermediate form between a unitary state and a true federation. The Supreme Court has used similar language, calling the structure federal but with a strong bias towards the Centre.

Several features explain this leaning. There is a single Constitution for both the Union and the states, a single citizenship for all citizens, and an integrated judiciary in which the Supreme Court sits at the apex of a single hierarchy that interprets both central and state law. During an emergency, the Centre can take near-total control of state affairs. These traits would be unusual in a textbook federation, which is why the “quasi” prefix sticks.

The Seventh Schedule and the division of powers 🔗

The heart of the federal arrangement lies in how legislative powers are divided. The Seventh Schedule, read with Article 246, distributes subjects into three lists: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. This idea of a threefold division was not invented in 1950. It was first introduced by the Government of India Act of 1935 and then adapted for an independent, sovereign republic.

The three lists explained 🔗

Each list has a clear purpose, and together they reduce overlap and confusion.

Union List: This contains subjects of national importance on which only Parliament can make laws. It covers matters like defence, foreign affairs, atomic energy, banking, and railways, the areas where uniform national policy is essential.

State List: This holds subjects of regional and local significance on which state legislatures normally have exclusive authority. Typical State List items include police, public order, public health, agriculture, and local government, the everyday concerns of governance closest to citizens.

Concurrent List: This includes subjects on which both Parliament and the state legislatures can legislate. Education, criminal law, and marriage fall here, and Union law prevails if there is a conflict. The Concurrent List was designed as a tool for shared governance, letting both levels respond to issues that cross boundaries.

How conflicts are resolved 🔗

The lists are arranged in a clear order of priority. If the Union List overlaps with the Concurrent List, the Union List prevails, and if the State List overlaps with the Concurrent List, the Concurrent List prevails. There is one notable exception. When a state law on a Concurrent subject receives Presidential assent, it can operate within that state, although Parliament retains the power to override it later.

The Centre’s reach extends even further in special situations. Parliament can legislate on State List subjects when the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution under Article 249, during a national emergency, during President’s Rule, when two or more states request it, or to implement an international treaty. These provisions give the central government considerable flexibility, which is one more reason the system tilts towards the Centre.

The bicameral Parliament and the place of states 🔗

A federal system needs the states to have a voice at the national level, and the structure of Parliament provides this through two distinct chambers.

Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha 🔗

The Lok Sabha represents the people directly. Its members are elected from constituencies based on population, so it reflects the will of citizens across the country. The Rajya Sabha, by contrast, is the chamber meant to represent the states in the federal scheme.

One subtle but important detail sets this design apart from some other federations. The states do not have equal representation in the Rajya Sabha, because more populous states send more representatives than smaller ones. In the United States, every state sends exactly two senators regardless of size. The Indian approach links state representation to population, which again softens the purely federal character of the upper house while still giving states a formal channel into national lawmaking.

The Supreme Court as the federal umpire 🔗

When the Centre and a state disagree, or when states clash with one another, the dispute needs a neutral forum. The Constitution assigns this role to the Supreme Court.

Original jurisdiction under Article 131 🔗

The Supreme Court holds a special power here. Under Article 131, it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between the Government of India and the states, or between two or more states. “Original” means the case can be heard there first rather than on appeal, and “exclusive” means no other court can hear it. This makes the Court the designated umpire of the federation.

There are limits, however. The dispute must involve a question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends, which excludes purely political quarrels, and a private citizen cannot bring a Centre-state matter under this article. The very first suit under this jurisdiction came from West Bengal, which challenged a central law concerning rights in coal-bearing areas.

The article remains lively today. Kerala used Article 131 in 2020 to challenge the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction rather than the route ordinary citizens use under Article 32. The courts also frequently affirm the federal idea itself. In the landmark S.R. Bommai case of 1994, a nine-judge bench held that federalism forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution, placing it beyond the reach of ordinary amendment.

From dual to cooperative federalism 🔗

The static text of the Constitution tells only part of the story. The relationship between the Centre and the states is a living, shifting one, and the dominant theme in recent decades has been cooperative federalism.

Institutions that drive cooperation 🔗

Cooperative federalism is the idea that both levels of government collaborate to achieve shared national goals while respecting each other’s space. Several mechanisms operationalise this, including the Inter-State Council created under Article 263 to coordinate policy and resolve disputes.

The most cited modern example is the Goods and Services Tax. The GST, introduced in 2017, replaced a tangle of state-level taxes with a unified system, and the GST Council brought representatives from the Union and all states together to set rates and resolve concerns. It is a rare instance of a constitutionally embedded body where both levels jointly make fiscal decisions.

Another key body is NITI Aayog. It replaced the Planning Commission on 1 January 2015 and was designed as a platform to involve states more directly in national planning. Earlier review bodies pointed in the same direction. The Sarkaria Commission of 1988 and the later Punchhi Commission of 2010 both recommended strengthening Centre-state coordination and reactivating institutions like the Inter-State Council.

The friction beneath the surface 🔗

Cooperation is the goal, but tension is the reality. Fiscal disputes are common, and the GST itself has exposed fault lines. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Union’s delay in disbursing GST compensation to the states triggered serious federal friction, reminding everyone that shared institutions do not erase competing interests.

There is also a steady debate about whether the Seventh Schedule needs updating. Critics argue that increasing centralisation has narrowed state autonomy, prompting calls to re-evaluate the lists for more balanced federalism. New challenges like digital technology and climate change do not fit neatly into a framework largely shaped in the 1930s and 1940s, which keeps the question of revision alive.

Why this design endures 🔗

The genius of the arrangement lies in its flexibility. A rigid federation might have fractured under the strain of India’s enormous diversity, while a fully unitary state might have suppressed regional identities and aspirations. The quasi-federal model strikes a deliberate balance, granting states real authority over their own affairs while keeping enough power at the Centre to hold the country together. The clear division of subjects, the bicameral Parliament, and the judicial umpire all work together to manage this balance, even when politics tests it.

The system continues to evolve through court rulings, commission reports, and new institutions. What stays constant is the underlying logic set in 1950: unity is non-negotiable, but governance is shared.

What do you think? If you were redesigning the Seventh Schedule today, which subjects would you shift between the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists to better reflect modern challenges? And do you believe the strong central tilt of the Constitution has helped or hindered the goal of genuine cooperation between the Centre and the states?

References

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